51 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lopez v. Swyergreen2 sentences2025See Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 122 (noting a cause of action will not accrue "if a A-1763-24 12 person does not know he or she has been injured at all"); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 (explaining that even if plaintiff knows they have been injured, there may be no "basis for an actionable claim," if they do not know their injury is "attributable to the fault [] of another"). 2025See Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 122 (noting a cause of action will not accrue "if a person does not know that he or she has been injured at A-0722-24 12 all"); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 (explaining that even if plaintiff knows they have been injured, there may be "no basis for an actionable claim," if they do not know their injury is "attributable to the fault [] of another"). | 4 | 10 |
Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co.green2 sentences2025See also Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545, 555-56 (2000) (explaining that courts "impute discovery if the plaintiff is aware of facts that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of an actionable claim; medical or legal certainty is not required"). 2025The court "impute[s] discovery if the plaintiff is aware of facts that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of an actionable claim; medical or legal certainty is not required." Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545, 555-56 (2000). | 4 | 8 |
Richard Catena v. Raytheon Companygreen2 sentences2025Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. 2022The judge's opinion may be clearly read as finding that it was not just that plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence and intelligence, but rather, that a prudent sophisticated business investor would have, through the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence, discovered A-2306-19 8 facts — for example, that the property was titled in TSP's name in 1994, DEP permits were issued to TSP in 1994, and TSP was listed on the tax records as the property's owner — "that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of an actionable claim." Catena, 447 N.J. | 3 | 5 |
Grunwald v. Bronkeshgreen2 sentences2025However, under the "discovery rule," a legal malpractice action will not accrue if the plaintiff "does not and cannot know the facts that constitute an actionable claim." Ibid. 2023At the very least, he was "aware of facts that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of an actionable claim [.]" Lapka, 162 N.J. at 555 ; Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 492. | 2 | 5 |
Beauchamp v. Amediogreen2 sentences2025See Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 122 (noting a cause of action will not accrue "if a A-1763-24 12 person does not know he or she has been injured at all"); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 (explaining that even if plaintiff knows they have been injured, there may be no "basis for an actionable claim," if they do not know their injury is "attributable to the fault [] of another"). 2025See Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 122 (noting a cause of action will not accrue "if a person does not know that he or she has been injured at A-0722-24 12 all"); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 (explaining that even if plaintiff knows they have been injured, there may be "no basis for an actionable claim," if they do not know their injury is "attributable to the fault [] of another"). | 2 | 2 |
Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2017See id. at 115-16 , 675 A.2d 1077 . 2016Yet the discovery rule does not toll the statute until the plaintiff has "legal certainty" of an actionable claim, Lapka v. 14 A-4636-13T4 Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J. 545, 555-56 (2000), or until the full extent of the damage becomes apparent, Russo Farms v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 144 N.J. 84, 115 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
State v. United States Steel Corp.green2 sentences1979Eq. 201 (E. & A. 1929); or (2) a defendant has failed to disclose information which he had a statutory duty to disclose, and such non-disclosure prevented a plaintiff from realizing that he possessed an actionable claim, see, e.g., State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 355-360 (1956); Noel v. Teffeau, 116 N.J. 1979Eq. 201 (E & A 1929); or (2) a defendant has failed to disclose information which he had a statutory duty to disclose, and such non-disclosure prevented a plaintiff from realizing that he possessed an actionable claim, see, e.g., State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 355-360 (1956); Noel v. Teffeau, 116 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Fernandi v. Strullygreen2 sentences2021The discovery rule, which was adopted by our Supreme Court in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450 (1961), delays accrual of a cause of action "until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a A-3845-19 15 basis for an actionable claim." R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 299 (2009) (quoting Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 ). "[I]n determining [if] it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule[,] [t]he crucial inquiry is 'whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence th 1993See Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65 , 424 A.2d 1169 (1981); Tevis, supra, 79 N.J. 422 , 400 A.2d 1189 ; Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 , 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434 , 173 A.2d 277 (1961). | 1 | 2 |
Caravaggio v. D'AGOSTINIgreen2 sentences2021The discovery rule, which was adopted by our Supreme Court in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450 (1961), delays accrual of a cause of action "until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a A-3845-19 15 basis for an actionable claim." R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 299 (2009) (quoting Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 ). "[I]n determining [if] it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule[,] [t]he crucial inquiry is 'whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence th 2017Fox’s foremost principle — that the plaintiff is normally entitled to the full limitations period upon diseoveiy of an actionable claim, id. at 126 , 363 A.2d 341—becomes a common theme in our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Caravaggio, supra, 166 N.J. at 250 , 765 A.2d 182 (quoting Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 134 , 363 A.2d 346 (1976)). | 1 | 2 |
Ramos v. Flowersgreen1 sentence2021Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , 391 n.4, 397 (1971) (recognizing individuals who allege a violation of their federal constitutional rights may have an actionable claim under § 1983); see also Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Dransfield v. Citizens Casualty Co. of NYgreen1 sentence2021See Estate of Gardinier, 40 N.J. at 266 (recognizing the A-1154-20 10 insured has a right to pursue "an action . . . upon the policy after judgment against the insured"); Dransfield, 5 N.J. at 194 (recognizing the insured has "'a cause of action the moment he is injured" which ripens into a right of action "when he recovers a judgment against the assured" on demonstrating the insured is "insolven[t]," quoting Century Indem. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Estate of Gardiniergreen1 sentence2021See Estate of Gardinier, 40 N.J. at 266 (recognizing the A-1154-20 10 insured has a right to pursue "an action . . . upon the policy after judgment against the insured"); Dransfield, 5 N.J. at 194 (recognizing the insured has "'a cause of action the moment he is injured" which ripens into a right of action "when he recovers a judgment against the assured" on demonstrating the insured is "insolven[t]," quoting Century Indem. | 1 | 1 |
Szczuvelek v. Harborside Healthcare Woods Edgegreen2 sentences2021The discovery rule, which was adopted by our Supreme Court in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450 (1961), delays accrual of a cause of action "until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a A-3845-19 15 basis for an actionable claim." R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 299 (2009) (quoting Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 ). "[I]n determining [if] it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule[,] [t]he crucial inquiry is 'whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence th 2021The standard for determining the application of the discovery rule is "basically an objective one— whether plaintiff 'knew or should have known' of sufficient facts to start the statute of limitations running.'" Szczuvelek, 182 N.J. at 281 (quoting Martinez, 163 N.J. at 52 ). | 1 | 1 |
R.L. v. Voytacgreen1 sentence2021The discovery rule, which was adopted by our Supreme Court in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450 (1961), delays accrual of a cause of action "until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a A-3845-19 15 basis for an actionable claim." R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 299 (2009) (quoting Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 ). "[I]n determining [if] it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule[,] [t]he crucial inquiry is 'whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence th | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Cooper Hospital-University Medical Centergreen2 sentences2021The discovery rule, which was adopted by our Supreme Court in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450 (1961), delays accrual of a cause of action "until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a A-3845-19 15 basis for an actionable claim." R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 299 (2009) (quoting Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 ). "[I]n determining [if] it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule[,] [t]he crucial inquiry is 'whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence th 2021The standard for determining the application of the discovery rule is "basically an objective one— whether plaintiff 'knew or should have known' of sufficient facts to start the statute of limitations running.'" Szczuvelek, 182 N.J. at 281 (quoting Martinez, 163 N.J. at 52 ). | 1 | 1 |
Paula Jensen v. Pressler & Presslergreen1 sentence2019See Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 420 (3d Cir. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
O'KEEFFE v. Snydergreen2 sentences2017See O’Keeffe, supra, 83 N.J. at 502 , 416 A.2d 862 . 2017See O’Keeffe, supra, 83 N.J. at 502 , 416 A.2d 862 . | 1 | 1 |
| Endre v. Arnoldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Wal-Mart Storesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dr. Julia Elizabeth Berry v. The Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., Etc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Christine RUSH v. SCOTT SPECIALTY GASES, INC., Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lynch v. Rubackygreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Jersey City v. Haguegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Becker v. Schwartzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lopez v. Swyergreen2 sentences2025See Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 122 (noting a cause of action will not accrue "if a A-1763-24 12 person does not know he or she has been injured at all"); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 (explaining that even if plaintiff knows they have been injured, there may be no "basis for an actionable claim," if they do not know their injury is "attributable to the fault [] of another"). 2025See Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 122 (noting a cause of action will not accrue "if a person does not know that he or she has been injured at A-0722-24 12 all"); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 (explaining that even if plaintiff knows they have been injured, there may be "no basis for an actionable claim," if they do not know their injury is "attributable to the fault [] of another"). | 1 | 10 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mancuso v. Neckles Ex Rel. Neckles
green
2 sentences2005In reinstating the complaint against Dr. Bernart, we concluded that “when a patient has relied on competent expert advice that one or more of her treating physicians did not contribute to the patient’s injuries, later assertions to the contrary by a competent expert would then provide the ‘basis for an actionable claim.’ ” Id. at 37 , 747 A.2d 255 (citation omitted). 2005In reinstating the complaint against Dr. Bernart, we concluded that “when a patient has relied on competent expert advice that one or more of her treating physicians did not contribute to the patient’s injuries, later assertions to the contrary by a competent expert would then provide the ‘basis for an actionable claim.’ ” Id. at 37 , 747 A.2d 255 (citation omitted). | 4 | 2000–2009 |
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2002Indeed, in a hypothetical example involving acts occurring during a 400-day period, the Supreme Court observed that "on day 401 all incidents are still part of the same claim[,]" and it does not "matter that the employee knows on [day 100] that an actionable claim happened[.]" Morgan, supra, ___ U.S. at ____, 122 S.Ct. at 2075 , 153 L.Ed. 2d at 125 . 2002Indeed, in a hypothetical example involving acts occurring during a 400-day period, the Supreme Court observed that "on day 401 all incidents are still part of the same claim[,]" and it does not "matter that the employee knows on [day 100] that an actionable claim happened[.]" Morgan, supra, ___ U.S. at ____, 122 S.Ct. at 2075 , 153 L.Ed. 2d at 125 . | 3 | 2002–2004 |
Caggiano v. Fontoura
green
2 sentences2004An actionable claim under LAD based upon a hostile work environment frequently arises out of repeated incidents that take place over time and by their cumulative effect make it unreasonable and unhealthy for the plaintiff to remain in that work environment. [Caggiano v. Fontoura, 354 N.J.Super. 111, 126 , 804 A.2d 1193 , (App.Div.2002).] The United States Supreme Court applied the continuing violation doctrine in Nat'l R.R. 2004An actionable claim under LAD based upon a hostile work environment frequently arises out of repeated incidents that take place over time and by their cumulative effect make it unreasonable and unhealthy for the plaintiff to remain in that work environment. [Caggiano v. Fontoura, 354 N.J.Super. 111, 126 , 804 A.2d 1193 , (App.Div.2002).] The United States Supreme Court applied the continuing violation doctrine in Nat'l R.R. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Mancini v. Township of Teaneck
green
2 sentences2003We also found that "[b]ecause she was the first female police officer in the Department, she expected certain unfairness so she should not be required to have known that the level of harassment she experienced constituted an actionable claim as of 1985, 1987, or 1988." Id. at 560 , 794 A. 2d 185 . *166 There is even less of a policy reason for reaching a different result under the equitable doctrine of laches. 2003We also found that "[b]ecause she was the first female police officer in the Department, she expected certain unfairness so she should not be required to have known that the level of harassment she experienced constituted an actionable claim as of 1985, 1987, or 1988." Id. at 560 , 794 A. 2d 185 . *166 There is even less of a policy reason for reaching a different result under the equitable doctrine of laches. | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Noel v. Teffeau
green
2 sentences1979Eq. 201 (E. & A. 1929); or (2) a defendant has failed to disclose information which he had a statutory duty to disclose, and such non-disclosure prevented a plaintiff from realizing that he possessed an actionable claim, see, e.g., State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 355-360 (1956); Noel v. Teffeau, 116 N.J. 1979Eq. 201 (E & A 1929); or (2) a defendant has failed to disclose information which he had a statutory duty to disclose, and such non-disclosure prevented a plaintiff from realizing that he possessed an actionable claim, see, e.g., State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 355-360 (1956); Noel v. Teffeau, 116 N.J. | 2 | 1979–1979 |
Savage v. Old Bridge-Sayreville Medical Group
green
1 sentence2025More particularly, they maintain plaintiff "was on notice of her cause of action against Dr. Rosario no later than August 30, 2018, when she consulted with Dr. Chapman." And, "[a]ny reasonable person, already having been told that the stents were not providing a benefit to her condition, would only have further reason to know of the possibility of wrongdoing when a subsequent physician then reversed the treatment provided by the defendants." Defendants further contend the court misapplied the discovery rule because the "limitations period must begin to run when a plaintiff is aware of facts su | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Temple v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021To establish an actionable claim of breach of warranty or violation under the Magnuson-Moss Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "(i) the item at issue was subject to a warranty; (ii) the item did not conform to the warranty; (iii) the A-4293-19 15 seller was given reasonable opportunity to cure any defects; and (iv) the seller failed to cure the defects within a reasonable time or a reasonable number of attempts." Temple, 133 Fed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
green
1 sentence2021Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , 391 n.4, 397 (1971) (recognizing individuals who allege a violation of their federal constitutional rights may have an actionable claim under § 1983); see also Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
MORAN v. Napolitano
green
2 sentences2017Fox’s foremost principle — that the plaintiff is normally entitled to the full limitations period upon diseoveiy of an actionable claim, id. at 126 , 363 A.2d 341—becomes a common theme in our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Caravaggio, supra, 166 N.J. at 250 , 765 A.2d 182 (quoting Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 134 , 363 A.2d 346 (1976)). 2017Fox’s foremost principle — that the plaintiff is normally entitled to the full limitations period upon diseoveiy of an actionable claim, id. at 126 , 363 A.2d 341—becomes a common theme in our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Caravaggio, supra, 166 N.J. at 250 , 765 A.2d 182 (quoting Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 134 , 363 A.2d 346 (1976)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Fox v. Passaic General Hospital
green
2 sentences2017Fox’s foremost principle — that the plaintiff is normally entitled to the full limitations period upon diseoveiy of an actionable claim, id. at 126 , 363 A.2d 341—becomes a common theme in our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Caravaggio, supra, 166 N.J. at 250 , 765 A.2d 182 (quoting Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 134 , 363 A.2d 346 (1976)). 2017Fox’s foremost principle — that the plaintiff is normally entitled to the full limitations period upon diseoveiy of an actionable claim, id. at 126 , 363 A.2d 341—becomes a common theme in our jurisprudence, see, e.g., Caravaggio, supra, 166 N.J. at 250 , 765 A.2d 182 (quoting Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 134 , 363 A.2d 346 (1976)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Steinhilber v. Alphonse
green
2 sentences2017And, "[w]hile a pure opinion cannot be the subject" of an actionable claim, Davis, supra, 22 N.E.3d at 1004 , an opinion that "implies that it is based upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it, . . . is a 'mixed opinion' and is actionable." Steinhilber, supra, 501 N.E.2d at 552-53 . 2017And, "[w]hile a pure opinion cannot be the subject" of an actionable claim, Davis, supra, 22 N.E.3d at 1004 , an opinion that "implies that it is based upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it, . . . is a 'mixed opinion' and is actionable." Steinhilber, supra, 501 N.E.2d at 552-53 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Robert Davis v. James Boeheim
green
2 sentences2017And, "[w]hile a pure opinion cannot be the subject" of an actionable claim, Davis, supra, 22 N.E.3d at 1004 , an opinion that "implies that it is based upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it, . . . is a 'mixed opinion' and is actionable." Steinhilber, supra, 501 N.E.2d at 552-53 . 2017And, "[w]hile a pure opinion cannot be the subject" of an actionable claim, Davis, supra, 22 N.E.3d at 1004 , an opinion that "implies that it is based upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it, . . . is a 'mixed opinion' and is actionable." Steinhilber, supra, 501 N.E.2d at 552-53 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Alexander v. Seton Hall University
green
2 sentences2010I concur with the following three conclusions of law reached by the majority: that "the payment of wages on a discriminatory basis proscribed by the LAD is, and remains, an actionable violation of our state's anti-discrimination law as long as the wage remains tainted by the original discriminatory action[,]" ante at 235, 8 A. 3d at 207 ; that "[e]ach payment of such discriminatory wages thus constitutes a renewed separable and actionable wrong that is remediable under the LAD[,]" ante at 235, 8 A. 3d at 207 ; and that "[t]he two-year statute of limitations applies to such violations, cutting 2010I concur with the following three conclusions of law reached by the majority: that "the payment of wages on a discriminatory basis proscribed by the LAD is, and remains, an actionable violation of our state's anti-discrimination law as long as the wage remains tainted by the original discriminatory action[,]" ante at 235, 8 A. 3d at 207 ; that "[e]ach payment of such discriminatory wages thus constitutes a renewed separable and actionable wrong that is remediable under the LAD[,]" ante at 235, 8 A. 3d at 207 ; and that "[t]he two-year statute of limitations applies to such violations, cutting | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| El-Sioufi v. ST. PETER'S UNIV. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Center green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Lehmann v. Toys 'R' US, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Zalewski v. Overlook Hospital green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Bolinger v. Bell Atlantic green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Vispisiano v. Ashland Chemical Co. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Viviano v. CBS, INC. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Baxt v. Liloia neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Ward v. Zelikovsky green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Tevis v. Tevis green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Sokolay v. Edlin green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Rankin v. Sowinski green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Yerzy v. Levine green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Yerzy v. Levine green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Michael Cohen v. Russell K. Norris green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Rappaport v. Nichols green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.