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14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. Matlack, Inc.green1 sentence2024Denver Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 701 P.2d 114, 118 (Colo. App. 1985).1 Importantly, “[i]f the legislative enactment or regulation defines the legal duty owed by the defendant, then proof of the violation establishes a breach of that duty.” Gerrity Oil, 946 P.2d at 930 ; see also Scott, 39 P.3d at 1166 . | 1 | 1 |
Lombard v. Colorado Outdoor Education Center, Inc.green1 sentence2024Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 573 (Colo. 2008). ¶60 To sustain an actionable claim of negligence per se, the statute or regulation “must prohibit or require a particular act.” Bauer v. Sw. | 1 | 1 |
Bauer v. Southwest Denver Mental Health Center, Inc.green2 sentences2024Denver Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 701 P.2d 114, 118 (Colo. App. 1985).1 Importantly, “[i]f the legislative enactment or regulation defines the legal duty owed by the defendant, then proof of the violation establishes a breach of that duty.” Gerrity Oil, 946 P.2d at 930 ; see also Scott, 39 P.3d at 1166 . 2024See Bauer, 701 P.2d at 118 (clarifying that a statute or regulation “must prohibit or require a particular act” to sustain an actionable claim of negligence per se (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp.green2 sentences2007Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 , 386 A.2d 1310, 1314 (1978) (court rejects argument that "the applicable limitations period does not begin running until [the plaintiff] learns from a lawyer that [the facts of his case] equate with a legal cause of action"); Maestas v. Zager, 141 N.M. 154 , 152 P.3d 141, 147 (2007)(the course the plaintiff proposed would delay the acerual of all claims until plaintiffs consult counsel); Reichel v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wash.2d 761, 772 , 733 P.2d 530, 536 (1987)("[The plaintiff] would have us adopt a rule that would in effect toll the statute of limitations until 2007Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 , 386 A.2d 1310, 1314 (1978) (court rejects argument that "the applicable limitations period does not begin running until [the plaintiff] learns from a lawyer that [the facts of his case] equate with a legal cause of action"); Maestas v. Zager, 141 N.M. 154 , 152 P.3d 141, 147 (2007)(the course the plaintiff proposed would delay the acerual of all claims until plaintiffs consult counsel); Reichel v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wash.2d 761, 772 , 733 P.2d 530, 536 (1987)("[The plaintiff] would have us adopt a rule that would in effect toll the statute of limitations until | 1 | 1 |
Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Companygreen2 sentences2007Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 , 386 A.2d 1310, 1314 (1978) (court rejects argument that "the applicable limitations period does not begin running until [the plaintiff] learns from a lawyer that [the facts of his case] equate with a legal cause of action"); Maestas v. Zager, 141 N.M. 154 , 152 P.3d 141, 147 (2007)(the course the plaintiff proposed would delay the acerual of all claims until plaintiffs consult counsel); Reichel v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wash.2d 761, 772 , 733 P.2d 530, 536 (1987)("[The plaintiff] would have us adopt a rule that would in effect toll the statute of limitations until 2007Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 , 386 A.2d 1310, 1314 (1978) (court rejects argument that "the applicable limitations period does not begin running until [the plaintiff] learns from a lawyer that [the facts of his case] equate with a legal cause of action"); Maestas v. Zager, 141 N.M. 154 , 152 P.3d 141, 147 (2007)(the course the plaintiff proposed would delay the acerual of all claims until plaintiffs consult counsel); Reichel v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wash.2d 761, 772 , 733 P.2d 530, 536 (1987)("[The plaintiff] would have us adopt a rule that would in effect toll the statute of limitations until | 1 | 1 |
Crowder v. Master Financial, Inc.green1 sentence2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona | 1 | 1 |
Maestas Ex Rel. Estate of Varela v. Zagergreen2 sentences2007Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 , 386 A.2d 1310, 1314 (1978) (court rejects argument that "the applicable limitations period does not begin running until [the plaintiff] learns from a lawyer that [the facts of his case] equate with a legal cause of action"); Maestas v. Zager, 141 N.M. 154 , 152 P.3d 141, 147 (2007)(the course the plaintiff proposed would delay the acerual of all claims until plaintiffs consult counsel); Reichel v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wash.2d 761, 772 , 733 P.2d 530, 536 (1987)("[The plaintiff] would have us adopt a rule that would in effect toll the statute of limitations until 2007Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-92 , 386 A.2d 1310, 1314 (1978) (court rejects argument that "the applicable limitations period does not begin running until [the plaintiff] learns from a lawyer that [the facts of his case] equate with a legal cause of action"); Maestas v. Zager, 141 N.M. 154 , 152 P.3d 141, 147 (2007)(the course the plaintiff proposed would delay the acerual of all claims until plaintiffs consult counsel); Reichel v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wash.2d 761, 772 , 733 P.2d 530, 536 (1987)("[The plaintiff] would have us adopt a rule that would in effect toll the statute of limitations until | 1 | 1 |
Bolduc v. National Semiconductor Corp.green1 sentence2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona | 1 | 1 |
Gutierrez v. Mofidgreen2 sentences2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona 2007This would nullify [the statute of limitations]."); Bolduc v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 106, 120 (D.Me.1998)("It would belie logic to fashion a rule whereby a cause of action accrues on the date a claimant consults with an attorney and discovers *855 he or she may have an actionable claim rather than on the day he or she discovers the facts pertinent to this injury that may or may not give rise to the legal claim."); Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886, 889 (1985)("[I]f one 'has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professiona | 1 | 1 |
Dillingham v. Univ. of Colo., Bd. of Regentsgreen1 sentence1991See Dillingham v. University of Colorado Board of Regents, 790 P.2d 851 (Colo.App.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Hasegawa v. Daygreen1 sentence1984See Hase-gawa v. Day, 684 P.2d 936 (Colo.App.1983). | 1 | 1 |
Fish v. Lileygreen2 sentences1982The separate and independent nature of this claim was recognized in Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 160 , 208 P.2d 930, 932 (1949), where a surviving wife sued for the wrongful death of her husband: “Properly considered ... the Death Act is not a survival statute. 1982The separate and independent nature of this claim was recognized in Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 160 , 208 P.2d 930, 932 (1949), where a surviving wife sued for the wrongful death of her husband: “Properly considered ... the Death Act is not a survival statute. | 1 | 1 |
Espinoza v. O'DELLgreen2 sentences1982It has long been the law in this state that a cause of action for wrongful death is not based upon a “survival theory,” section 13-20-101(1), C.R.S.1973; see Espinoza v. O’Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo.1981); Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado National Bank, 139 Colo. 205 , 338 P.2d 702 (1959), but rather is an entirely new cause of action which comes into being at death and only then vests the surviving spouse with an actionable claim for relief. 1982It has long been the law in this state that a cause of action for wrongful death is not based upon a "survival theory," section 13-20-101(1), C.R.S.1973; see Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo.1981); Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado National Bank, 139 Colo. 205 , 338 P.2d 702 (1959), but rather is an entirely new cause of action which comes into being at death *831 and only then vests the surviving spouse with an actionable claim for relief. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Arvada ex rel. Arvada Police Department v. Denver Health and Hospital Authority
green
2 sentences2024C.R.S. § 13-1-125(3) states very clearly that service of process is an explicit right that cannot be limited or affecte d. ¶ 29 However, t he statute’s reference to process service under t he procedural rules as a “right” is not dispositive as to whether plaintiffs have an actionable claim for relief , under the statute or procedural rules in a civil suit based on alleged obstacles to servin g 16 process. 6 See City of Arvada , ¶¶ 18, 20, 403 P.3d at 613 . 2024C.R.S. § 13-1-125(3) states very clearly that service of process is an explicit right that cannot be limited or affecte d. ¶ 29 However, t he statute’s reference to process service under t he procedural rules as a “right” is not dispositive as to whether plaintiffs have an actionable claim for relief , under the statute or procedural rules in a civil suit based on alleged obstacles to servin g 16 process. 6 See City of Arvada , ¶¶ 18, 20, 403 P.3d at 613 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness
green
1 sentence2024Denver Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 701 P.2d 114, 118 (Colo. App. 1985).1 Importantly, “[i]f the legislative enactment or regulation defines the legal duty owed by the defendant, then proof of the violation establishes a breach of that duty.” Gerrity Oil, 946 P.2d at 930 ; see also Scott, 39 P.3d at 1166 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens
green
2 sentences2003“The basis for a contract action is the parties’ agreement; to succeed under the consumer protection law, one must show not necessarily an agreement, but in all cases, an unfair or deceptive practice.” American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 , 115 S.Ct. 817 , 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (concerning the Illinois Consumer Protection Act). 2003“The basis for a contract action is the parties’ agreement; to succeed under the consumer protection law, one must show not necessarily an agreement, but in all cases, an unfair or deceptive practice.” American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 , 115 S.Ct. 817 , 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (concerning the Illinois Consumer Protection Act). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
First National Bank in Lamar v. Collins
green
1 sentence1992In First National Bank v. Collins, 44 Colo.App. 228 , 616 P.2d 154 (1980), we adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1976) in recognizing negligent misrepresentation as an actionable claim in Colorado. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
FIRST NAT. BANK IN LAMAR v. Collins
green
1 sentence1992In First National Bank v. Collins, 44 Colo.App. 228 , 616 P.2d 154 (1980), we adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1976) in recognizing negligent misrepresentation as an actionable claim in Colorado. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble
green
2 sentences1992In Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138 (Colo.1984), however, we acknowledged in passing that “Colorado courts recognize negligent en-trustment as an actionable claim,” citing Hasegawa. 1992Id. at 1140 n. 3. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Dunbar v. Olivieri
green
2 sentences1985Dunbar v. Olivieri, 97 Colo. 381 , 50 P.2d 64 (1935). 1985Dunbar v. Olivieri, 97 Colo. 381 , 50 P.2d 64 (1935). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Dickens v. Barnham
green
2 sentences1984Jensen’s negligent entrustment claim was based upon the fact that Trimble had made the family automobile available to his minor son, knowing of his son’s poor driving record, his problems with alcohol, and his behavioral problems in general. 3 .Prior to Douglass , Colorado courts had not explicitly recognized the tort of "negligent en-trustment.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Douglass that, based on its interpretation of Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349 , 194 P. 356 (1920), Colorado courts recognize negligent entrustment as an actionable claim. 1984Jensen’s negligent entrustment claim was based upon the fact that Trimble had made the family automobile available to his minor son, knowing of his son’s poor driving record, his problems with alcohol, and his behavioral problems in general. 3 .Prior to Douglass , Colorado courts had not explicitly recognized the tort of "negligent en-trustment.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Douglass that, based on its interpretation of Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349 , 194 P. 356 (1920), Colorado courts recognize negligent entrustment as an actionable claim. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Public Service Co.
green
2 sentences1984McGee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., supra. See Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co., 194 Colo. 107 , 570 P.2d 239 (1977). 1984McGee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., supra. See Federal Insurance Co. v. Public Service Co., 194 Colo. 107 , 570 P.2d 239 (1977). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado National Bank of Denver
green
2 sentences1982It has long been the law in this state that a cause of action for wrongful death is not based upon a “survival theory,” section 13-20-101(1), C.R.S.1973; see Espinoza v. O’Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo.1981); Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado National Bank, 139 Colo. 205 , 338 P.2d 702 (1959), but rather is an entirely new cause of action which comes into being at death and only then vests the surviving spouse with an actionable claim for relief. 1982It has long been the law in this state that a cause of action for wrongful death is not based upon a “survival theory,” section 13-20-101(1), C.R.S.1973; see Espinoza v. O’Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo.1981); Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado National Bank, 139 Colo. 205 , 338 P.2d 702 (1959), but rather is an entirely new cause of action which comes into being at death and only then vests the surviving spouse with an actionable claim for relief. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Berry v. Donovan
green
1 sentence1925Berry v. Donovan, supra; R. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Moe v. Lowry
green
2 sentences1925Moe v. Lowry, 69 Colo. 371 , 194 Pac. 363 ; Daniel v. Brown, 33 Fed. 849 . 1925Moe v. Lowry, 69 Colo. 371 , 194 Pac. 363 ; Daniel v. Brown, 33 Fed. 849 . | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Daniel v. Brown
neutral
1 sentence1925Moe v. Lowry, 69 Colo. 371 , 194 Pac. 363 ; Daniel v. Brown, 33 Fed. 849 . | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.