arbitrary rule in Tennessee

1968As more tersely said, the doctrine ‘is not an arbitrary rule (but) is rather a common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence.’ George Foltis, Inc. v. [City of] New York, 287 N.Y. 108 , 38 N.E.2d 455 , 153 A.L.R. 1122 ; Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 438 , 192 S.W.2d 992 .” We conclude that the circuit court correctly ruled, under the undisputed proof, that res ipsa is inapplicable.

1968As more tersely said, the doctrine ‘is not an arbitrary rule (but) is rather a common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence.’ George Foltis, Inc. v. [City of] New York, 287 N.Y. 108 , 38 N.E.2d 455 , 153 A.L.R. 1122 ; Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 438 , 192 S.W.2d 992 .” We conclude that the circuit court correctly ruled, under the undisputed proof, that res ipsa is inapplicable.

1968As more tersely said, the doctrine ‘is not an arbitrary rule (but) is rather a common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence.’ George Foltis, Inc. v. [City of] New York, 287 N.Y. 108 , 38 N.E.2d 455 , 153 A.L.R. 1122 ; Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 438 , 192 S.W.2d 992 .” We conclude that the circuit court correctly ruled, under the undisputed proof, that res ipsa is inapplicable.

1968As more tersely said, the doctrine ‘is not an arbitrary rule (but) is rather a common sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence.’ George Foltis, Inc. v. [City of] New York, 287 N.Y. 108 , 38 N.E.2d 455 , 153 A.L.R. 1122 ; Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 438 , 192 S.W.2d 992 .” We conclude that the circuit court correctly ruled, under the undisputed proof, that res ipsa is inapplicable.

1978Any such attempt to limit the judgment of the courts would come close to the *425 exercise of a judicial function.” 313 S.W.2d at 443-444 .

1968As has been remarked at several other points, there is no place for fictions in compensation law; this is especially true when your particular rule is built up largely on the basis of personal moral culpability in an individual, and. the effect of the fiction is to assume that the shifting of technical legal liability under the arbitrary principle of respondeat superior connotes .also the shifting of the moral and ethical .■ responsibility for the wrong — a completely erroneous ■conclusion.” In reaching this conclusion Stewart v. McLellan’s Stores, 194 S.C. 50 , 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), and Heskett

1968As has been remarked at several other points, there is no place for fictions in compensation law; this is especially true when your particular rule is built up largely on the basis of personal moral culpability in an individual, and. the effect of the fiction is to assume that the shifting of technical legal liability under the arbitrary principle of respondeat superior connotes .also the shifting of the moral and ethical .■ responsibility for the wrong — a completely erroneous ■conclusion.” In reaching this conclusion Stewart v. McLellan’s Stores, 194 S.C. 50 , 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), and Heskett

1968As has been remarked at several other points, there is no place for fictions in compensation law; this is especially true when your particular rule is built up largely on the basis of personal moral culpability in an individual, and. the effect of the fiction is to assume that the shifting of technical legal liability under the arbitrary principle of respondeat superior connotes .also the shifting of the moral and ethical .■ responsibility for the wrong — a completely erroneous ■conclusion.” In reaching this conclusion Stewart v. McLellan’s Stores, 194 S.C. 50 , 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), and Heskett

1968As has been remarked at several other points, there is no place for fictions in compensation law; this is especially true when your particular rule is built up largely on the basis of personal moral culpability in an individual, and. the effect of the fiction is to assume that the shifting of technical legal liability under the arbitrary principle of respondeat superior connotes .also the shifting of the moral and ethical .■ responsibility for the wrong — a completely erroneous ■conclusion.” In reaching this conclusion Stewart v. McLellan’s Stores, 194 S.C. 50 , 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), and Heskett

1968As has been remarked at several other points, there is no place for fictions in compensation law; this is especially true when your particular rule is built up largely on the basis of personal moral culpability in an individual, and. the effect of the fiction is to assume that the shifting of technical legal liability under the arbitrary principle of respondeat superior connotes .also the shifting of the moral and ethical .■ responsibility for the wrong — a completely erroneous ■conclusion.” In reaching this conclusion Stewart v. McLellan’s Stores, 194 S.C. 50 , 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), and Heskett

1968As has been remarked at several other points, there is no place for fictions in compensation law; this is especially true when your particular rule is built up largely on the basis of personal moral culpability in an individual, and. the effect of the fiction is to assume that the shifting of technical legal liability under the arbitrary principle of respondeat superior connotes .also the shifting of the moral and ethical .■ responsibility for the wrong — a completely erroneous ■conclusion.” In reaching this conclusion Stewart v. McLellan’s Stores, 194 S.C. 50 , 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), and Heskett

1924The purpose of the by-law under consideration is not to do away with presumption of death on account of the disappearance and continued absence, but is to substitute certainty for uncertainty, to displace guesswork by science, and to supplant groundless conjecture by actual experience.” In Kelly v. Supreme Council, supra, the court said: “The foregoing facts being admitted — as they must be for the purpose of considering the demurrer — it does not require argument to demonstrate that the defense is not demurrable.