47 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1935–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Edgewood Independent School District v. Menogreen2 sentences2002A consistent theme of the court’s extensive analysis is that the relevant measuring stick for the system is the accredited education, which the court equated with the constitutional term a “general diffusion of knowledge.” See id. at 730 (noting that in the legislation authorizing the current school financing scheme, the “Legislature equates the provision of a ‘general diffusion of knowledge’ with the provision of an accredited education”); see also id. at 731 n. 10 (stating that “accreditation standards ... [are] the legislatively defined level of efficiency that achieves a general diffusion 2002A consistent theme of the court’s extensive analysis is that the relevant measuring stick for the system is the accredited education, which the court equated with the constitutional term a “general diffusion of knowledge.” See id. at 730 (noting that in the legislation authorizing the current school financing scheme, the “Legislature equates the provision of a ‘general diffusion of knowledge’ with the provision of an accredited education”); see also id. at 731 n. 10 (stating that “accreditation standards ... [are] the legislatively defined level of efficiency that achieves a general diffusion | 4 | 4 |
Motorola, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2003An Arizona court of appeals, after conducting an extensive analysis of the title-vesting provisions, concluded that “after examining both types of contracts, we conclude that because title passed, the items were sold and therefore were not subject to the use tax.” Motorola, Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 196 Ariz. 137 , 993 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Ct.App.1999). 7 The Comptroller argues that the above cases “are of limited value because each turned on the statute and precedent of that state.” Although arguing that this case is solely a matter of Texas state law, the Comptroller further contends tha 2003An Arizona court of appeals, after conducting an extensive analysis of the title-vesting provisions, concluded that “after examining both types of contracts, we conclude that because title passed, the items were sold and therefore were not subject to the use tax.” Motorola, Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 196 Ariz. 137 , 993 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Ct.App.1999). 7 The Comptroller argues that the above cases “are of limited value because each turned on the statute and precedent of that state.” Although arguing that this case is solely a matter of Texas state law, the Comptroller further contends tha | 3 | 3 |
Robison v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2012See Robison v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.1998). 2012See Robison v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1998). | 2 | 2 |
Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H.green2 sentences2013Id. at 673 (citing Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308 , 313 (5th Cir. 2000)). 2004See Spence, 227 F.3d at 313. | 1 | 2 |
Granviel v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Citing Holder v. State, 643 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 122 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); Bel achheb v. State, 699 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. ref’d); Heflin v. State, 640 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref’d); Finch v. State, 638 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth), pet. dism’d, 643 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (per curiam). 3 .Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not engage in an extensive analysis of Robison's contentions in terms of constitutional rights, the same defendant later brought a federal habeas c 1982Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 , 97 S.Ct. 2642 , 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977). | 1 | 2 |
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.green1 sentence2021Semperit, 508 S.W.3d at 584 (citing McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. 1967)). | 1 | 1 |
Brumit v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See id. | 1 | 1 |
Belachheb v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Citing Holder v. State, 643 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 122 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); Bel achheb v. State, 699 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. ref’d); Heflin v. State, 640 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref’d); Finch v. State, 638 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth), pet. dism’d, 643 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (per curiam). 3 .Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not engage in an extensive analysis of Robison's contentions in terms of constitutional rights, the same defendant later brought a federal habeas c | 1 | 1 |
Vice v. Kasprzakgreen1 sentence2012See Vice , 318 S.W.3d at 12–16 . | 1 | 1 |
Heflin v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Citing Holder v. State, 643 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 122 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); Bel achheb v. State, 699 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. ref’d); Heflin v. State, 640 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref’d); Finch v. State, 638 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth), pet. dism’d, 643 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (per curiam). 3 .Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not engage in an extensive analysis of Robison's contentions in terms of constitutional rights, the same defendant later brought a federal habeas c | 1 | 1 |
Holder v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Citing Holder v. State, 643 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 122 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); Bel achheb v. State, 699 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. ref’d); Heflin v. State, 640 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref’d); Finch v. State, 638 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth), pet. dism’d, 643 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (per curiam). 3 .Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not engage in an extensive analysis of Robison's contentions in terms of constitutional rights, the same defendant later brought a federal habeas c | 1 | 1 |
Finch v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Citing Holder v. State, 643 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 122 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); Bel achheb v. State, 699 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. ref’d); Heflin v. State, 640 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref’d); Finch v. State, 638 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth), pet. dism’d, 643 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (per curiam). 3 .Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not engage in an extensive analysis of Robison's contentions in terms of constitutional rights, the same defendant later brought a federal habeas c | 1 | 1 |
Mondragon v. Austingreen1 sentence2011More recently, in an extensive analysis of the distinctions between temporary and permanent nuisances and how the difference should be determined, the supreme court rejected the potential criterium of remediability by injunctive relief with the following reasoning delineating the respective roles of judge and jury in regard to equitable-relief claims for nuisance: 5 Hanson also emphasizes that in a pre-judgment letter to the parties, the district court indicated that “it does not conclude that a nuisance in this case was established as a matter of law,” but instead “finds, in equity, that the | 1 | 1 |
Cherokee Water Co. v. Gregg County Appraisal Districtgreen1 sentence2011More recently, in an extensive analysis of the distinctions between temporary and permanent nuisances and how the difference should be determined, the supreme court rejected the potential criterium of remediability by injunctive relief with the following reasoning delineating the respective roles of judge and jury in regard to equitable-relief claims for nuisance: 5 Hanson also emphasizes that in a pre-judgment letter to the parties, the district court indicated that “it does not conclude that a nuisance in this case was established as a matter of law,” but instead “finds, in equity, that the | 1 | 1 |
| Gallo v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Oglegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sun Coast Resources, Inc. v. Coopergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Hartec Enterprises, Inc. And Jose J. Acevesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Thirteenth Court of Appealsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lawrence Woodard, Jr. v. Everett I. Perrin, Warden, New Hampshire State Prisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Little v. Brycegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martinez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Yekaterina Tanklevskaya
green
2 sentences2011Faced with -7- facts nearly identical to the record before us, and after an extensive analysis of the available federal authority, the First District Court of Appeals concluded that the holding in Padilla was not a “new rule” in terms of Teague, and concluded that it could be applied retroactively for purposes of Texas habeas corpus proceedings.3 Id., 2011 WL 2132722, at *5-7 . 2011Faced with -7- facts nearly identical to the record before us, and after an extensive analysis of the available federal authority, the First District Court of Appeals concluded that the holding in Padilla was not a “new rule” in terms of Teague, and concluded that it could be applied retroactively for purposes of Texas habeas corpus proceedings.3 Id., 2011 WL 2132722, at *5-7 . | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission
green
2 sentences1936Of this it was said by the Austin court: It has been judicially determined by this court that the 660-330 spacing rule (Rule 37) in the East Texas field “promulgated after an extensive hearing,” was in effect an official, authoritative finding by the Commission that “wells in closer proximity producing equally would tend to create waste.” Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 68 S.W.(2d) 609, 612 , affirmed Bennett v. Sun Oil Co. (Tex.Sup.) 84 S.W.(2d) 693 . 1935In Atlantic Oil Production Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, we said: “It has been judicially determined by this court that the 660-330 feet spacing rule (37) in the East Texas field, ‘promulgated after an extensive hearing,’ was in effect an authoritative official finding by the commission that ‘wells in closer proximity producing equally would tend to create waste.’ Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 68 S. W.(2d) 609 , affirmed [Bennett v. Sun Oil Co.] (Tex.Sup.) 84 S.W.(2d) 693 .” It is but to reiterate an elementary principle to aver that orders of the commission, within it | 3 | 1935–1936 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2014I join in all respects the majority’s extensive analysis and conclusion that the State failed to establish exigent circumstances to support its warrantless blood draw under Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 2014I join in all respects the majority’s extensive analysis and conclusion that the State failed to establish exigent circumstances to support its warrantless blood draw under Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2014I join in all respects the majority’s extensive analysis and conclusion that the State failed to establish exigent circumstances to support its warrantless blood draw under Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 2014I join in all respects the majority’s extensive analysis and conclusion that the State failed to establish exigent circumstances to support its warrantless blood draw under Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Gonzalez v. State
green
2 sentences2009Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 125-26 . 2009Gonzalez , 195 S.W.3d at 125-26 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences1973Prior to the introduction in evidence of appellant's confession, the court, in the absence of the jury, held an extensive hearing on the voluntariness and admissibility of the confession, as required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , and by Article 38.22, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. 1973Prior to the introduction in evidence of appellant's confession, the court, in the absence of the jury, held an extensive hearing on the voluntariness and admissibility of the confession, as required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , and by Article 38.22, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. | 2 | 1971–1973 |
Bennett v. Sun Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1936Of this it was said by the Austin court: It has been judicially determined by this court that the 660-330 spacing rule (Rule 37) in the East Texas field “promulgated after an extensive hearing,” was in effect an official, authoritative finding by the Commission that “wells in closer proximity producing equally would tend to create waste.” Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 68 S.W.(2d) 609, 612 , affirmed Bennett v. Sun Oil Co. (Tex.Sup.) 84 S.W.(2d) 693 . 1935In Atlantic Oil Production Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, we said: “It has been judicially determined by this court that the 660-330 feet spacing rule (37) in the East Texas field, ‘promulgated after an extensive hearing,’ was in effect an authoritative official finding by the commission that ‘wells in closer proximity producing equally would tend to create waste.’ Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 68 S. W.(2d) 609 , affirmed [Bennett v. Sun Oil Co.] (Tex.Sup.) 84 S.W.(2d) 693 .” It is but to reiterate an elementary principle to aver that orders of the commission, within it | 2 | 1935–1936 |
Semperit Technische Produkte Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Hennessy ex rel. Smithers
green
1 sentence2021Semperit, 508 S.W.3d at 584 (citing McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. 1967)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Coffee v. F. W. Woolworth Co.
green
1 sentence2020Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Byrd v. State
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 246 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Leming v. State
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 556-61 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lo, Ex Parte John Christopher
green
2 sentences2015The court’s extensive analysis, id. at 39-61 , led it to conclude that Section 36.03(a)(1) was a far more expansive criminal prohibition on speech than the district court had believed. 2015Id. at 60 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Southwestern Refining Co., Inc. v. Bernal
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 673 (citing Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308 , 313 (5th Cir. 2000)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2012After conducting an extensive analysis of cases applying a vested-rights analysis, the court concluded that “[w]hat constitutes an impairment of vested rights is too much in the eye of the beholder to serve as a test for unconstitutional retroactivity.” Id. at 143 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 794 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Finch v. State
green
1 sentence2012Citing Holder v. State, 643 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 122 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); Bel achheb v. State, 699 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. ref’d); Heflin v. State, 640 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref’d); Finch v. State, 638 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth), pet. dism’d, 643 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (per curiam). 3 .Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not engage in an extensive analysis of Robison's contentions in terms of constitutional rights, the same defendant later brought a federal habeas c | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Brown v. United States green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Grady v. Corbin red | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Beathard v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Cobra Oil & Gas Corporation v. Sadler green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Owens v. Meanor green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Livingston v. Texas green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Wade green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Railroad Commission of Texas v. Bass neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.