extensive analysis in North Carolina

1997Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the “plaintiffs’ right to freedom of religion, as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, was violated by the trial court’s extensive inquiry into plaintiffs’ religion,” Petersen, 337 N.C. at 399-400 , 445 S.E.2d at 902 , and the court remanded the case “ ‘for proceedings free from unwarranted religious inquisition into the beliefs of the parties’ ”, id. (quoting Petersen, 111 N.C.

1994The court found that plaintiffs’ right to freedom of religion, as guar *400 anteed by the federal and state constitutions, was violated by the trial court’s extensive inquiry into plaintiffs’ religion and remanded “for proceedings free from unwarranted religious inquisition into the beliefs of the parties.” Id. at 725 , 433 S.E.2d at 778 .

2009The plaintiffs in Tolson , a group of North Carolina counties, cities and towns, argued inter alia that Executive Order 19 violated our constitution because it took "funds allocated for local governments and [used] them for other purposes that the General Assembly did not authorize." Tolson, 169 N.C.App. at 639 , 610 S.E.2d at 446 .

2009The plaintiffs in Tolson , a group of North Carolina counties, cities and towns, argued inter alia that Executive Order 19 violated our constitution because it took "funds allocated for local governments and [used] them for other purposes that the General Assembly did not authorize." Tolson, 169 N.C.App. at 639 , 610 S.E.2d at 446 .

1999We need not engage in an extensive analysis of defendants’ duty to Elizabeth or any potential breach of that duty, even in light of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998), to retroactively abolish the common law distinctions between invitees and licensees, because even if defendants were negligent, Elizabeth was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. “[T]he law imposes upon a person the duty to exercise ordinary care to protect himself from injury and to avoid a known danger; and . . . where there is such knowledge and there is an

1999We need not engage in an extensive analysis of defendants’ duty to Elizabeth or any potential breach of that duty, even in light of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 , 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998), to retroactively abolish the common law distinctions between invitees and licensees, because even if defendants were negligent, Elizabeth was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. “[T]he law imposes upon a person the duty to exercise ordinary care to protect himself from injury and to avoid a known danger; and . . . where there is such knowledge and there is an

1999App. 115, 122 , 284 S.E.2d 702, 706-07 (1981), disc. review denied, 305 N.C. 300 , 290 S.E.2d 702 (1982).

1999App. 115, 122 , 284 S.E.2d 702, 706-07 (1981), disc. review denied, 305 N.C. 300 , 290 S.E.2d 702 (1982).

1999Virmani, 127 N.C.

1997Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the “plaintiffs’ right to freedom of religion, as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, was violated by the trial court’s extensive inquiry into plaintiffs’ religion,” Petersen, 337 N.C. at 399-400 , 445 S.E.2d at 902 , and the court remanded the case “ ‘for proceedings free from unwarranted religious inquisition into the beliefs of the parties’ ”, id. (quoting Petersen, 111 N.C.

1997Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the “plaintiffs’ right to freedom of religion, as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, was violated by the trial court’s extensive inquiry into plaintiffs’ religion,” Petersen, 337 N.C. at 399-400 , 445 S.E.2d at 902 , and the court remanded the case “ ‘for proceedings free from unwarranted religious inquisition into the beliefs of the parties’ ”, id. (quoting Petersen, 111 N.C.

1989One such case cited in Whittington, State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293 , 283 S.E.2d 719 (1981), stated in footnote 1, the following: We perceive that the Legislature intended to make implicit in G.S. 14-27.2 a matter of ordinary common sense: that the use of a deadly weapon, in any manner, in the course of a rape offense, always has some tendency to assist, if not entirely enable, the perpetrator to accomplish his evil design upon the victim, who is usually unarmed.

1989One such case cited in Whittington, State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293 , 283 S.E.2d 719 (1981), stated in footnote 1, the following: We perceive that the Legislature intended to make implicit in G.S. 14-27.2 a matter of ordinary common sense: that the use of a deadly weapon, in any manner, in the course of a rape offense, always has some tendency to assist, if not entirely enable, the perpetrator to accomplish his evil design upon the victim, who is usually unarmed.

1933In Mershon v. Morris, 148 N. C., 48 , the Court, after saying that the ancient rule that a corpora *290 tion could act only by its corporate seal has been greatly relaxed in later times, if, indeed, not wholly abrogated, approved the following-quotation ' from 10 Cyc., 1003: “Excluding the operation of express statutes, a very extensive principle of the law of corporations, applicable to every kind of written contract executed ostensibly by a corporation and to every kind of act done by its officers and agents professedly in its behalf, is that, when the officer or agent is the appropriate off