arbitrary bar in Montana

2003The equities unique to this case weigh heavily in Ereth’s favor, as does our longstanding preference for allowing “resolution of claims on their merits rather than the arbitrary bar of the statute of limitations.” Kearney v. KXLF Communications, Inc. (1994), 263 Mont. 407, 413 , 869 P.2d 772, 775 . ¶31 Accordingly, parties convicted in a criminal proceeding are hereby put on notice that any alleged act of attorney error or omission discovered on or after the date of this Opinion triggers the running of the statute of limitations for the filing of any legal malpractice claim.

2003The equities unique to this case weigh heavily in Ereth’s favor, as does our longstanding preference for allowing “resolution of claims on their merits rather than the arbitrary bar of the statute of limitations.” Kearney v. KXLF Communications, Inc. (1994), 263 Mont. 407, 413 , 869 P.2d 772, 775 . ¶31 Accordingly, parties convicted in a criminal proceeding are hereby put on notice that any alleged act of attorney error or omission discovered on or after the date of this Opinion triggers the running of the statute of limitations for the filing of any legal malpractice claim.

2000“This [general rule] serves the legislative intent of protecting defendants from stale claims, yet provides an approach of liberality which affords a plaintiff party-litigant maximum free access to our court system....” Thiel, 218 Mont. at 212-13 , 710 P.2d at 40 (citations omitted). ¶20 Royal thus urges this Court to apply that general rule here, as we did in Ritland v. Rowe (1993), 260 Mont. 453 , 861 P.2d 175 , and Kearney v. KXLF Communications, Inc. (1994), 263 Mont. 407 , 869 P.2d 772 , so as to further the public policy recognized in Thiel of favoring “access to our courts and resolutio

2000“This [general rule] serves the legislative intent of protecting defendants from stale claims, yet provides an approach of liberality which affords a plaintiff party-litigant maximum free access to our court system....” Thiel, 218 Mont. at 212-13 , 710 P.2d at 40 (citations omitted). ¶20 Royal thus urges this Court to apply that general rule here, as we did in Ritland v. Rowe (1993), 260 Mont. 453 , 861 P.2d 175 , and Kearney v. KXLF Communications, Inc. (1994), 263 Mont. 407 , 869 P.2d 772 , so as to further the public policy recognized in Thiel of favoring “access to our courts and resolutio

1997See Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856 ; Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17 ; Burke, 766 P.2d at 256 .

1997See Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856 ; Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17 ; Burke, 766 P.2d at 256 .

1997See Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856 ; Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17 ; Burke, 766 P.2d at 256 .

1997See Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856 ; Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17 ; Burke, 766 P.2d at 256 .

1932Co. v. Dodge County, 80 Neb. 18 , 113 N. W. 805 ; State v. State Board of Equalization, 56 Mont. 413 , 185 Pac. 708, 713 , 186 Pac. 697 .) In the case last cited, this court, in construing section 6, Chapter 49, Laws of 1919, now section 2143, supra, held that the method of valuation for taxing purposes provided by that act “does not establish an arbitrary rule of assessment, but only requires that the total value of the plant and property, wherever situated, shall be taken into consideration in determining the actual cash value for taxation of that portion of the plant and property situated w

1932Co. v. Dodge County, 80 Neb. 18 , 113 N. W. 805 ; State v. State Board of Equalization, 56 Mont. 413 , 185 Pac. 708, 713 , 186 Pac. 697 .) In the case last cited, this court, in construing section 6, Chapter 49, Laws of 1919, now section 2143, supra, held that the method of valuation for taxing purposes provided by that act “does not establish an arbitrary rule of assessment, but only requires that the total value of the plant and property, wherever situated, shall be taken into consideration in determining the actual cash value for taxation of that portion of the plant and property situated w

1932Co. v. Dodge County, 80 Neb. 18 , 113 N. W. 805 ; State v. State Board of Equalization, 56 Mont. 413 , 185 Pac. 708, 713 , 186 Pac. 697 .) In the case last cited, this court, in construing section 6, Chapter 49, Laws of 1919, now section 2143, supra, held that the method of valuation for taxing purposes provided by that act “does not establish an arbitrary rule of assessment, but only requires that the total value of the plant and property, wherever situated, shall be taken into consideration in determining the actual cash value for taxation of that portion of the plant and property situated w

1932Co. v. Dodge County, 80 Neb. 18 , 113 N. W. 805 ; State v. State Board of Equalization, 56 Mont. 413 , 185 Pac. 708, 713 , 186 Pac. 697 .) In the case last cited, this court, in construing section 6, Chapter 49, Laws of 1919, now section 2143, supra, held that the method of valuation for taxing purposes provided by that act “does not establish an arbitrary rule of assessment, but only requires that the total value of the plant and property, wherever situated, shall be taken into consideration in determining the actual cash value for taxation of that portion of the plant and property situated w

1924Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320 , 137 Pac. 392 ; Hilger v. Moore, supra; Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258 , 175 Pac. 878 ,) Also, we must hear in mind that Article XII of our Constitution deals with the raising of revenue and the valuation and taxation of property, and that “the division of our Constitution into Chapters and sections is a mere matter of convenience for the purpose of reference, and is not of significance in applying the rules of construction and interpretation”; and also that “every provision dealing with the same subject matter must be considered in determining the meaning of a

1924Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320 , 137 Pac. 392 ; Hilger v. Moore, supra; Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258 , 175 Pac. 878 ,) Also, we must hear in mind that Article XII of our Constitution deals with the raising of revenue and the valuation and taxation of property, and that “the division of our Constitution into Chapters and sections is a mere matter of convenience for the purpose of reference, and is not of significance in applying the rules of construction and interpretation”; and also that “every provision dealing with the same subject matter must be considered in determining the meaning of a

1924Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320 , 137 Pac. 392 ; Hilger v. Moore, supra; Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258 , 175 Pac. 878 ,) Also, we must hear in mind that Article XII of our Constitution deals with the raising of revenue and the valuation and taxation of property, and that “the division of our Constitution into Chapters and sections is a mere matter of convenience for the purpose of reference, and is not of significance in applying the rules of construction and interpretation”; and also that “every provision dealing with the same subject matter must be considered in determining the meaning of a

1924Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320 , 137 Pac. 392 ; Hilger v. Moore, supra; Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258 , 175 Pac. 878 ,) Also, we must hear in mind that Article XII of our Constitution deals with the raising of revenue and the valuation and taxation of property, and that “the division of our Constitution into Chapters and sections is a mere matter of convenience for the purpose of reference, and is not of significance in applying the rules of construction and interpretation”; and also that “every provision dealing with the same subject matter must be considered in determining the meaning of a