arbitrary requirement in North Carolina

1924The position was somewhat modified in the well-considered case of Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394 , opinion by Associate Justice Brown, wherein it was held that except when otherwise controlled by an arbitrary rule of law, as by the rule in Shelley’s case, the question was largely one of intent, and if on a perusal of the entire instrument, including the habendum, it clearly appeared that a lessér estate was intended than that conferred in the premises, such a construction should prevail and the intent of the grantor be given effect, a case that has been cited with approval in numerous de

1924The position was somewhat modified in the well-considered case of Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394 , opinion by Associate Justice Brown, wherein it was held that except when otherwise controlled by an arbitrary rule of law, as by the rule in Shelley’s case, the question was largely one of intent, and if on a perusal of the entire instrument, including the habendum, it clearly appeared that a lesser estate was intended than that conferred in the premises, such a construction should prevail and the intent of the grantor be given effect, a case that has been cited with approval in numerous de

1907The principle which this Court has adopted, and which we think correct, is thus stated by Mr. Justice Rohe in Bradley v. Railroad, 144 N. C., 555 : “When the employees are en *217 gaged in the operation of mills and other plants having machinery more or less complicated and usually driven by mechanical power, in such case an arbitrary standard of duty has been fixed, and the employer is required to pi'ovide methods, placing, implements and appliances such as are known, approved and in general use,” citing Hicks v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 319 ; Horne v. Power Co., 141 N. C., 50 ; Fearingt

1907Hicks v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 319 ; Horne v. Power Co., 141 N. C., 50 ; Fearington v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. C., 80 .

1907The principle which this Court has adopted, and which we think correct, is thus stated by Mr. Justice Rohe in Bradley v. Railroad, 144 N. C., 555 : “When the employees are en *217 gaged in the operation of mills and other plants having machinery more or less complicated and usually driven by mechanical power, in such case an arbitrary standard of duty has been fixed, and the employer is required to pi'ovide methods, placing, implements and appliances such as are known, approved and in general use,” citing Hicks v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 319 ; Horne v. Power Co., 141 N. C., 50 ; Fearingt

1907Hicks v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 319 ; Horne v. Power Co., 141 N. C., 50 ; Fearington v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. C., 80 .

1907The principle which this Court has adopted, and which we think correct, is thus stated by Mr. Justice Rohe in Bradley v. Railroad, 144 N. C., 555 : “When the employees are en *217 gaged in the operation of mills and other plants having machinery more or less complicated and usually driven by mechanical power, in such case an arbitrary standard of duty has been fixed, and the employer is required to pi'ovide methods, placing, implements and appliances such as are known, approved and in general use,” citing Hicks v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 319 ; Horne v. Power Co., 141 N. C., 50 ; Fearingt

1907Hicks v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 319 ; Horne v. Power Co., 141 N. C., 50 ; Fearington v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. C., 80 .

2012Defendants’ duty to keep Lampión and other children safe could have only applied when those children were on Defendants’ land and ended where Defendants’ ownership and control of their property ended. *462 Contrarily, Plaintiffs cite several cases that they contend stand for the proposition that “North Carolina does not impose an arbitrary requirement that the dangerous instrumentality be something controlled by the [defendant-landowner].” See Willis v. New Bern, 191 N.C. 507 , 132 S.E. 286 (1926); Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N.C. 383 , 100 S.E. 619 (1919); Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431 (1884)

2012Defendants’ duty to keep Lampión and other children safe could have only applied when those children were on Defendants’ land and ended where Defendants’ ownership and control of their property ended. *462 Contrarily, Plaintiffs cite several cases that they contend stand for the proposition that “North Carolina does not impose an arbitrary requirement that the dangerous instrumentality be something controlled by the [defendant-landowner].” See Willis v. New Bern, 191 N.C. 507 , 132 S.E. 286 (1926); Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N.C. 383 , 100 S.E. 619 (1919); Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431 (1884)

2012Defendants’ duty to keep Lampión and other children safe could have only applied when those children were on Defendants’ land and ended where Defendants’ ownership and control of their property ended. *462 Contrarily, Plaintiffs cite several cases that they contend stand for the proposition that “North Carolina does not impose an arbitrary requirement that the dangerous instrumentality be something controlled by the [defendant-landowner].” See Willis v. New Bern, 191 N.C. 507 , 132 S.E. 286 (1926); Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N.C. 383 , 100 S.E. 619 (1919); Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431 (1884)

2012Defendants’ duty to keep Lampión and other children safe could have only applied when those children were on Defendants’ land and ended where Defendants’ ownership and control of their property ended. *462 Contrarily, Plaintiffs cite several cases that they contend stand for the proposition that “North Carolina does not impose an arbitrary requirement that the dangerous instrumentality be something controlled by the [defendant-landowner].” See Willis v. New Bern, 191 N.C. 507 , 132 S.E. 286 (1926); Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N.C. 383 , 100 S.E. 619 (1919); Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431 (1884)

2012Defendants’ duty to keep Lampión and other children safe could have only applied when those children were on Defendants’ land and ended where Defendants’ ownership and control of their property ended. *462 Contrarily, Plaintiffs cite several cases that they contend stand for the proposition that “North Carolina does not impose an arbitrary requirement that the dangerous instrumentality be something controlled by the [defendant-landowner].” See Willis v. New Bern, 191 N.C. 507 , 132 S.E. 286 (1926); Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N.C. 383 , 100 S.E. 619 (1919); Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N.C. 431 (1884)

1951(S. v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, p. 770 , 51 S.E. 2d 731 .) The bonding requirement, in attempting to extend liability to the outermost limits of simple contractual liability, without reference to fraudulent practices, and in attempting to suspend the doctrine of respondeat superior, goes beyond the limits of legitimate regulation.

1951(S. v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, p. 770 , 51 S.E. 2d 731 .) The bonding requirement, in attempting to extend liability to the outermost limits of simple contractual liability, without reference to fraudulent practices, and in attempting to suspend the doctrine of respondeat superior, goes beyond the limits of legitimate regulation.

1927Such an arbitrary rule of evidence takes away from the defendant his constitutional rights and interferes with his guaranteed equality before the law, and, as the Supreme Court of the United States says, Violates those fundamental rights and immutable principles of justice which are embraced within the conception of due process of law.’ ” To the same effect is the utterance of Uolce, J., in Minton v. Early, 183 N. C., 199 .

1924Bagwell v. Hines, 187 N. C., 690 .

1909This is not a reasonable regulation in aid of interstate commerce, but a direct and immediate burden upon it.” In Garrison v. Railroad, ante, 575, the Court has held, Associate Justice Gonnor delivering the opinion, that the statute in question here is not an arbitrary requirement permitting no defense, but that “When the carrier shows the existence of conditions for which it is not responsible, preventing and rendering impossible the discharge of the duty, it will not be liable for the penalty,” and quotes with, approval from an opinion' by Ashe, J., as follows: “When the facts show that by f

1909This is not a reasonable regulation in aid of interstate commerce, but a direct and immediate burden upon it.” In Garrison v. Railroad, ante, 575, the Court has held, Associate Justice Gonnor delivering the opinion, that the statute in question here is not an arbitrary requirement permitting no defense, but that “When the carrier shows the existence of conditions for which it is not responsible, preventing and rendering impossible the discharge of the duty, it will not be liable for the penalty,” and quotes with, approval from an opinion' by Ashe, J., as follows: “When the facts show that by f

1909This is not a reasonable regulation in aid of interstate commerce, but a direct and immediate burden upon it.” In Garrison v. Railroad, ante, 575, the Court has held, Associate Justice Gonnor delivering the opinion, that the statute in question here is not an arbitrary requirement permitting no defense, but that “When the carrier shows the existence of conditions for which it is not responsible, preventing and rendering impossible the discharge of the duty, it will not be liable for the penalty,” and quotes with, approval from an opinion' by Ashe, J., as follows: “When the facts show that by f

1907The principle which this Court has adopted, and which we think correct, is thus stated by Mr. Justice Rohe in Bradley v. Railroad, 144 N. C., 555 : “When the employees are en *217 gaged in the operation of mills and other plants having machinery more or less complicated and usually driven by mechanical power, in such case an arbitrary standard of duty has been fixed, and the employer is required to pi'ovide methods, placing, implements and appliances such as are known, approved and in general use,” citing Hicks v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 319 ; Horne v. Power Co., 141 N. C., 50 ; Fearingt