actionable claim in Iowa

2026Then in Thompson v. Kaczinski, our supreme court adopted the principles of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm and held, “An actionable claim of negligence requires ʻthe existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, a failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and damages.’” 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009) (citations omitted).

2026See Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009) (“An actionable claim of negligence requires the existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, a failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and damages.” (cleaned up)).

2020See Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009) (“An actionable claim of negligence requires ‘the existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, [and] a failure to conform to that standard . . . .’” (quoting Stotts v. Eveleth, 688 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Iowa 2004))). 4 According to the Schantz’s mother the Wild Rose manager indicated grip strips in a tub are unsanitary. 9 Dismissal is required when the record contains no evidence on the applicable standard of care or its breach.

2020“An actionable claim of negligence requires ‘the existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, a failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and damages.’” Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Stotts v. Eveleth, 688 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Iowa 2004)).

2020Co., 599 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted).

2009Co., 599 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa 1999)).

2015The district court considered this argument, but rejected it: [T]he Iowa Supreme Court ... has adopted the rule that the date of injury “coincides with the last possible date when the attorney’s negligence became irreversible.” Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa 1987).

2015The district court considered this argument, but rejected it: [T]he Iowa Supreme Court . . . has adopted the rule that the date of injury “coincides with the last possible date when the attorney’s negligence became irreversible.” Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa 1987).

2006We have also held "that once claimants have knowledge of facts supporting an actionable claim they have no more than the applicable period of limitations to discover all the theories of action they may wish to pursue in support of that claim." Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc., 408 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Iowa 1987).

2006We have also held “that once claimants have knowledge of facts supporting an actionable claim they have no more than the applicable period of limitations to discover all the theories of action they may wish to pursue in support of that claim.” Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc., 408 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Iowa 1987).

1994See Sedlak v. Ford Motor Company, 64 Mich.App. 61, 63 , 235 N.W.2d 63, 64 (1975).

1994See Sedlak v. Ford Motor Company, 64 Mich.App. 61, 63 , 235 N.W.2d 63, 64 (1975).

2018Cf. Farmland Foods v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm'n , 672 N.W.2d 733 , 741 (Iowa 2003) ("[T]he existence of past acts and the employee's prior knowledge of their occurrence ... does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed." (second alteration in original) (quoting Nat'l R.R.

2018Cf. Farmland Foods v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 741 (Iowa 2003) (“[T]he existence of past acts and the employee’s prior knowledge of their occurrence . . . does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l R.R.

2025Quigley, 598 F.3d at 947 (explaining quid pro quo harassment occurs when benefits are “explicitly or implicitly” conditioned on sexual favors).

2022See id. at 504 (“[B]efore a violation of our rules of professional conduct can be used—even as some evidence of negligence—there must be an underlying actionable claim against the attorney arising out of how the attorney mishandled a 19 legal matter.”).

2020See Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701 , 709–10 (Iowa 1999) (affirming directed verdict in defendant’s favor on claims against employer for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision); Hartig v. Francois, 562 N.W.2d 427 , 430–31 (Iowa 1997) (holding defendant was entitled to directed verdict on negligence claims based on insufficient evidence of the standard of care or its breach); Fisher v. Dallas Cty., 369 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Iowa 1985) (affirming dismissal because “[t]he record contains no evidence regarding that standard of care” or its breach).

2020See Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701 , 709–10 (Iowa 1999) (affirming directed verdict in defendant’s favor on claims against employer for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision); Hartig v. Francois, 562 N.W.2d 427 , 430–31 (Iowa 1997) (holding defendant was entitled to directed verdict on negligence claims based on insufficient evidence of the standard of care or its breach); Fisher v. Dallas Cty., 369 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Iowa 1985) (affirming dismissal because “[t]he record contains no evidence regarding that standard of care” or its breach).

2017Co., 553 F.3d 121, 130 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he denial of a disabled employee’s request for accommodation starts the clock running on the day it 22 occurs. . . . [S]uch a denial is a discrete discriminatory act that . . . does not require repeated conduct to establish an actionable claim.”).

2010The Felds’ resistance to the motion for summary judgment placed the issue of recklessness squarely in play, predicated on the understanding that it supported an actionable claim for liability based on recklessness. 5 See Rieff v. Evans, 630 N.W.2d 278, 292 (Iowa 2001) (“[W]e do not require a petition to allege a specific legal theory.”); see also Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1994) (“A petition gives ‘fair notice’ if it informs the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claim’s general nature.”).

2010The Felds’ resistance to the motion for summary judgment placed the issue of recklessness squarely in play, predicated on the understanding that it supported an actionable claim for liability based on recklessness. 5 See Rieff v. Evans, 630 N.W.2d 278, 292 (Iowa 2001) (“[W]e do not require a petition to allege a specific legal theory.”); see also Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1994) (“A petition gives ‘fair notice’ if it informs the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claim’s general nature.”).

2010The Felds’ resistance to the motion for summary judgment placed the issue of recklessness squarely in play, predicated on the understanding that it supported an actionable claim for liability based on recklessness. 5 See Rieff v. Evans, 630 N.W.2d 278, 292 (Iowa 2001) (“[W]e do not require a petition to allege a specific legal theory.”); see also Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1994) (“A petition gives ‘fair notice’ if it informs the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claim’s general nature.”).

2010The Felds’ resistance to the motion for summary judgment placed the issue of recklessness squarely in play, predicated on the understanding that it supported an actionable claim for liability based on recklessness. 5 See Rieff v. Evans, 630 N.W.2d 278, 292 (Iowa 2001) (“[W]e do not require a petition to allege a specific legal theory.”); see also Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1994) (“A petition gives ‘fair notice’ if it informs the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claim’s general nature.”).