actionable claim in Texas

2008Garcia, 967 S.W.2d at 885 (citing Meritor Sav.

2008Garcia , 967 S.W.2d at 885 ( citing Meritor Sav.

2019See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1990)(where plaintiff argued for the first time on appeal that the defendant should have challenged his pleadings through a special exception, which would have given him the opportunity to amend his pleadings in order to state an actionable claim against the defendant, appellate court erred by reversing the trial court's decision on that basis); Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Park Warwick, L.P., 298 S.W.3d 436, 444 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)(“A nonmovant waives a complaint that summary judgment improperl

2017See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1990) (where plaintiff argued for the first time on appeal that the defendant should have challenged his pleadings through a special exception, which would have given him the opportunity to amend his pleadings in order to state an actionable claim against the defendant, appellate court erred by reversing the trial court’s decision on that basis); Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Park Warwick, L.P., 298 S.W.3d 436, 444 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“A nonmovant waives a complaint that summary judgment improper

2019See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1990)(where plaintiff argued for the first time on appeal that the defendant should have challenged his pleadings through a special exception, which would have given him the opportunity to amend his pleadings in order to state an actionable claim against the defendant, appellate court erred by reversing the trial court's decision on that basis); Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Park Warwick, L.P., 298 S.W.3d 436, 444 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)(“A nonmovant waives a complaint that summary judgment improperl

2017See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1990) (where plaintiff argued for the first time on appeal that the defendant should have challenged his pleadings through a special exception, which would have given him the opportunity to amend his pleadings in order to state an actionable claim against the defendant, appellate court erred by reversing the trial court’s decision on that basis); Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Park Warwick, L.P., 298 S.W.3d 436, 444 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“A nonmovant waives a complaint that summary judgment improper

2005See, e.g., Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, 32 S.W.3d 429, 441-42 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (concluding that summary judgment in favor of law firm was proper because allegations of conspiracy and fraud involved only acts undertaken as part of the firm’s duties as counsel to an opposing party). 21 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in the case.

2005See, e.g. , Chapman Children = s Trust v. Porter & Hedges , 32 S.W.3d 429 , 441 B 42 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (concluding that summary judgment in favor of law firm was proper because allegations of conspiracy and fraud involved only acts undertaken as part of the firm = s duties as counsel to an opposing party). [21] Accordingly, we affirm the trial court = s judgment in the case.

2003See Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649-50 (Tex. 1996).

2003See Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp. , 919 S.W.2d 644, 649-50 (Tex. 1996).

2000See , e.g. , Hoggett v. Brown , 971 S.W.2d 472, 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (concluding there was no actionable conspiracy claim once court determined plaintiff could not assert an actionable claim against defendants).

2000See, e.g., Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 493 (Tex.App. *277 Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (concluding there was no actionable conspiracy claim once court determined plaintiff could not assert an actionable claim against defendants).

2002Wyatt v. Longoria, 33 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.) (citing In the Interest of B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex.1994)) (“Special exceptions are the appropriate method for claiming that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action, because plaintiffs must have an opportunity to cure a deficient petition by amendment before their lawsuit is dismissed for faffing to state an actionable claim.”).

2000B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d at 13 .

2005Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital District, 659 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex.1983); Gonzales v. City of El Paso, 978 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).

1999Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d at 32 .

2024See ALNA Properties II, LLC v. Cobb, No. 05-22-00166-CV, 2023 WL 5740182 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 1, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reversing judgment on premises liability because there was no evidence of similar misconduct “immediately preceding” the act of a shooting outside of a home even though there was an ongoing feud between the two months prior to the shooting); QuikTrip Corp. v. Goodwin, 449 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (holding assailant’s profane actions and descriptions of past illicit activity while inside the QuickTrip store was not immediately

2024See ALNA Properties II, LLC v. Cobb, No. 05-22-00166-CV, 2023 WL 5740182 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 1, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reversing judgment on premises liability because there was no evidence of similar misconduct “immediately preceding” the act of a shooting outside of a home even though there was an ongoing feud between the two months prior to the shooting); QuikTrip Corp. v. Goodwin, 449 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (holding assailant’s profane actions and descriptions of past illicit activity while inside the QuickTrip store was not immediately

2020Our opinion is bolstered by Garza’s failure to identify specific misrepresentations in her pleadings, which only quote statutory language and provide generalities as to the purported misrepresentations. “[T]o to bring an actionable claim for an alleged misrepresentation by an insurer, the plaintiff must identify the specific misrepresentation the insurer made.” Ramirez v. GEICO, 548 S.W.3d 761, 772 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, pet. denied) (granting insurer’s summary judgment motion on DTPA claims about alleged misrepresentations about the policy and its benefits because insured “did not point to

2019A private nuisance “is a condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.” Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 593 (quoting Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003)); see also Bolton, 528 S.W.3d at 778 (“A private nuisance affects an individual or a small number of individuals rather than the public at large.” (quoting Mathis v. Barnes, 377 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Tyler 2012, no pet.))).

2019A private nuisance “is a condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.” Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 593 (quoting Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003)); see also Bolton, 528 S.W.3d at 778 (“A private nuisance affects an individual or a small number of individuals rather than the public at large.” (quoting Mathis v. Barnes, 377 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Tyler 2012, no pet.))).

2019A private nuisance “is a condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.” Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 593 (quoting Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003)); see also Bolton, 528 S.W.3d at 778 (“A private nuisance affects an individual or a small number of individuals rather than the public at large.” (quoting Mathis v. Barnes, 377 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Tyler 2012, no pet.))).

2016Co., 553 F.3d 121, 130 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that statute of limitations begins to run on employee’s failure-to-accommodate-disability claim when request for accommodation is denied because “such a denial is a discrete discriminatory act that, like a termination, a refusal to transfer, or a failure to promote, does not require repeated conduct to establish an actionable claim”); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 403 F.3d 1026, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that failure-to- accommodate-disability claim was time barred because last refusal to offer the employee “a job she requested” was o

2016See Wanzer v. Garcia, 299 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied); see also Kennedy v. Keith, No. 04-99-00100-CV, 2000 WL 31865 , at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 6 2000, no pet.) (memo. op.) (holding that an inmate receiving a fifteen-day cell restriction and forty-five day recreation and commissary restrictions was not an actionable claim under § 1983 because it did not involve “atypical or significant” hardships protected by due process rights).

2016Co., 553 F.3d 121, 130 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that statute of limitations begins to run on employee’s failure-to-accommodate-disability claim when request for accommodation is denied because “such a denial is a discrete discriminatory act that, like a termination, a refusal to transfer, or a failure to promote, does not require repeated conduct to establish an actionable claim”); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 403 F.3d 1026, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that failure-to- accommodate-disability claim was time barred because last refusal to offer the employee “a job she requested” was o

2016Co., 553 F.3d 121, 130 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that statute of limitations begins to run on employee’s failure-to-accommodate-disability claim when request for accommodation is denied because “such a denial is a discrete discriminatory act that, like a termination, a refusal to transfer, or a failure to promote, does not require repeated conduct to establish an actionable claim”); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 403 F.3d 1026, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that failure-to- accommodate-disability claim was time barred because last refusal to offer the employee “a job she requested” was o

2014See, e.g., Castro v. McNabb, 319 S.W.3d 721, 731-32 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, no pet.) (declaratory judgment action was not brought “under the Tort Claims Act” because the Declaratory Judgment Act provided a separate waiver of sovereign immunity under which claim was brought); see also Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 393 (Medina, J., dissenting) (noting that under the majority’s reading, “the statute nonsensically requires the plaintiff’ to dismiss an actionable claim against the employee and “bring a claim [against the government] over which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”).

2014See, e.g., Castro v. McNabb, 319 S.W.3d 721, 731-32 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, no pet.) (declaratory judgment action was not brought “under the Tort Claims Act” because the Declaratory Judgment Act provided a separate waiver of sovereign immunity under which claim was brought); see also Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 393 (Medina, J., dissenting) (noting that under the majority’s reading, “the statute nonsensically requires the plaintiff’ to dismiss an actionable claim against the employee and “bring a claim [against the government] over which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”).

2014To support its argument that these statements are actionable, Matheson cites Stokes v. Stokes, 48 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1982, no writ), for the general proposition that “misrepresentations of value may, under certain circumstances, be treated as actionable misrepresentations of fact, as where such misrepresentations are coupled with concealment of material facts, or with artifice or misrepresentations used to prevent the hearer from learning the truth.” But the statements Matheson relies upon cannot, as a matter of law, form the basis of an actionable claim for common law frau

2012See, e.g., Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tex.2012) (holding that “if immunity is first asserted on interlocutory appeal, section 51.014(a) does not preclude the appellate court from having to consider the issue at the outset in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction to address the merits.”).