arbitrary rule in Ohio

2002There is nothing `intrinsic to the jury's truth-finding function in an arbitrary requirement that opposing counsel's trial strategy may not be undercut.' Bell v. State (Fla. 1986), 491 So.2d 537 , 538." State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24 , 34 , 553 N.E.2d 576 ; see, also, Sanders . {¶ 23} In the case at bar, we agree with the trial court that the state was entitled to inquire into its own witness's prior criminal history to "draw the sting" of Lowry's cross-examination.

1990There is nothing “intrinsic to the jury’s truth-finding function in an arbitrary requirement that opposing counsel’s trial strategy may not be undercut.” Bell v. State (Fla. 1986), 491 So. 2d 537, 538 .

1962As stated by the Court of Appeals in the Ellis case, 70 Ohio Law Abs., 417, 425 , it would be difficult to fix an arbitrary rule as to the period of time within which the purchase price of such property should be either admitted or excluded.

1962As stated by the Court of Appeals in the Ellis case, 70 Ohio Law Abs., 417, 425 , it would be difficult to fix an arbitrary rule as to the period of time within which the purchase price of such property should be either admitted or excluded.

2006In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the rule excluding defense evidence based on the strength of the prosecution’s case was arbitrary and improperly denied the defendant his constitutional right to have “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” 547 U.S. at-, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 , quoting Crane v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , quoting California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 . {¶ 70} In this case, the trial court did not exclude evidence about Trent based on the

2006In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the rule excluding defense evidence based on the strength of the prosecution’s case was arbitrary and improperly denied the defendant his constitutional right to have “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” 547 U.S. at-, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 , quoting Crane v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , quoting California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 . {¶ 70} In this case, the trial court did not exclude evidence about Trent based on the

2006In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the rule excluding defense evidence based on the strength of the prosecution’s case was arbitrary and improperly denied the defendant his constitutional right to have “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” 547 U.S. at-, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 , quoting Crane v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , quoting California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 . {¶ 70} In this case, the trial court did not exclude evidence about Trent based on the

2006In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the rule excluding defense evidence based on the strength of the prosecution’s case was arbitrary and improperly denied the defendant his constitutional right to have “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” 547 U.S. at-, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 , quoting Crane v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , quoting California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 . {¶ 70} In this case, the trial court did not exclude evidence about Trent based on the

2006In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the rule excluding defense evidence based on the strength of the prosecution’s case was arbitrary and improperly denied the defendant his constitutional right to have “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” 547 U.S. at-, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 , quoting Crane v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , quoting California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 . {¶ 70} In this case, the trial court did not exclude evidence about Trent based on the

2006In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the rule excluding defense evidence based on the strength of the prosecution’s case was arbitrary and improperly denied the defendant his constitutional right to have “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” 547 U.S. at-, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 , quoting Crane v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 683 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , quoting California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 . {¶ 70} In this case, the trial court did not exclude evidence about Trent based on the

2002There is nothing `intrinsic to the jury's truth-finding function in an arbitrary requirement that opposing counsel's trial strategy may not be undercut.' Bell v. State (Fla. 1986), 491 So.2d 537 , 538." State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24 , 34 , 553 N.E.2d 576 ; see, also, Sanders . {¶ 23} In the case at bar, we agree with the trial court that the state was entitled to inquire into its own witness's prior criminal history to "draw the sting" of Lowry's cross-examination.

2002There is nothing `intrinsic to the jury's truth-finding function in an arbitrary requirement that opposing counsel's trial strategy may not be undercut.' Bell v. State (Fla. 1986), 491 So.2d 537 , 538." State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24 , 34 , 553 N.E.2d 576 ; see, also, Sanders . {¶ 23} In the case at bar, we agree with the trial court that the state was entitled to inquire into its own witness's prior criminal history to "draw the sting" of Lowry's cross-examination.

1992The absence of such explicitness in the instant case militates against a judicial decision in favor of the subjective personal judgment criterion in two ways: * * * In the absence of a specific expression in the instrument or a clear indication from the nature of the subject matter, the preference of the law is for the less arbitrary standard of the reasonable man.” Id., 20 Cal.App.3d at 262-263 , 97 Cal.Rptr. at 751-752 .

1992The absence of such explicitness in the instant case militates against a judicial decision in favor of the subjective personal judgment criterion in two ways: * * * In the absence of a specific expression in the instrument or a clear indication from the nature of the subject matter, the preference of the law is for the less arbitrary standard of the reasonable man.” Id., 20 Cal.App.3d at 262-263 , 97 Cal.Rptr. at 751-752 .

1980As the court noted in United States v. Torquato (C.A. 3, 1979), 602 F. 2d 564 , 568: “ * * *To permit criminal prosecutions to be initiated on the basis of arbitrary or irrational factors would be to transform the prosecutorial function from one protecting the public interest through impartial enforcement of the rule of law to one permitting the exercise of prosecutorial power based on personal or political bias.” It is our obligation to prevent such personal abuses of governmental power.

1963The territory may be smaller or larger than one state, and as Judge Woolley in Jacobs v. Iodent Chemical Co., 41 F. 2d 637 (C.

1945Appellants cite the first paragraph of the syllabus of Holdren, Admr., v. Holdren, 78 Ohio St., 276 , 85 N. E., 537 , 18 L.

1943If the regulations are responsive to the purpose and powers properly delegated to the administrator by the act, then it must follow that the defendants have the right of it, and the landlord must strictly pursue the administrator’s regulations as to notice, upon the arbitrary rule that such aii act is an imperative war measure necessary to control rent inflation which was recognized in a like act in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S., 135 , 65 L.

1943If the regulations are responsive to the purpose and powers properly delegated to the administrator by the act, then it must follow that the defendants have the right of it, and the landlord must strictly pursue the administrator’s regulations as to notice, upon the arbitrary rule that such aii act is an imperative war measure necessary to control rent inflation which was recognized in a like act in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S., 135 , 65 L.

1912In the case of Bigaouette v. Paulet, supra, the court held that: “A husband may maintain an action for the loss of the consortium of his wife against the person who has criminal conversation with her, whether such conversation is with or without her consent and although the act caused no actual loss of her services to him.” The case of Hart v. Knapp, 76 Conn., 135 , was a suit by the wife against another woman for the alienating of her husband’s affection by acts of illicit intercourse.

1912In the case of Bigaouette v. Paulet, supra, the court held that: “A husband may maintain an action for the loss of the consortium of his wife against the person who has criminal conversation with her, whether such conversation is with or without her consent and although the act caused no actual loss of her services to him.” The case of Hart v. Knapp, 76 Conn., 135 , was a suit by the wife against another woman for the alienating of her husband’s affection by acts of illicit intercourse.

1876Where, therefore, as in the case of Wood v. Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172 , and the later case of Leggett v. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272 , money is advanced, to be used in a trading business, and returned in a year with a share of the profits made during that time, it may well be implied that the business was conducted on behalf and by the authority of the person advancing the money and sharing the profits, for it is to the continuing trade, in the ordinary way,'that he looks for his profits.