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16 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1949–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Districtgreen1 sentence2024This provision did not include an actionable claim for discrimination based on “handicap or disability” until 1974, (continued…) [J-65-2022] - 96 addressed the school’s argument that the termination was justified by willful violation of school laws—namely, her failure to resign in violation of a School Board regulation requiring that “any employee who becomes pregnant shall resign effective not later than the end of the fifth (5th) month of the pregnancy.” Cerra, 299 A.2d at 278-79. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gacobanogreen1 sentence2019See Austin, 3751 EDA 2015, at *6-7; see also Commonwealth v. Gacobano, 65 A.3d 416, 419-20 (Pa. Super. 2013) (discussing the law of the case doctrine). -7- J-S63028-19 petitioner establishes the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim where counsel fails to raise a meritorious claim). | 1 | 1 |
BIG BASS LAKE COMMUNITY ASS'N v. Warrengreen2 sentences2011The case for a mandatory injunction must be made by a very strong showing, one stronger than that required for a restraining-type injunction.” Id., 950 A.2d at 1145 (citations omitted). a. 2011The case for a mandatory injunction must be made by a very strong showing, one stronger than that required for a restraining-type injunction." Id., 950 A.2d at 1145 (citations omitted). a. | 1 | 1 |
Mascaro v. Youth Study Centergreen2 sentences1990Snyder; see Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351 , 523 A.2d 1118 (1987). 1990Snyder; see Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351 , 523 A.2d 1118 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
KIPP Philadelphia Charter Schools v. PA, Department of Education and Pedro A. Rivera, in his official capacity as Secretary of Education
green
1 sentence2020Kipp, 161 A.3d at 442 (quoting Wyland v. W. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Mazzie v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2011The case for a mandatory injunction must be made by a very strong showing, one stronger than that required for a restraining-type injunction.” Id., 950 A.2d at 1145 (citations omitted). a. 2011The case for a mandatory injunction must be made by a very strong showing, one stronger than that required for a restraining-type injunction." Id., 950 A.2d at 1145 (citations omitted). a. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Firth v. Scherzberg
green
2 sentences2010Id., 366 Pa. at 447 , 77 A.2d at 446 . 2010Id., 366 Pa. at 447 , 77 A.2d at 446 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Baker Et. Ux. v. Moore
neutral
1 sentence2010Id., 366 Pa. at 447 , 77 A.2d at 446 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
McFadden v. Lehman
green
1 sentence2008Id.; McFadden v. Lehman, 968 F. Supp. 1001 (1997). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cimaszewski v. Bd. of Probation and Parole
green
2 sentences2006In that case, Cimaszewski v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 582 Pa. 27 , 868 A.2d 416 (2005), our Supreme Court provides, in relevant part: [I]t is now clear that retroactive changes in the laws governing parole may violate the ex post facto clause. 2006In that case, Cimaszewski v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 582 Pa. 27 , 868 A.2d 416 (2005), our Supreme Court provides, in relevant part: [I]t is now clear that retroactive changes in the laws governing parole may violate the ex post facto clause. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Stevens v. Collard
green
2 sentences2005Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 , 596 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1992), modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct.App.1993). ¶ 9 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the effect, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 of a default entered for failure to timely plead to a complaint: The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established. ... 2005Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 , 596 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1992), modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct.App.1993). ¶ 9 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the effect, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [25] of a default entered for failure to timely plead to a complaint: *303 The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.... | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Stevens v. Collard
green
2 sentences2005Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 , 596 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1992), modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct.App.1993). ¶ 9 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the effect, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 of a default entered for failure to timely plead to a complaint: The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established. ... 2005Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 , 596 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1992), modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct.App.1993). ¶ 9 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the effect, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [25] of a default entered for failure to timely plead to a complaint: *303 The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.... | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township
green
2 sentences1992Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township, 123 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 226, 553 A.2d 510 (1989). 1992Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township, 123 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 226, 553 A.2d 510 (1989). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Elia v. Erie Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences1991Elia v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 398 Pa.Super. 433 , 581 A.2d 209 (1990). 1991Elia v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 398 Pa.Super. 433 , 581 A.2d 209 (1990). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Orner v. Mallick
green
2 sentences1989Orner v. Mallick, 515 Pa. 132 , 527 A.2d 521 (1987). 4 . 1989Orner v. Mallick, 515 Pa. 132 , 527 A.2d 521 (1987). 4 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
International Union of Operating Engineers v. Linesville Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1987International Union of Operating Engineers v. Linesville Construction Company, 457 Pa. 220, 233 , 322 A.2d 353 (1974). 1987International Union of Operating Engineers v. Linesville Construction Company, 457 Pa. 220, 233 , 322 A.2d 353 (1974). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Dziokonski v. Babineau
green
2 sentences1986Appellants appealed this determination to the Superior Court arguing that consideration be given to Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555 , 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978), which allowed recovery where the parent arrived at the scene of the accident while the injured child was still there. 1986Appellants appealed this determination to the Superior Court arguing that consideration be given to Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555 , 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978), which allowed recovery where the parent arrived at the scene of the accident while the injured child was still there. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Folmar v. Shaffer
green
2 sentences1982Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 Pa. Super. 22 , 332 A.2d 821 (1974); Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 461 , 222 A.2d 493 (1966); Ferguson v. Manufacturers’ Casualty Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 129 Pa. Super. 276 , 195 A. 661 (1937); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co., 456 F.Supp. 627 (E.D. 1982Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 Pa. Super. 22 , 332 A.2d 821 (1974); Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 461 , 222 A.2d 493 (1966); Ferguson v. Manufacturers’ Casualty Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 129 Pa. Super. 276 , 195 A. 661 (1937); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co., 456 F.Supp. 627 (E.D. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.
green
2 sentences1982Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 Pa. Super. 22 , 332 A.2d 821 (1974); Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 461 , 222 A.2d 493 (1966); Ferguson v. Manufacturers’ Casualty Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 129 Pa. Super. 276 , 195 A. 661 (1937); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co., 456 F.Supp. 627 (E.D. 1982Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 Pa. Super. 22 , 332 A.2d 821 (1974); Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 461 , 222 A.2d 493 (1966); Ferguson v. Manufacturers’ Casualty Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 129 Pa. Super. 276 , 195 A. 661 (1937); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co., 456 F.Supp. 627 (E.D. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Aetna Ins. Co. v. PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS ASS'N
green
1 sentence1982Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 Pa. Super. 22 , 332 A.2d 821 (1974); Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 461 , 222 A.2d 493 (1966); Ferguson v. Manufacturers’ Casualty Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 129 Pa. Super. 276 , 195 A. 661 (1937); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co., 456 F.Supp. 627 (E.D. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ferguson v. Manufacturers' Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences1982Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 Pa. Super. 22 , 332 A.2d 821 (1974); Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 461 , 222 A.2d 493 (1966); Ferguson v. Manufacturers’ Casualty Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 129 Pa. Super. 276 , 195 A. 661 (1937); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co., 456 F.Supp. 627 (E.D. 1982Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 Pa. Super. 22 , 332 A.2d 821 (1974); Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 461 , 222 A.2d 493 (1966); Ferguson v. Manufacturers’ Casualty Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, 129 Pa. Super. 276 , 195 A. 661 (1937); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co., 456 F.Supp. 627 (E.D. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Bureau of Highway Safety v. Wright
green
1 sentence1949In the Wright case Justice Jones states ( 355 Pa. 307, 311 ) : “An examination of our cases where reinstatement by a court of common pleas of an operator’s suspended license has been sustained will disclose that the alleged actionable violation of the Code was either doubt ful or at least not clearly proven under the testimony adduced at the hearing in court on appeal.” This defendant himself has placed his violation beyond doubt by admitting that. he violated the code repeatedly. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.