extensive analysis in Kansas

2012Barnes, 293 Kan. at 21-28 , 259 P.3d 725 . *700 After an extensive analysis, our Supreme Court determined there were two surviving claims: "In summary, we hold the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under K.S.A. 60-907(a) on the following issues: (1) the County exceeded its statutory authority in violation of the County Home Rule Act when the Board enacted the Resolution's self-help and abatement remedy provisions; and (2) Resolution 2005-01 was unconstitutional as applied, and the County engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct as noted above." 293 Kan. at 28 , 259 P.3d 7

2012After an extensive analysis, our Supreme Court determined there were two surviving claims: “In summary, we hold the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under K.S.A. 60-907(a) on the following issues: (1) the County exceeded its statutory authority in violation of the County Home Rule Act when the Board enacted the Resolution’s self-help and abatement remedy provisions; and (2) Resolution 2005-01 was unconstitutional as apphed, and the County engaged in arbitra^ and capricious conduct as noted above.” 293 Kan. at 28 .

2010App. 2d 678 , 623 P.2d 534 (1981), stated: “[Andrews] held that even if the trial court conducted an extensive inquiry into the defendant’s desire to waive counsel, if that inquiry did not appear in the record, the State could not meet its burden of proving that defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made and therefore, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was abridged.” Gilchrist, 238 Kan. at 208-09 .

1986App. 2d 678, 680 , 623 P.2d 534 (1981), where the Court of Appeals held that, even if the trial court conducted an extensive inquiry into the defendant’s desire to waive counsel, if that inquiry did not appear in the record, the State could not meet its burden of proving that defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made and, therefore, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was abridged.

2025Still, the court went on to find that under the totality of the circumstances presented in the case, a reasonable person in Thompson's position would feel free to decline the officer's request for questioning or otherwise terminate the encounter. 284 Kan. at 812 .

2025After conducting an extensive analysis of the relevant circumstances, our Supreme Court determined that Weinbrenner's return of Thompson's driver's license and his statement to have a nice day was not a clear statement that the traffic stop had ended and was not "a clear physical disengagement." 284 Kan. at 811 .

2024To do otherwise would transform the Fifth Amendment from a constitutional "safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure" into "a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell." Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 , 78 S. Ct. 622 , 2 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1958). 2.

2024To do otherwise would transform the Fifth Amendment from a constitutional "safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure" into "a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell." Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 , 78 S. Ct. 622 , 2 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1958). 2.

2017We thoroughly considered the State's contentions under four of the six justiciability factors identified in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , especially whether judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist for resolving the substantive issue, e.g., equity. 298 Kan. at 1139-61.

2016We recently provided an extensive framework for analyzing the denials of requests for new counsel in State v. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. 747, 758-60 , 357 P.3d 877 (2015).

2016We recently provided an extensive framework for analyzing the denials of requests for new counsel in State v. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. 747, 758-60 , 357 P.3d 877 (2015).

2016Dickeys holding means what it says Dickey’s holding that “a defendant’s stipulation or failure to object at sentencing will prevent the defendant from later challenging the existence of convictions listed in his or her criminal history” is not mere dicta—that language made a distinction necessary to the issue being decided in Dickey and was the resolution of the court’s extensive analysis of its prior cases applying the invited error doctrine. 301 Kan. at 1032 .

2014In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 360-66 , 818 N.E.2d 1214 (2004).

2014In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 360-66 , 818 N.E.2d 1214 (2004).

2012In Edioards, the Nevada Supreme Court simply set forth the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided” language of die federal statute and the “if otherwise permitted by” language of the Act and concluded state law applies. 122 Nev. at 326-28 .

2012Barnes, 293 Kan. at 21-28 , 259 P.3d 725 . *700 After an extensive analysis, our Supreme Court determined there were two surviving claims: "In summary, we hold the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under K.S.A. 60-907(a) on the following issues: (1) the County exceeded its statutory authority in violation of the County Home Rule Act when the Board enacted the Resolution's self-help and abatement remedy provisions; and (2) Resolution 2005-01 was unconstitutional as applied, and the County engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct as noted above." 293 Kan. at 28 , 259 P.3d 7

2012Barnes, 293 Kan. at 21-28 , 259 P.3d 725 . *700 After an extensive analysis, our Supreme Court determined there were two surviving claims: "In summary, we hold the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under K.S.A. 60-907(a) on the following issues: (1) the County exceeded its statutory authority in violation of the County Home Rule Act when the Board enacted the Resolution's self-help and abatement remedy provisions; and (2) Resolution 2005-01 was unconstitutional as applied, and the County engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct as noted above." 293 Kan. at 28 , 259 P.3d 7

2010App. 2d 678 , 623 P.2d 534 (1981), stated: “[Andrews] held that even if the trial court conducted an extensive inquiry into the defendant’s desire to waive counsel, if that inquiry did not appear in the record, the State could not meet its burden of proving that defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made and therefore, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was abridged.” Gilchrist, 238 Kan. at 208-09 .

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009The Dillard court thén undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no— the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009The Dillard court thén undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no— the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1991); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96 Wash. 2d 274 , 635 P.2d 426 (1981); Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 1987).

2009The Dillard court then undertook an extensive analysis of the policy considerations and rationale underlying the holdings of a majority of other jurisdictions that the answer to the issue was no—the landowner is not liable under the two exceptions or theories of liability asserted by Lee Dillard. 255 Kan. at 710-25 , 877 P.2d 371 ; see Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660 , 548 A.2d 461 (1988); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md.App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384

2009App. 590 , 547 A.2d 1080 (1988); Matteuzzi v. The Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1991); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96 Wash. 2d 274 , 635 P.2d 426 (1981); Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 1987).

2007State v. Crowley, 220 Kan. 532, 536-37 , 552 P.2d 971 (1976); State v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 748 , 529 P.2d 90 (1974); State v. Hollaway, 214 Kan. 636, 638-39 , 522 P.2d 364 (1974); see also State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 253 , 970 P.2d 42 (1998) (if an out-of-court statement is offered “merely for the purpose of establishing what was then said, and not for the purpose of estabhshing the truth of the statement, the statement is not hearsay”). *221 Here, it is not necessary to engage in an extensive analysis of whether Lewis’ statements were offered for the truth of tire matter stated because

2007State v. Crowley, 220 Kan. 532, 536-37 , 552 P.2d 971 (1976); State v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 748 , 529 P.2d 90 (1974); State v. Hollaway, 214 Kan. 636, 638-39 , 522 P.2d 364 (1974); see also State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 253 , 970 P.2d 42 (1998) (if an out-of-court statement is offered “merely for the purpose of establishing what was then said, and not for the purpose of estabhshing the truth of the statement, the statement is not hearsay”). *221 Here, it is not necessary to engage in an extensive analysis of whether Lewis’ statements were offered for the truth of tire matter stated because

2007State v. Crowley, 220 Kan. 532, 536-37 , 552 P.2d 971 (1976); State v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 748 , 529 P.2d 90 (1974); State v. Hollaway, 214 Kan. 636, 638-39 , 522 P.2d 364 (1974); see also State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 253 , 970 P.2d 42 (1998) (if an out-of-court statement is offered “merely for the purpose of establishing what was then said, and not for the purpose of estabhshing the truth of the statement, the statement is not hearsay”). *221 Here, it is not necessary to engage in an extensive analysis of whether Lewis’ statements were offered for the truth of tire matter stated because

2007State v. Crowley, 220 Kan. 532, 536-37 , 552 P.2d 971 (1976); State v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 748 , 529 P.2d 90 (1974); State v. Hollaway, 214 Kan. 636, 638-39 , 522 P.2d 364 (1974); see also State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 253 , 970 P.2d 42 (1998) (if an out-of-court statement is offered “merely for the purpose of establishing what was then said, and not for the purpose of estabhshing the truth of the statement, the statement is not hearsay”). *221 Here, it is not necessary to engage in an extensive analysis of whether Lewis’ statements were offered for the truth of tire matter stated because

2007State v. Crowley, 220 Kan. 532, 536-37 , 552 P.2d 971 (1976); State v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 748 , 529 P.2d 90 (1974); State v. Hollaway, 214 Kan. 636, 638-39 , 522 P.2d 364 (1974); see also State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 253 , 970 P.2d 42 (1998) (if an out-of-court statement is offered “merely for the purpose of establishing what was then said, and not for the purpose of estabhshing the truth of the statement, the statement is not hearsay”). *221 Here, it is not necessary to engage in an extensive analysis of whether Lewis’ statements were offered for the truth of tire matter stated because

2007State v. Crowley, 220 Kan. 532, 536-37 , 552 P.2d 971 (1976); State v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 748 , 529 P.2d 90 (1974); State v. Hollaway, 214 Kan. 636, 638-39 , 522 P.2d 364 (1974); see also State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 253 , 970 P.2d 42 (1998) (if an out-of-court statement is offered “merely for the purpose of establishing what was then said, and not for the purpose of estabhshing the truth of the statement, the statement is not hearsay”). *221 Here, it is not necessary to engage in an extensive analysis of whether Lewis’ statements were offered for the truth of tire matter stated because

1995FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 400 (4th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3659 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1994) (No. 93-1483); FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1993) (observing that state law determines in every respect whether state law claims expired before the FDIC acquired them), cert. denied, No. 93-1486, 1994 WL 101161 (U.S. June 13, 1994); Regier Carr & Monroe, 996 F.2d at 225 ; cf. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, No. 93-489, 1994 WL 249558 , at “5 (U.S. June 13, 1994) (‘[Section] 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) places the FDIC in the shoes of the insolvent S&L, to wnrk out its claims unde

1993Ed. 2d 330 , 93 S. Ct. 351 (1972), the trial court gave the only defense witness an extensive warning about perjury and implied that it expected the witness to lie and indicated that if the witness did lie, he would have difficulty in being paroled from his own sentence.

1980App. 2d 726 , 602 P.2d 99 (1979), contains an extensive analysis of double jeopardy law as it exists in Kansas which will not be repeated here, except to note that there the court analyzes K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 21-3108(2)(a) and concludes that it incorporates both the compulsory joinder rule, formerly K.S.A. 62-1449, and the constitutional “identity of elements rule,” i.e., where each offense requires proof of a fact not required by the other, double jeopardy is not a bar.