extensive analysis in Alabama

1999In this case, the trial court engaged in an extensive analysis, as required by Hammond v. City of Gadsden , 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989), but it failed to determine how much of the award made by the general verdict is compensatory damages and how much of the award is punitive damages.

1999In this case, the trial court engaged in an extensive analysis, as required by Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), but it failed to determine how much of the award made by the general verdict is compensatory damages and how much of the award is punitive damages.

1997Judge Patterson, with the assistance of a strong and well-reasoned dissent of Justice Maddox in Ex parte King, 707 So.2d 657 (Ala.1997), has presented this court with an opportunity to rectify the law in an area in which the ends of justice are thwarted.

1997Judge Patterson, with the assistance of a strong and well-reasoned dissent of Justice Maddox in Ex parte King, 707 So.2d 657 (Ala.1997), has presented this court with an opportunity to rectify the law in an area in which the ends of justice are thwarted.

1984While recognizing that all of the policies underlying the rationales of other courts may not be applicable to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, this court adopted a `basic continuity of enterprise' test regarding the issue of transferee liability derived from Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. , 397 Mich. 406 , 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976), which contains an extensive analysis of the issues involved.

1984While recognizing that all of the policies underlying the rationales of other courts may not be applicable to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, this court adopted a `basic continuity of enterprise' test regarding the issue of transferee liability derived from Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. , 397 Mich. 406 , 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976), which contains an extensive analysis of the issues involved.

2025However, I encourage parties in future cases to fully brief these questions. 5In reaching this conclusion, the main opinion provides an extensive analysis of this issue under both Lujan and Express Enterprises, Inc. v. Waites, 979 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 2007), the case on which the circuit court relied in concluding that the Board lacked standing to bring its lawsuit against the City.

2014See also Gamble v. State, 791 So.2d 409 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Hamilton v. State, 680 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Riddle v. State, 661 So.2d 274 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); and Hayes v. State, 647 So.2d 11 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).

2014See also Gamble v. State, 791 So.2d 409 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Hamilton v. State, 680 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Riddle v. State, 661 So.2d 274 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); and Hayes v. State, 647 So.2d 11 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).

2014See also Gamble v. State, 791 So.2d 409 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Hamilton v. State, 680 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Riddle v. State, 661 So.2d 274 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); and Hayes v. State, 647 So.2d 11 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).

2014See also Gamble v. State, 791 So.2d 409 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); Clemons v. State, 720 So.2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Hamilton v. State, 680 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1996); Riddle v. State, 661 So.2d 274 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); and Hayes v. State, 647 So.2d 11 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).

2009On the other hand, a major metropolis with a sprawling police jurisdiction whose population has been burgeoning in recent years and includes dozens of new residential subdivisions and hundreds, if not thousands, of businesses may not be able to estimate the cost of the services it will be called upon to render in the police jurisdiction without a more extensive analysis.” 37 So.3d at 144 .

2006"Similar to the extensive inquiry required in Compass Bank [v. Snow , 823 So.2d 667 (Ala. 2001),] the necessity of conducting such a detailed inquiry into more than 60,000 transactions among numerous class members renders the requirement of predominance impossible.

2001Id. at 793 .

2000That may be, because we can find no case in which an evidentiary hearing was not held to establish the witness's unavailability and whether the movant had made a goodfaith effort to procure the witness's presence. [2] We refer the trial court to Johnson v. State, 623 So.2d 444 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), in which the judge had held an extensive hearing before it determined that the witness was unavailable.

1999In this case, the trial court engaged in an extensive analysis, as required by Hammond v. City of Gadsden , 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989), but it failed to determine how much of the award made by the general verdict is compensatory damages and how much of the award is punitive damages.

1999In this case, the trial court engaged in an extensive analysis, as required by Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), but it failed to determine how much of the award made by the general verdict is compensatory damages and how much of the award is punitive damages.

1999This analysis is consistent with the traditional bias against predispute agreements to arbitrate reflected in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 , 74 S.Ct. 182 , 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953).

1999This analysis is consistent with the traditional bias against predispute agreements to arbitrate reflected in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 , 74 S.Ct. 182 , 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953).

1998Land & Associates, 562 So.2d at 149 .

1994Indeed, the Court expressly noted *581 certain "exceptions to the general rule" in which the legislature was permitted to alter the character of the fact-finding tribunal, despite the fact that in each case a trial by jury was provided by statute in 1901. 292 Ala. at 270 n. 2, 292 So.2d at 653 n. 2.

1994Indeed, the Court expressly noted *581 certain "exceptions to the general rule" in which the legislature was permitted to alter the character of the fact-finding tribunal, despite the fact that in each case a trial by jury was provided by statute in 1901. 292 Ala. at 270 n. 2, 292 So.2d at 653 n. 2.

1990The law requires a more extensive hearing than is indicated here to determine whether a settlement is in the best interest of the minor. "[A] judgment entered on a compromise of an infant's claim is erroneous, and may be set aside where the court has made no examination or investigation of the facts to determine whether the compromise is for the best interest of the infant." Abernathy, supra , at 1209, quoting 42 Am.Jur.2d Infants § 47 (1978).

1990The law requires a more extensive hearing than is indicated here to determine whether a settlement is in the best interest of the minor. "[A] judgment entered on a compromise of an infant's claim is erroneous, and may be set aside where the court has made no examination or investigation of the facts to determine whether the compromise is for the best interest of the infant." Abernathy, supra, at 1209 , quoting 42 Am.Jur.2d Infants § 47 (1978).

1985Co. , 467 So.2d 244 (Ala. 1985), this Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the cause-of-action element of res judicata.

1977As in Jacobs , supra, Judge Hocklander, the trial judge, conducted an extensive hearing, as required by Title 15, Section 342, Subsections (8) and (9), Code of Alabama 1940, as amended 1975, as to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this cause.