8 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Palomogreen2 sentences2002See United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Inasmuch as no harm has been shown, [defendant] has not demonstrated an actionable violation of his right against seF-incrimination.’’); see also State v. Bushey, 147 Vt. 140, 144 , 513 A.2d 1177, 1180 (1986) (because defendant did not demonstrate prejudice, Court declines to address Fifth Amendment issue). 2002See United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir.1996) ("Inasmuch as no harm has been shown, [defendant] has not demonstrated an actionable violation of his right against self-incrimination."); see also State v. Bushey, 147 Vt. 140, 144 , 513 A.2d 1177, 1180 (1986) (because defendant did not demonstrate prejudice, Court declines to address Fifth Amendment issue). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Busheygreen2 sentences2002See United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir.1996) ("Inasmuch as no harm has been shown, [defendant] has not demonstrated an actionable violation of his right against self-incrimination."); see also State v. Bushey, 147 Vt. 140, 144 , 513 A.2d 1177, 1180 (1986) (because defendant did not demonstrate prejudice, Court declines to address Fifth Amendment issue). 2002See United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir.1996) ("Inasmuch as no harm has been shown, [defendant] has not demonstrated an actionable violation of his right against self-incrimination."); see also State v. Bushey, 147 Vt. 140, 144 , 513 A.2d 1177, 1180 (1986) (because defendant did not demonstrate prejudice, Court declines to address Fifth Amendment issue). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hospitalgreen1 sentence2024For example, in Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp., an employee asked a black coworker whether she “brought fried chicken to eat,” which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held was insufficient for an actionable claim under Title VII. 966 F. Supp. 33, 51 (D.D.C. 1997); see Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[a] comment about fried chicken,” although “inappropriate,” did not create actionable Title VII claim), overruled in part on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Hawk | 1 | 1 |
Torgerson v. City of Rochestergreen1 sentence2024For example, in Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp., an employee asked a black coworker whether she “brought fried chicken to eat,” which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held was insufficient for an actionable claim under Title VII. 966 F. Supp. 33, 51 (D.D.C. 1997); see Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[a] comment about fried chicken,” although “inappropriate,” did not create actionable Title VII claim), overruled in part on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Hawk | 1 | 1 |
Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp.green1 sentence2024For example, in Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp., an employee asked a black coworker whether she “brought fried chicken to eat,” which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held was insufficient for an actionable claim under Title VII. 966 F. Supp. 33, 51 (D.D.C. 1997); see Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[a] comment about fried chicken,” although “inappropriate,” did not create actionable Title VII claim), overruled in part on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Hawk | 1 | 1 |
Searles v. Agency of Transportationgreen2 sentences2002See id. at 565 , 762 A.2d at 815 (“To reverse *227 Gaubert’s presumption and require the State to produce evidence that it made a conscious decision, based upon policy considerations, not to place a warning sign at every dirt road intersection in Vermont, would be unduly burdensome.”); see also Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 665-66 (10th Cir. 1983) (failure to warn of dangerous road conditions is not an actionable claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act). 2002See id. at 565 , 762 A.2d at 815 (“To reverse *227 Gaubert’s presumption and require the State to produce evidence that it made a conscious decision, based upon policy considerations, not to place a warning sign at every dirt road intersection in Vermont, would be unduly burdensome.”); see also Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 665-66 (10th Cir. 1983) (failure to warn of dangerous road conditions is not an actionable claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002See id. at 565 , 762 A.2d at 815 (“To reverse *227 Gaubert’s presumption and require the State to produce evidence that it made a conscious decision, based upon policy considerations, not to place a warning sign at every dirt road intersection in Vermont, would be unduly burdensome.”); see also Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 665-66 (10th Cir. 1983) (failure to warn of dangerous road conditions is not an actionable claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act). | 1 | 1 |
Harmasse Leclair and Elizabeth Leclair, Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. William Saunders, Appellant-Cross-Appelleegreen1 sentence1983See Le-Clair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Smith, Bell & Hauck Real Estate, Inc., 132 Vt. 295, 301-02 , 318 A.2d 183, 188 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Smith, Bell & Hauck Real Estate, Inc.green2 sentences1983See Le-Clair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Smith, Bell & Hauck Real Estate, Inc., 132 Vt. 295, 301-02 , 318 A.2d 183, 188 (1974). 1983See Le-Clair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Smith, Bell & Hauck Real Estate, Inc., 132 Vt. 295, 301-02 , 318 A.2d 183, 188 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Heien v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2019Plaintiff appeals, arguing that: (1) in assessing whether the stop in this case violated Article 11, which offers more protection than the Fourth Amendment, this Court should not follow the U.S. Supreme Court's recent holding that reasonable suspicion to support a traffic or investigatory stop may rest upon a police officer's reasonable mistake of law, see Heien v. N. Carolina , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) ; (2) even if this Court were to adopt a Heien -type analysis, the stop in this instance violated Article 11 because it was not objectively reasonable for Trooper H 2019Plaintiff appeals, arguing that: (1) in assessing whether the stop in this case violated Article 11, which offers more protection than the Fourth Amendment, this Court should not follow the U.S. Supreme Court's recent holding that reasonable suspicion to support a traffic or investigatory stop may rest upon a police officer's reasonable mistake of law, see Heien v. N. Carolina , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) ; (2) even if this Court were to adopt a Heien -type analysis, the stop in this instance violated Article 11 because it was not objectively reasonable for Trooper H | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Stump v. Sparkman
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 356 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.