arbitrary rule in Texas

2015In Fisher v. Wilkinson, Mo., 382 S.W.2d [**8] Page 4 412 S.W.2d 299 , *; 1967 Tex. LEXIS 293 , **; 10 Tex. Sup. J. 187 627, 632 , we held: 'Without the aid of expert medical testimony in this case a jury could not, without resorting to conjecture and surmise or by setting up an arbitrary standard of their own, determine that defendants failed to exercise their skill and use the care exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful and prudent physician acting under the same or similar circumstances.' And, as we said in Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 736 , 102 S.W.2d 600 , 607: 'Juries should n

2015In Fisher v. Wilkinson, Mo., 382 S.W.2d [**8] Page 4 412 S.W.2d 299 , *; 1967 Tex. LEXIS 293 , **; 10 Tex. Sup. J. 187 627, 632 , we held: 'Without the aid of expert medical testimony in this case a jury could not, without resorting to conjecture and surmise or by setting up an arbitrary standard of their own, determine that defendants failed to exercise their skill and use the care exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful and prudent physician acting under the same or similar circumstances.' And, as we said in Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 736 , 102 S.W.2d 600 , 607: 'Juries should n

1936As authority for the proposition that a municipality may -not, by an arbitrary standard, declare that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact, appellant cites the cases of Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303 , 247 S.W. 810 , 26 A.L.R. 1210 , and City of Texarkana v. Reagan, 112 Tex. 317 , 247 S.W. 816, 818 .

1936As authority for the proposition that a municipality may -not, by an arbitrary standard, declare that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact, appellant cites the cases of Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303 , 247 S.W. 810 , 26 A.L.R. 1210 , and City of Texarkana v. Reagan, 112 Tex. 317 , 247 S.W. 816, 818 .

2020In the first scenario, “the constitutional infirmity is in the arbitrary rule of evidence itself.” Id. (quoting Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex. Crim.

2015Williams, 273 S.W.3d at 232 .

1967In Fisher v. Wilkinson, Mo., 382 S.W.2d 627, 632 , we held: "Without the aid of expert medical testimony in this case a jury could not, without resorting to conjecture and surmise or by setting up an arbitrary standard of their own, determine that defendants failed to exercise their skill and use the care exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful and prudent physician acting under the same or similar circumstances.' And, as we said in Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 736 , 102 S.W.2d 600 , 607: `Juries should not be thus turned loose and privileged to say, perchance, the method of treatin

1967In Fisher v. Wilkinson, Mo., 382 S.W.2d 627, 632 , we held: Without the aid of expert medical testimony in this case a jury could not, without resorting to conjecture and surmise or by setting up an arbitrary standard of their own, determine that defendants failed to exercise their skill and use the care exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful and prudent physician acting under the same or similar circumstances.’ And, as we said in Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 736 , 102 S.W.2d 600 , 607: ‘Juries should not be thus turned loose and privileged to say, perchance, the method of treating

2018“In the first category, the constitutional infirmity is in the arbitrary rule of evidence itself.” Id.

2007Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 949 , 123 S.Ct. 415 , 154 L.Ed.2d 294 (2002).

2012The court of appeals held that merely because a city has the power by charter and statute to define and prevent a nuisance does not mean a city “may ‘by an arbitrary standard, declare that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact.’ ” Id.

2007Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 949 , 123 S.Ct. 415 , 154 L.Ed.2d 294 (2002).

2007Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 949 , 123 S.Ct. 415 , 154 L.Ed.2d 294 (2002).

2002Rather, its purpose is to afford each member of a governing body the opportunity to be present and to impart to his colleagues the benefit of his experience, counsel, and judgment on an issue so that when it is decided, it is the “composite judgment of the body as a whole.” See Webster, 166 S.W.2d at 77 .

1973Such has been the law in all civilized nations since in his Politics, Aristotle wrote: ‘As the physician ought to be *317 judged by the physician, so ought men to be judged by their peers/ ” Appellants suggest some “modern refinements” of the Bowles rule; however, as late as 1967, our Supreme Court in Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 , reaffirmed the principles of Bowles, and additionally adopted the following language of the Supreme Court of Missouri found in Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 , 674: “ ‘Without the aid of expert medical testimony in this case a jury could not, without resorting to

1973Safeway Stores, Inc. v. White, 162 Tex. 473 , 348 S.W.2d 162 (1961); Ford v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry.

1973Safeway Stores, Inc. v. White, 162 Tex. 473 , 348 S.W.2d 162 (1961); Ford v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry.

1970The defendant, relying upon York v. Glenn, 242 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1951, no writ hist.), asserts that any convictions occurring less than eight to ten years prior to the civil trial are not too remote, and are admissible.

1970The defendant, relying upon York v. Glenn, 242 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1951, no writ hist.), asserts that any convictions occurring less than eight to ten years prior to the civil trial are not too remote, and are admissible.

1956It is axiomatic that no legislative body may “by an arbitrary standard, declare that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact.” Bielecki v. City of Port Arthur, supra [ 12 S.W.2d 978 ], In Murphy v. Wright, supra [ 115 S.W.2d 451 ], this Court held that a city “would have no right to supersede” a revenue statute by declaration that a licensed business is, there, a nuisance.

1944The question came before the courts probably for the first time in the case of Parker v. State, 29" S. W. 480, from which we quote the following i “The only standard of time recognized by the courts is the meridian of the sun, and an arbitrary standard set up by persons in business will not be recognized.” Supporting this opinion is Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S. E. 734 ; and Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N. W. 872 , each of which holds that meetings and adjournments of courts should be regulated by the true sun time.

1940The idea of adopting one plan or set method of ascertaining values was discussed in the~case of Port Arthur Independent School Dlstrlct v. Baumer, 64 S.W. (2d) 412 .

1938App. 20, 13 S. W. 990 , Judge Wilson seemed to sepse the situation and as a warning suggested in the language quoted in our original opinion that *32 while it was not necessary in all cases to give such an instruction, yet it was then the opinion of the Court that where admissions and confessions of aii accused were admitted against him, and contained exculpatory statements, “it would be proper and just to the defendant to instruct the jury” relative thereto.

1936Irvine v. Grady, 85 Tex. 120 , 19 S.W. 1028 .

1936Irvine v. Grady, 85 Tex. 120 , 19 S.W. 1028 .

1936As authority for the proposition that a municipality may -not, by an arbitrary standard, declare that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact, appellant cites the cases of Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303 , 247 S.W. 810 , 26 A.L.R. 1210 , and City of Texarkana v. Reagan, 112 Tex. 317 , 247 S.W. 816, 818 .

1936As authority for the proposition that a municipality may -not, by an arbitrary standard, declare that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact, appellant cites the cases of Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303 , 247 S.W. 810 , 26 A.L.R. 1210 , and City of Texarkana v. Reagan, 112 Tex. 317 , 247 S.W. 816, 818 .

1927App.] 286 S. W. 195 ), to determine “all questions arising under this law” which are not settled by agreement and which are not otherwise definitely ruled in the law, together with broad rule-making power (section 4, art. 8307), and since a trial in the court is de novp (section 5, art. 8307), the “average weekly wages” (within the meaning of section 8, art. 8306) must be found as a fact upon evidence showing the average actual payment, unless an arbitrary rule is elsewhere in the statute definitely fixed.

1919Rep., 747 ." *Page 118 As indicative of the impossibility of fixing an arbitrary rule we cite Thomas v. State, 28 S.W.