14 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hughes v. State of Oregon
green
2 sentences2015Hughes, 314 Or at 22-27 . 2015Hughes, 314 Or at 22-27 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Babson
green
1 sentence2022Ultimately, the court held that “the [Legislative Administrative Committee] guideline [that imposed the overnight use restriction], on its face, does not violate Article I, section 8, or Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution.” Id. at 387 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Jenkins
neutral
2 sentences2013Finally, the state argues that, in State v. Jenkins, 63 Or App 858 , 666 P2d 869 (1983), we concluded that a certified copy of a judgment is the sole means of proving a prior conviction under OEC 609. 2013Finally, the state argues that, in State v. Jenkins, 63 Or App 858 , 666 P2d 869 (1983), we concluded that a certified copy of a judgment is the sole means of proving a prior conviction under OEC 609. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc.
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 54-64 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Winters v. Bisaillon
green
2 sentences1994In Winters v. Bisaillon, 153 Or 509 , 57 P2d 1095 (1936), the court had interpreted the then existing statute regarding joinder of actions, which provided, in part: “The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint when they all arise out of: “1. 1994In Winters v. Bisaillon, 153 Or 509 , 57 P2d 1095 (1936), the court had interpreted the then existing statute regarding joinder of actions, which provided, in part: “The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint when they all arise out of: “1. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Utah Home Fire Insurance v. Colonial Insurance
green
1 sentence1993After an extensive analysis of legislature history and an examination of the statutory scheme involving motor vehicle liability insurance, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended the definition of “insured vehicle” in ORS 743.504(2)(b) to be applicable to the PIP law. 300 Or at 571-72 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Boger v. Norris & Stevens, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993Although an extensive inquiry into the facts behind a judgment of conviction may in some cases be too time-consuming, cumulative or confusing to the jury, and therefore may be limited by the trial judge, see Boger v. Norris & Stevens, Inc., 109 Or App 90, 96 , 818 P2d 947 (1991), rev den 312 Or 588 (1992), OEC 609 does not prevent the state from showing the nature of prior felony convictions that meet the other requirements of that rule. 1993Although an extensive inquiry into the facts behind a judgment of conviction may in some cases be too time-consuming, cumulative or confusing to the jury, and therefore may be limited by the trial judge, see Boger v. Norris & Stevens, Inc., 109 Or App 90, 96 , 818 P2d 947 (1991), rev den 312 Or 588 (1992), OEC 609 does not prevent the state from showing the nature of prior felony convictions that meet the other requirements of that rule. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Brinegar v. United States
green
2 sentences1984Brinegar [ v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , [1309], 93 L.Ed.2d 1879 (1949)]. 1984Brinegar [ v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , [1309], 93 L.Ed.2d 1879 (1949)]. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Tupper v. FAIRVIEW HOSP. & TRAIN. CENTER, ETC.
green
2 sentences1979The amount of process which is due public employes who are being discharged for cause is determined by Tupper v. Fairview Hospital, 276 Or 657 , 556 P2d 1340 (1976) and Hammer v. OSP, 283 Or 369 , 583 P2d 1136 (1978). 1979The amount of process which is due public employes who are being discharged for cause is determined by Tupper v. Fairview Hospital, 276 Or 657 , 556 P2d 1340 (1976) and Hammer v. OSP, 283 Or 369 , 583 P2d 1136 (1978). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Adams v. State
green
1 sentence1979We need not undertake an extensive analysis of the positions taken by the various courts and commentators for we conclude, as did the Alaska Supreme Court in Adams v. State, supra, that any distinction between "public” and "private” duty is precluded by statute in this state. 4 ORS 30.265(1) provides that " * * * every public body is liable for its torts and those of its officers, employes and agents * * * whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function. ” (Emphasis added.) Prior to the enactment of this statute, this court stated: " * * * our power to choose the policy of this s | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Vendrell v. School District No. 26C
green
2 sentences1979We need not undertake an extensive analysis of the positions taken by the various courts and commentators for we conclude, as did the Alaska Supreme Court in Adams v. State, supra, that any distinction between "public” and "private” duty is precluded by statute in this state. 4 ORS 30.265(1) provides that " * * * every public body is liable for its torts and those of its officers, employes and agents * * * whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function. ” (Emphasis added.) Prior to the enactment of this statute, this court stated: " * * * our power to choose the policy of this s 1979We need not undertake an extensive analysis of the positions taken by the various courts and commentators for we conclude, as did the Alaska Supreme Court in Adams v. State, supra, that any distinction between "public” and "private” duty is precluded by statute in this state. 4 ORS 30.265(1) provides that " * * * every public body is liable for its torts and those of its officers, employes and agents * * * whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function. ” (Emphasis added.) Prior to the enactment of this statute, this court stated: " * * * our power to choose the policy of this s | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Hammer v. OREGON STATE PENITENTIARY, ETC.
neutral
2 sentences1979The amount of process which is due public employes who are being discharged for cause is determined by Tupper v. Fairview Hospital, 276 Or 657 , 556 P2d 1340 (1976) and Hammer v. OSP, 283 Or 369 , 583 P2d 1136 (1978). 1979The amount of process which is due public employes who are being discharged for cause is determined by Tupper v. Fairview Hospital, 276 Or 657 , 556 P2d 1340 (1976) and Hammer v. OSP, 283 Or 369 , 583 P2d 1136 (1978). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1967State v. Smith, 242 Or 223 , 408 P2d 942 , permits the introduction of statements for impeachment purposes if found voluntary. 1967State v. Smith, 242 Or 223 , 408 P2d 942 , permits the introduction of statements for impeachment purposes if found voluntary. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Stout v. Madden & Williams
green
2 sentences1963In an earlier ease before this court, Stout v. Madden v. Williams, 1956, 208 Or 294 , 300 P2d 461 , Justice Perry made an extensive analysis of much of the *158 authority just mentioned. 1963In an earlier ease before this court, Stout v. Madden v. Williams, 1956, 208 Or 294 , 300 P2d 461 , Justice Perry made an extensive analysis of much of the *158 authority just mentioned. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Duluth, SS & AR Co. v. Michigan Corporation and Securities Comm'n
green
1 sentence1960Co. v. C. & S. Comm., 1958, 353 Mich 636 , 92 NW2d 22 ; cert den 359 US 310 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Duluth, SS & AR Co. v. C. & S. COMM.
green
2 sentences1960Co. v. C. & S. Comm., 1958, 353 Mich 636 , 92 NW2d 22 ; cert den 359 US 310 . 1960Co. v. C. & S. Comm., 1958, 353 Mich 636 , 92 NW2d 22 ; cert den 359 US 310 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.