extensive analysis in Indiana

2010Following an extensive analysis of the development of unlawful discrimination law in our federal courts, our Supreme Court summarized the current test as follows: [In light of [Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 , 123 S.Ct. 2148 , 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003)], the traditional McDonnell - Douglas - burden-shifting paradigm requires a slight modification, but only in its final stage....

2010Following an extensive analysis of the development of unlawful discrimination law in our federal courts, our Supreme Court summarized the current test as follows: [In light of [Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 , 123 S.Ct. 2148 , 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003)], the traditional McDonnell - Douglas - burden-shifting paradigm requires a slight modification, but only in its final stage....

2010We next engaged in an extensive analysis of the "jurisdiction" issue in In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind.Ct.

2010We next engaged in an extensive analysis of the "jurisdiction" issue in In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied.

1981Without elaboration, the court further indicated that constitutional proscriptions were involved by stating, 456 F.2d at 395 : “Under our holding that only one offense was committed, and that at the outset of the questioning, we think due process would be violated by the imposition of a harsher sentence than that imposed for the first offense adjudicated.” Accord, Second Additional Grand Jury v. Grillo, (1963) 12 N.Y.2d 206 , 237 N.Y.S.2d 709 , 188 N.E.2d 138 , 94 A.L.R.2d 1241 .

1981Without elaboration, the court further indicated that constitutional proscriptions were involved by stating, 456 F.2d at 395 : “Under our holding that only one offense was committed, and that at the outset of the questioning, we think due process would be violated by the imposition of a harsher sentence than that imposed for the first offense adjudicated.” Accord, Second Additional Grand Jury v. Grillo, (1963) 12 N.Y.2d 206 , 237 N.Y.S.2d 709 , 188 N.E.2d 138 , 94 A.L.R.2d 1241 .

1981Without elaboration, the court further indicated that constitutional proscriptions were involved by stating, 456 F.2d at 395 : "Under our holding that only one offense was committed, and that at the outset of the questioning, we think due process would be violated by the imposition of a harsher sentence than that imposed for the first offense adjudicated." Accord, Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, (1963) 12 N.Y.2d 206 , 237 N.Y.S.2d 709 , 188 N.E.2d 138 , 94 A.L.R.2d 1241 . *1291 We summarize our holding as follows.

1981Without elaboration, the court further indicated that constitutional proscriptions were involved by stating, 456 F.2d at 395 : “Under our holding that only one offense was committed, and that at the outset of the questioning, we think due process would be violated by the imposition of a harsher sentence than that imposed for the first offense adjudicated.” Accord, Second Additional Grand Jury v. Grillo, (1963) 12 N.Y.2d 206 , 237 N.Y.S.2d 709 , 188 N.E.2d 138 , 94 A.L.R.2d 1241 .

1947Whether "fair value" is the end product of rate making and not the starting point as seems to be determined in the case of Power Comm'n. v. Hope Gas Co. (1943), 320 U.S. 591 , 88 L.Ed. 333 , 64 S.Ct. 281 , or whether the rate base upon which rates are fixed is determined by § 54-203, Burns' 1933, is a matter to be decided in the final hearing of this cause.

1947Whether "fair value" is the end product of rate making and not the starting point as seems to be determined in the case of Power Comm'n. v. Hope Gas Co. (1943), 320 U.S. 591 , 88 L.Ed. 333 , 64 S.Ct. 281 , or whether the rate base upon which rates are fixed is determined by § 54-203, Burns' 1933, is a matter to be decided in the final hearing of this cause.

2018Id. at 396 . [17] Unlike in Drake, Riggle concedes that “the trial court engaged in what was, overall, an extensive inquiry into his decision to proceed pro se” and that the first and second Poynter factors “weigh in favor of finding that [he] made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.” Appellant’s Brief at 14-15.

2018We will “most likely uphold the trial judge’s decision to honor or deny the defendant’s request to represent himself where the judge has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information, and reaches a reasoned conclusion about the defendant’s understanding of his rights and voluntariness of his decision.” Id. (quoting Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 410 ). [14] Riggle concedes that “the trial court engaged in what was, overall, an extensive inquiry into his decision to proceed pro se” and that the first and second Poynter factors “weigh in favor of finding that [he] made a knowing, voluntary

2018We will “most likely uphold the trial judge’s decision to honor or deny the defendant’s request to represent himself where the judge has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information, and reaches a reasoned conclusion about the defendant’s understanding of his rights and voluntariness of his decision.” Id. (quoting Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 410 ). [14] Riggle concedes that “the trial court engaged in what was, overall, an extensive inquiry into his decision to proceed pro se” and that the first and second Poynter factors “weigh in favor of finding that [he] made a knowing, voluntary

2006In Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Vill. of Addison, 988 F.Supp. 1130 (N.D.IIL.1997), the district court engaged in an extensive analysis of disparate impact jurisprudence.

2003Endres, 334 F.3d 618 .

2003Endres, 334 F.3d 618 .

2000Callahan had also undergone one trial while represented by counsel (as the trial court had initially denied his request to proceed pro se as untimely) and had subsequently “repeatedly asserted that he wished to proceed pro se.” The trial court asked Callahan if he had ever tried a case before, and he responded that he had, at which point the trial court allowed Callahan’s appointed counsel to withdraw, and in spite of Callahan’s objections, “insured ... that counsel was available” to Callahan “at all stages of the proceedings.” Similarly, in Frederick v. State, 658 N.E.2d 941 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)

2000However, the trial court in Callahan, unlike in Poynter’s case, had “conducted an extensive inquiry into Callahan’s reasons for wishing to proceed pro se and his readiness to do so.” Id.

1994Malan v. Lewis (1984), Utah, 693 P.2d 661, 663 .

1993ADMISSIBILITY OF INFRARED THERMOGRAPHY EVIDENCE In K-Mart Corp. v. Morrison (1993), Ind.App., 609 N.E.2d 17 , trans. denied, (decided after the case before us), after an extensive analysis of case law, the court held that the admission of thermographic evidence was error.

1992By far the most extensive analysis of the cocaine isomer defense appears in Best v. State (1989), 79 Md.App. 241 , 556 A.2d 701 , cert. denied, 317 Md. 70 , 562 A.2d 718 .

1992By far the most extensive analysis of the cocaine isomer defense appears in Best v. State (1989), 79 Md.App. 241 , 556 A.2d 701 , cert. denied, 317 Md. 70 , 562 A.2d 718 .

1992According to Best , the defense first appeared in the Seventh Circuit in the 1976 case United States v. Orzechowski (7th Cir.1976), 547 F.2d 978 , cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 , 97 S.Ct. 1701 , 52 L.Ed.2d 391 .

1992According to Best , the defense first appeared in the Seventh Circuit in the 1976 case United States v. Orzechowski (7th Cir.1976), 547 F.2d 978 , cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 , 97 S.Ct. 1701 , 52 L.Ed.2d 391 .

1992According to Best , the defense first appeared in the Seventh Circuit in the 1976 case United States v. Orzechowski (7th Cir.1976), 547 F.2d 978 , cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 , 97 S.Ct. 1701 , 52 L.Ed.2d 391 .

1981The polity approach was applied in Draskovich et al. v. Pasalich et al., supra, 151 Ind.App. 397 , 280 N.E.2d 69 .

1981The polity approach was applied in Draskovich et al. v. Pasalich et al., supra, 151 Ind.App. 397 , 280 N.E.2d 69 .

1978This subject has recently undergone an extensive analysis by Justice Pivarnik in Elmore v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 532 , 382 N.E.2d 893 , 65 Ind.Dec. 397.

1978This subject has recently undergone an extensive analysis by Justice Pivarnik in Elmore v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 532 , 382 N.E.2d 893 , 65 Ind.Dec. 397.

1977Both parties have cited the recent case of Hiatt v. Yergen (1972), 152 Ind. App. 497 , 284 N.E.2d 834 , in which Judge Buchanan rendered an extensive analysis of the right to jury provision of Rules 38 and 39, as being dispositive of the issues in this case.

1977Both parties have cited the recent case of Hiatt v. Yergen (1972), 152 Ind. App. 497 , 284 N.E.2d 834 , in which Judge Buchanan rendered an extensive analysis of the right to jury provision of Rules 38 and 39, as being dispositive of the issues in this case.

1976When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i.e., see McHenry v. United States 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning.” An extensive hearing on the Appellant’s motion to suppress the confession was held by the trial court.

1976When the issue is raised in an admissibility hearing, i.e., see McHenry v. United States, 10 Cir., 308 F.2d 700 , it is for the court to objectively determine whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey the required warning." An extensive hearing on the Appellant's motion to suppress the confession was held by the trial court.

1975Smith v. State, supra; Matthews v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 252 , 156 N.E.2d 387 ; Dawson v. State, supra. In view of the extensive warnings given Smith and the failure to point to any promises made to him, other than a vague promise of help from “his friend”, the Deputy Prosecutor, we can only conclude that the confession was voluntarily given and was supported by sufficient evidence.

1975Smith v. State, supra; Matthews v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 252 , 156 N.E.2d 387 ; Dawson v. State, supra. In view of the extensive warnings given Smith and the failure to point to any promises made to him, other than a vague promise of help from “his friend”, the Deputy Prosecutor, we can only conclude that the confession was voluntarily given and was supported by sufficient evidence.