actionable claim in New York

2006To assert an actionable claim under Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiff must show that he was injured during “the erection [or] demolition ... of a building or structure” (Labor Law § 240 [1]; see Martinez v City of New York, 93 NY2d 322, 326 [1999]; Keenan v Just Kids Learning Ctr., 297 AD2d 708 [2002]).

2006To assert an actionable claim under Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiff must establish that he or she was injured during “the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” (Labor Law § 240 [1]; see Martinez v City of New York, 93 NY2d 322, 326 [1999]).

2024Again, in New York, violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, do not, absent more, provide a basis for a legal malpractice claim against an attorney or firm ( Doscher at 699 ; Cohen at 513; Kallman at 1096 ; Arkin Kaplan LLP at 366 ; Weintraub at 254 ).

2024Again, in New York, violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, do not, absent more, provide a basis for a legal malpractice claim against an attorney or firm ( Doscher at 699 ; Cohen at 513; Kallman at 1096 ; Arkin Kaplan LLP at 366 ; Weintraub at 254 ).

2024Corp. v Kalish , 22 Misc 3d 130 [A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50127[U] [App Term, 1st Dept [*4]2009] ["In the absence of any claim or showing that tenant's alleged [conduct] in any way affected other building residents, landlord failed to state an actionable claim for nuisance (internal citation omitted)."]) In Nestor v McDowell , 81 NY2d 410, 413 (1993), the lower court and the Appellate Division held that the installation of a washing machine in violation of the lease amounted to curable conduct under RPAPL 753 (4).

2024Corp. v Kalish , 22 Misc 3d 130 [A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50127[U] [App Term, 1st Dept [*4]2009] ["In the absence of any claim or showing that tenant's alleged [conduct] in any way affected other building residents, landlord failed to state an actionable claim for nuisance (internal citation omitted)."]) In Nestor v McDowell , 81 NY2d 410, 413 (1993), the lower court and the Appellate Division held that the installation of a washing machine in violation of the lease amounted to curable conduct under RPAPL 753 (4).

2021Instead, an actionable claim for fraudulent inducement must allege the "representation of present fact, not of future intent" ( Deerfield Communication Corp. v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc. , 68 NY2d 954, 956 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2021Instead, an actionable claim for fraudulent inducement must allege the "representation of present fact, not of future intent" ( Deerfield Communication Corp. v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc. , 68 NY2d 954, 956 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018With regard to the circumstances under which a corporate employer may be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of its employees, the "City HRL imposes strict liability on employers for the acts of managers and supervisors . . . where . . . the offending employee exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility'" ( McRedmond v Sutton Place Rest. & Bar, Inc. , 95 AD3d 671, 673 [1st Dept 2012], quoting Zakrzewska v New School , 14 NY3d 469, 479 [2010], quoting Administrative Code § 8-107[13][b][1]).

2018With regard to the circumstances under which a corporate employer may be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of its employees, the "City HRL imposes strict liability on employers for the acts of managers and supervisors . . . where . . . the offending employee exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility'" ( McRedmond v Sutton Place Rest. & Bar, Inc. , 95 AD3d 671, 673 [1st Dept 2012], quoting Zakrzewska v New School , 14 NY3d 469, 479 [2010], quoting Administrative Code § 8-107[13][b][1]).

2018With regard to the circumstances under which a corporate employer may be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of its employees, the "City HRL imposes strict liability on employers for the acts of managers and supervisors . . . where . . . the offending employee exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility'" ( McRedmond v Sutton Place Rest. & Bar, Inc. , 95 AD3d 671, 673 [1st Dept 2012], quoting Zakrzewska v New School , 14 NY3d 469, 479 [2010], quoting Administrative Code § 8-107[13][b][1]).

2018With regard to the circumstances under which a corporate employer may be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of its employees, the "City HRL imposes strict liability on employers for the acts of managers and supervisors . . . where . . . the offending employee exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility'" ( McRedmond v Sutton Place Rest. & Bar, Inc. , 95 AD3d 671, 673 [1st Dept 2012], quoting Zakrzewska v New School , 14 NY3d 469, 479 [2010], quoting Administrative Code § 8-107[13][b][1]).

2014Giving plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the pleadings (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634 [1976]), as we must on a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442 [1982], cert denied 459 US 1146 [1983]), it appears that the inaction of counsel rendered the lapse of plaintiffs cause of action not merely possible — or even probable — but inevitable.

2014Giving plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the pleadings (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634 [1976]), as we must on a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442 [1982], cert denied 459 US 1146 [1983]), it appears that the inaction of counsel rendered the lapse of plaintiffs cause of action not merely possible — or even probable — but inevitable.

2014Giving plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the pleadings (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634 [1976]), as we must on a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442 [1982], cert denied 459 US 1146 [1983]), it appears that the inaction of counsel rendered the lapse of plaintiffs cause of action not merely possible — or even probable — but inevitable.

2014Giving plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the pleadings (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634 [1976]), as we must on a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442 [1982], cert denied 459 US 1146 [1983]), it appears that the inaction of counsel rendered the lapse of plaintiffs cause of action not merely possible — or even probable — but inevitable.

2025The Second Circuit has consistently recognized that hostile work environment claims differ from discrete acts of discrimination because they involve repeated conduct over time, the cumulative effect of which creates an actionable claim (see Taylor v. City of New York, 207 F. Supp. 3d 293, 302 [S.D.N.Y. 2016]).

2025In particular, the doctrine allows courts to consider conduct that occurred outside the statutory limitations period when it is part of an ongoing and systematic practice of discrimination (see Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359 [2d Cir. 2001][holding that “a continuing violation may be found where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice”]). 156492/2024 WALLS, GABRIELLE vs.

2022While "finger pointing and generalized yelling . . . is not the type of menacing conduct that may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful conduct needed to state an actionable claim of assault" ( Okoli v Paul Hastings LLP , 117 AD3d 539, 540 [1st Dept 2014]), the complaint alleges that defendant Drukier "encroached further upon her" while screaming an epithet.

2019Notwithstanding, a motion for summary [*2]judgment must be denied if there are issues of fact as to an actionable claim, even if the claim was not properly pleaded ( Ramos v Jake Realty Co. , 21 AD3d 744, 745 [1st Dept 2005]).

2019The SAC did not attribute specific misrepresentations or wrongdoing to most defendants ( see Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co. , 50 NY2d 31, 44-45 [1980]; Fletcher v Dakota Inc., 99 AD3d 43 , 49 [1st Dept 2012]), but rather, impermissibly lumped those defendants together with the others against whom specific acts had been pleaded ( Jonas v National Life Ins.

2010To plead a deceptive act or practice, a plaintiff must allege “(1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice” (City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc., 12 NY3d 616, 621 [2009]).

2010A plaintiff need not be a consumer or someone standing in the shoes of a consumer to have an actionable claim (Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v Philip Morris USA Inc., 344 F3d 211, 218 [2d Cir 2003]).

2010(Silberblatt, 5 NY2d at 640.) Consequently, the court finds that the MRT is properly assessed against federal credit unions, including Hudson Valley, and that DTF’s motion to dismiss is granted because Hudson Valley has failed to state an actionable claim.

2009Co. v Matthew Bender & Co., 220 AD2d 488, 490 [2d Dept 1995]; Nassau Diagnostic Imaging & Radiation Oncology Assoc. v Winthrop-University Hosp., 197 AD2d 563, 563-564 [2d Dept 1993]). “[C]onduct constituting tortious interference with business relations is, by definition, conduct directed not at the plaintiff itself, but at the party with which the plaintiff has or seeks to have a relationship” (Carvel Corp. v Noonan, 3 NY3d 182, 192 [2004]).

2009With respect to Empire’s second cause of action for tortious interference with business relations, in order to state an actionable claim for tortious interference with business relations, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a business relation with a third party; (2) that the defendant, having knowledge of such relationship, intentionally interfered with it; (3) that the defendant either acted with the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff or by means that were dishonest, unfair, or improper; and (4) a resulting injury to the plaintiffs business relationship (see Zdenek Marek v Old N

2009With respect to Empire’s second cause of action for tortious interference with business relations, in order to state an actionable claim for tortious interference with business relations, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a business relation with a third party; (2) that the defendant, having knowledge of such relationship, intentionally interfered with it; (3) that the defendant either acted with the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff or by means that were dishonest, unfair, or improper; and (4) a resulting injury to the plaintiffs business relationship (see Zdenek Marek v Old N