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19 Colorado opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
SANCHEZ-MARTINEZ v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2026See Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011) (“Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”); Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8 (a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors and precludes review of issues arising before the entry of the plea); see also People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 24 (declining to consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or development); People v. Delgado, 2026Legal Authority and Standard of Review ¶ 12 “Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011). | 5 | 7 |
Patton v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2025See Patton, 35 P.3d at 128 (“Because a guilty plea effectuates such an extensive waiver, a challenge to the conviction entered thereon is normally limited to whether the plea itself was voluntary and intelligent.”). 2011Patton v. People, 35 P.3d 124, 128 (Colo. 2001). | 2 | 2 |
Von Pickrell v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is 2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is | 2 | 2 |
Sanders v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is 2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is | 2 | 2 |
Blehm v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is 2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is | 2 | 2 |
People v. Venzorgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is 2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kylergreen2 sentences2025“A guilty plea must represent ‘a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant,’ and must be the product of ‘a free and rational choice.’” People v. Kyler, 991 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1999) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). ¶9 “Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Sanchez-Martinez, 250 P.3d at 1255 . 2001Because a guilty plea effectuates such an extensive waiver, a challenge to the conviction entered thereon is normally limited to whether the plea itself was voluntary and intelligent. 3 See, e.g., Schneider, 25 P.8d at 760-61; Kyler, 991 P.2d at 816 ; see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)("[WJhen the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary."). | 1 | 2 |
Peo v. Housergreen1 sentence2026See Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011) (“Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”); Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8 (a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors and precludes review of issues arising before the entry of the plea); see also People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 24 (declining to consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or development); People v. Delgado, | 1 | 1 |
Neuhaus v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2026See Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011) (“Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”); Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8 (a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors and precludes review of issues arising before the entry of the plea); see also People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 24 (declining to consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or development); People v. Delgado, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Delgadogreen1 sentence2026See Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011) (“Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”); Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8 (a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors and precludes review of issues arising before the entry of the plea); see also People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 24 (declining to consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or development); People v. Delgado, | 1 | 1 |
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen1 sentence2025“A guilty plea must represent ‘a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant,’ and must be the product of ‘a free and rational choice.’” People v. Kyler, 991 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1999) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). ¶9 “Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Sanchez-Martinez, 250 P.3d at 1255 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kirkgreen1 sentence2024See People v. Kirk, 221 P.3d 63, 64-65 (Colo. App. 2009); see also Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011) (“Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”). ¶ 10 The order is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Durlinggreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., 551 N.E.2d at 1199 (noting that courts must assess reliability of the evidence in determining good cause). . 2010See, e.g., 551 N.E.2d at 1199 (noting that courts must assess reliability of the evidence in determining good cause). [23] I also agree with Justice Coats, see conc. & dis. op. at 419, that there is no evidence in the record to support the majority's assertion that the prosecution made a "decision to withhold the names of the declarants until shortly before the hearing," maj. op. at 416. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Brocegreen2 sentences2001Because a guilty plea effectuates such an extensive waiver, a challenge to the conviction entered thereon is normally limited to whether the plea itself was voluntary and intelligent. 3 See, e.g., Schneider, 25 P.8d at 760-61; Kyler, 991 P.2d at 816 ; see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)("[WJhen the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary."). 2001Because a guilty plea effectuates such an extensive waiver, a challenge to the conviction entered thereon is normally limited to whether the plea itself was voluntary and intelligent. 3 See, e.g., Schneider, 25 P.8d at 760-61; Kyler, 991 P.2d at 816 ; see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)("[WJhen the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pendleton
green
2 sentences2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is 2024See, e.g. , Sanchez-Martinez , 250 P.3d at 1257-59 ; see also Von Pickrell v. People , 163 Colo. 591, 598 , 431 P.2d 1003, 1006-07 (1967) (“ However regular the proceedings . . . might appear from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not ma ke an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional right s.” (quoting Sanders v. United States , 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963))). ¶ 17 Our review of case law shows that a providency hearing could refute an incompetency claim if it included one or more of t he following (1) defense counsel’s assessment that the defendant is | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Stovall
green
1 sentence2026Thus, “[a] defendant may challenge [a] guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel when that challenge goes to the issue of whether the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.” People v. Stovall, 2012 COA 7M , ¶ 13, 284 P.3d 151, 154 . 5 ¶ 13 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to effective representation of counsel. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998However, it determined that the standard articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) was applicable. 1998However, it determined that the standard articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) was applicable. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
West v. Hinksmon
green
1 sentence1997Moreover, the Crystal Park court’s interpretation of this constitutional language has been reaffirmed in West v. Hinksmon, 857 P.2d 483 (Colo.App.1992) (private way of necessity includes ways for reasonable and practical access to property otherwise isolated); Bear Creek Development Corp. v. Dyer, 790 P.2d 897 (Colo.App.1990) (private way of necessity granted for access to parcel used for operation of telecommunications tower). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Bear Creek Development Corp. v. Dyer
green
1 sentence1997Moreover, the Crystal Park court’s interpretation of this constitutional language has been reaffirmed in West v. Hinksmon, 857 P.2d 483 (Colo.App.1992) (private way of necessity includes ways for reasonable and practical access to property otherwise isolated); Bear Creek Development Corp. v. Dyer, 790 P.2d 897 (Colo.App.1990) (private way of necessity granted for access to parcel used for operation of telecommunications tower). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1995This part 6 shall not apply to any policy ... insuring more than four automobiles .... ” (Emphasis added.) The majority relies on the extensive analysis of the legislative history of part 6 in Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 882 P.2d 1312 (Colo.1994), to find that the legislature did not intend that section 10-4-608 modify or otherwise affect the substantive interpre tation of section 10^-609’s UM/UIM provision. 1995This part 6 shall not apply to any policy ... insuring more than four automobiles ...." (Emphasis added.) The majority relies on the extensive analysis of the legislative history of part 6 in Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 882 P.2d 1312 (Colo.1994), to find that the legislature did not intend that section 10-4-608 modify or otherwise affect the substantive interpretation *107 of section 10-4-609's UM/UIM provision. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bock v. Westminster Mall Co.
green
1 sentence1994After an extensive analysis of the applicable caselaw, the trial court concluded that, as a holder of a permit from the City, Spring-spree’s festival did not constitute state action under Bock v. Westminster Mall, 819 P.2d 55 (Colo.1991), and that Springspree had the right to enforce its own policy prohibiting political, religious, ideological, or social causes during the festival under its own rights under the First Amendment and Colo. Const, art. 2, § 10. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
A Book Named \John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure\" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts"
green
2 sentences1989We relied upon the three-part test for identifying obscenity set forth in Miller [1] and acknowledged that Miller abandoned the "utterly without redeeming social value" test promulgated in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 , 86 S.Ct. 975 , 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966). 1989We relied upon the three-part test for identifying obscenity set forth in Miller [1] and acknowledged that Miller abandoned the "utterly without redeeming social value" test promulgated in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 , 86 S.Ct. 975 , 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Miller v. California
green
2 sentences1989In the seminal decision of Tabron I, we conducted an extensive analysis of obscenity regulation including the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in Miller, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). 1989In the seminal decision of Tabron I, we conducted an extensive analysis of obscenity regulation including the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in Miller, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Jones v. Wolf
green
2 sentences1986Third, to say that the court may analyze only those provisions in the relevant documents that relate to control over the property in question, see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 604 , 99 S.Ct. at 3026 , is but a truism reflecting the concept that only relevant evidence may be considered. 1986Third, to say that the court may analyze only those provisions in the relevant documents that relate to control over the property in question, see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 604 , 99 S.Ct. at 3026 , is but a truism reflecting the concept that only relevant evidence may be considered. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Morrow v. State
green
1 sentence1983In an extensive analysis of the "dominant factor" doctrine the supreme court of Alaska, in Morrow v. State , 511 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1973), set forth a four-part test to determine whether skill dominates over chance: 1) whether without skill it would be impossible to win the game; 2) whether the general public, not experts, have the capacity to solve the problems presented; 3) skill must control the final result, not just one part of the larger scheme — where skill does not destroy the dominant effect of chance, the scheme is a lottery and 4) the participants must be informed of the criteria used | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1973Witnesses for the defendant, including a professor of foreign languages who had conversed with the defendant in both English and Spanish, testified that the defendant did not understand or speak English to the extent necessary to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights as delineated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 1973Witnesses for the defendant, including a professor of foreign languages who had conversed with the defendant in both English and Spanish, testified that the defendant did not understand or speak English to the extent necessary to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights as delineated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.