16 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,786 Prescott H. Rathborne v. J. Cornelius Rathbornegreen2 sentences1999Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 918 (5th Cir.1982). 1998Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914, 918 (5th Cir. 1982). | 3 | 3 |
Chalk v. Bertholfgreen2 sentences2017See Chalk v. Bertholf, 980 So.2d 290, 296-99 (¶¶ 11-19) (Miss. 2017See Chalk v. Bertholf, 980 So. 2d 290, 296-99 (¶¶11-19) (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences1996In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So.2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990), wherein we found that a cause of action accrued only when illness was discovered in asbestosis cases and not when the plaintiff was first exposed to the toxic substance, we stated that "[a] cause of action accrues only when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim; that is when the right to sue becomes vested." Applying that principle in the wrongful death context as we did in Sweeney and Preston , the Montana Supreme Court recently applied its finding that a cause of action for wrongful death did not accrue until a de 1993In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990), wherein we found that a cause of action accrued only when illness was discovered in asbestosis cases and not when the plaintiff was first exposed to the toxic substance, we stated that "[a] cause of action accrues only when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim; that is when the right to sue becomes vested." Applying that principle in the wrongful death context as we did in Sweeney and Preston, the Montana Supreme Court recently applied its finding that a cause of action for wrongful death did not accrue until a de | 2 | 2 |
Shaw v. Burchfieldgreen1 sentence2022See Shaw, 481 So. 2d at 255 ; Vestal, 500 So. 2d at 957 . | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Stategreen1 sentence1987If, as Johnson claims, his attorneys erroneously informed him prior to trial that a life sentence offered by the prosecution as a plea bargain carried with it no parole eligibility at any point during its service, such advice was clearly erroneous, see Hill v. State, 388 So.2d 143, 146 (Miss. 1980), and constitutes an actionable error as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and our own cases Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1987), Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986), Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307 (Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 655303
green
2 sentences1998Id. at 371 . 1996Id. at 371 . | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Punzo v. Jackson County
green
1 sentence2023We maintained that the initial “flood [did] not create enough notice of an actionable claim’s existence or of someone’s fault.” Id. at 346 ; see also Hood v. A&A Excavating Contractors, 338 So. 3d 145 , 147 (Miss. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Smith v. Sanders
green
1 sentence2022Id. at (¶20). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Vestal v. Oden
green
1 sentence2022See Shaw, 481 So. 2d at 255 ; Vestal, 500 So. 2d at 957 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
NGO v. Centennial Insurnance Co.
green
1 sentence2021Co., 893 So. 2d 1076 , 1081- 82 (Miss. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Fanny Hudson v. City of Yazoo City, Mississippi
green
1 sentence2019That negligent maintenance is a separate actionable claim against a public entity and not subject to discretionary-function analysis is noted in the post-Wilcher case of Estate of Hudson v. Yazoo City, 246 So. 3d 872 (Miss. 2018). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hodges v. Scully
green
2 sentences2012Leavitt cites Hodges v. Scully, 141 A.D.2d 729 , 529 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y.App.Div.1988), to support his claim that Officer Reese’s action — marking him “guilty” without , a meaningful opportunity to present evidence — was an actionable violation of MDOC policy. 2012Leavitt cites Hodges v. Scully, 141 A.D.2d 729 , 529 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y.App.Div.1988), to support his claim that Officer Reese’s action — marking him “guilty” without , a meaningful opportunity to present evidence — was an actionable violation of MDOC policy. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dufour v. State
green
1 sentence1987If, as Johnson claims, his attorneys erroneously informed him prior to trial that a life sentence offered by the prosecution as a plea bargain carried with it no parole eligibility at any point during its service, such advice was clearly erroneous, see Hill v. State, 388 So.2d 143, 146 (Miss. 1980), and constitutes an actionable error as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and our own cases Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1987), Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986), Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307 (Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1987If, as Johnson claims, his attorneys erroneously informed him prior to trial that a life sentence offered by the prosecution as a plea bargain carried with it no parole eligibility at any point during its service, such advice was clearly erroneous, see Hill v. State, 388 So.2d 143, 146 (Miss. 1980), and constitutes an actionable error as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and our own cases Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1987), Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986), Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307 (Miss. 1985). 1987If, as Johnson claims, his attorneys erroneously informed him prior to trial that a life sentence offered by the prosecution as a plea bargain carried with it no parole eligibility at any point during its service, such advice was clearly erroneous, see Hill v. State, 388 So.2d 143, 146 (Miss. 1980), and constitutes an actionable error as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and our own cases Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1987), Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986), Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307 (Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Irving v. State
green
1 sentence1987If, as Johnson claims, his attorneys erroneously informed him prior to trial that a life sentence offered by the prosecution as a plea bargain carried with it no parole eligibility at any point during its service, such advice was clearly erroneous, see Hill v. State, 388 So.2d 143, 146 (Miss. 1980), and constitutes an actionable error as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and our own cases Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1987), Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986), Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307 (Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Waldrop v. State
green
1 sentence1987If, as Johnson claims, his attorneys erroneously informed him prior to trial that a life sentence offered by the prosecution as a plea bargain carried with it no parole eligibility at any point during its service, such advice was clearly erroneous, see Hill v. State, 388 So.2d 143, 146 (Miss. 1980), and constitutes an actionable error as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and our own cases Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1987), Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986), Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307 (Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.