12 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1950–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bankgreen2 sentences2021Rule 9.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “the circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity.” As we have explained, “[a] claim of fraud is deficient if the complaint fails to state with particularity an intentional misrepresentation of a material fact.” Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d 32, 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 2011Henderson v. SAIA, 318 S.W.3d 328, 338 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008)); Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d 32, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). | 2 | 2 |
Boatman v. Morrisongreen1 sentence2025See Boatman v. Morrison, 746 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (reasoning that the nonclaim statute “only bars claims against [an] estate and does not bar a creditor who may have other legal remedies”); Commerce Union Bank v. Weis, 181 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944) (noting that creditor was entitled to look to joint obligor and the secured collateral for satisfaction of a debt after declining to file a claim against the debtor’s estate). | 1 | 1 |
American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc.green1 sentence2025Towers Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1194 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LLC, 221 P.3d 234 (Utah 2009) (stating that a trial court should enter a default judgment “only if it is determined those [admitted] facts established an actionable claim” (quoting Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 , 596 n.5 (Utah. | 1 | 1 |
Commerce Union Bank v. Weisgreen1 sentence2025See Boatman v. Morrison, 746 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (reasoning that the nonclaim statute “only bars claims against [an] estate and does not bar a creditor who may have other legal remedies”); Commerce Union Bank v. Weis, 181 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944) (noting that creditor was entitled to look to joint obligor and the secured collateral for satisfaction of a debt after declining to file a claim against the debtor’s estate). | 1 | 1 |
Stacks v. Saundersgreen1 sentence2021“Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations will only begin to run when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the claim, or when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that [it] has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct.” Coffey v. Coffey, 578 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). -6- To state an actionable claim for fraud, Mount Hopewell must show the following: (1) intentional misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation was false—that the misrepresentation was made knowingly or reckless | 1 | 1 |
Laura Cowan Coffey v. David L. Coffeygreen1 sentence2021“Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations will only begin to run when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the claim, or when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that [it] has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct.” Coffey v. Coffey, 578 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). -6- To state an actionable claim for fraud, Mount Hopewell must show the following: (1) intentional misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation was false—that the misrepresentation was made knowingly or reckless | 1 | 1 |
Dog House Investments, LLC v. Teal Properties, Inc.green1 sentence2021“Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations will only begin to run when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the claim, or when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that [it] has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct.” Coffey v. Coffey, 578 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). -6- To state an actionable claim for fraud, Mount Hopewell must show the following: (1) intentional misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation was false—that the misrepresentation was made knowingly or reckless | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Birman Managed Care, Inc.green1 sentence2021“Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations will only begin to run when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the claim, or when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that [it] has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct.” Coffey v. Coffey, 578 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). -6- To state an actionable claim for fraud, Mount Hopewell must show the following: (1) intentional misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation was false—that the misrepresentation was made knowingly or reckless | 1 | 1 |
Trau-Med of America, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.green1 sentence2012Co, 71 S.W.3d 691, 703 (Tenn. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Dobbs v. Guenthergreen1 sentence2011Henderson v. SAIA, 318 S.W.3d 328, 338 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008)); Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d 32, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). | 1 | 1 |
City of Memphis v. Shelby County Election Commissiongreen1 sentence2011See City of Memphis v. Shelby County Election Commission, 146 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tenn. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc.green1 sentence2011Henderson v. SAIA, 318 S.W.3d 328, 338 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008)); Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d 32, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. SAIA, INC.green1 sentence2011Henderson v. SAIA, 318 S.W.3d 328, 338 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, 249 S.W.3d 301, 311 (Tenn. 2008)); Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d 32, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). | 1 | 1 |
William R. Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corporationgreen1 sentence2004Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514-15 (1st Cir. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Douglas Emmons v. Robert McLaughlin Donald Ratliff, Gary Dewalt, City of Norwalk, Reese Winemangreen1 sentence2000See Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 352 (6th Cir. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Order of Railway Conductors v. Jones
green
2 sentences1950A case somewhat in point to the instant case is that of Order of Railway Conductors v. Jones, 78 Colo. 80 , 239 P. 882, 883 , wherein the Court says: “It is enough to say that to induce without justification an employer to break his contract of employment with his employee is an actionable violation of the employee’s right to labor.” This seems to us a fair and reasonable definition of what would constitute an actionable act under the circumstances here considered. 1950A case somewhat in point to the instant case is that of Order of Railway Conductors v. Jones, 78 Colo. 80 , 239 P. 882, 883 , wherein the Court says: “It is enough to say that to induce without justification an employer to break his contract of employment with his employee is an actionable violation of the employee’s right to labor.” This seems to us a fair and reasonable definition of what would constitute an actionable act under the circumstances here considered. | 2 | 1950–1950 |
Estate of Minton v. Claim of Markham
green
1 sentence2025Contrary to Mr. Edwards’s protests on appeal, “exact or precise information as to the extent of [a claimant’s] damages” is not required “to set the statute in operation, so long as it is reasonably apparent that he has an actionable claim.” Minton’s Est., 625 S.W.2d at 263 .3 Mr. Edwards insists that even if his claim against the estate is barred, he may pursue his contract remedies against Ms. Underwood. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Stevens v. Collard
green
1 sentence2025Towers Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1194 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LLC, 221 P.3d 234 (Utah 2009) (stating that a trial court should enter a default judgment “only if it is determined those [admitted] facts established an actionable claim” (quoting Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 , 596 n.5 (Utah. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC
green
1 sentence2025Towers Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1194 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LLC, 221 P.3d 234 (Utah 2009) (stating that a trial court should enter a default judgment “only if it is determined those [admitted] facts established an actionable claim” (quoting Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 , 596 n.5 (Utah. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Stones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid-South Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence2001A libel does not occur unless the words are “reasonably construable as holding the plaintiff up to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” Stones River Motors, Inc., 651 S.W.2d at 719 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Taylor v. Clayton Mobile Homes, Inc.
green
1 sentence1981Taylor v. Clayton Mobile Homes, 516 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn.1974). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Teeters v. Currey
green
1 sentence1981Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn.1974). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.