arbitrary rule in California

1966(People v. Romero, 13 Cal.App.2d 667 [ 57 P.2d 557 ].) The question is one of balancing the public interest and the rights of the defendant.

1940As was said by this court in People v. Romero, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 667, 672 [ 57 Pac. (2d) 557 ] : “Time only will not always suffice as the sole basis for the determination of this question, but time, together with the surrounding circumstances, avoids an arbitrary standard and yet effectively preserves the safeguards created by the Constitution.” (See, also, People v. Brock, 87 Cal. App. 601 [ 262 Pac. 369 , 263 Pac. 544 ].) Finally, appellant contends that the court erred in its rulings admitting ■ certain evidence which it is claimed was hearsay.

1949(Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 [ 4 P. 919 , 10 P. 674 ].) The Welfare and Institutions Code, sections 6650 et seq., provides that certain relatives or an estate are liable for the care and maintenance of an “insane person or an inebriate.” It is the department’s contention that the amendment of 1945 to section 6650 of the Welfare and Institutions Code regarding those committed without trial under Penal Code section 1026 and its adjunct, 1026(a), “was for the purpose of clarification of the existing law.” The department overlooks the fact that there was no existing law except the arbitrary rule of

1949(Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 [ 4 P. 919 , 10 P. 674 ].) The Welfare and Institutions Code, sections 6650 et seq., provides that certain relatives or an estate are liable for the care and maintenance of an “insane person or an inebriate.” It is the department’s contention that the amendment of 1945 to section 6650 of the Welfare and Institutions Code regarding those committed without trial under Penal Code section 1026 and its adjunct, 1026(a), “was for the purpose of clarification of the existing law.” The department overlooks the fact that there was no existing law except the arbitrary rule of

1940As was said by this court in People v. Romero, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 667, 672 [ 57 Pac. (2d) 557 ] : “Time only will not always suffice as the sole basis for the determination of this question, but time, together with the surrounding circumstances, avoids an arbitrary standard and yet effectively preserves the safeguards created by the Constitution.” (See, also, People v. Brock, 87 Cal. App. 601 [ 262 Pac. 369 , 263 Pac. 544 ].) Finally, appellant contends that the court erred in its rulings admitting ■ certain evidence which it is claimed was hearsay.

1940As was said by this court in People v. Romero, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 667, 672 [ 57 Pac. (2d) 557 ] : “Time only will not always suffice as the sole basis for the determination of this question, but time, together with the surrounding circumstances, avoids an arbitrary standard and yet effectively preserves the safeguards created by the Constitution.” (See, also, People v. Brock, 87 Cal. App. 601 [ 262 Pac. 369 , 263 Pac. 544 ].) Finally, appellant contends that the court erred in its rulings admitting ■ certain evidence which it is claimed was hearsay.

2017Additionally, Craig does not "mark[ ] the outer boundary" of when alternative procedures to face-to-face confrontation are constitutionally permissible. ( Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 , 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) Trial courts have "constitutionally conferred, inherent authority to 'create new forms of procedure' in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court. [Citations.]" ( *974 Id . at p. 1507, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) But courts may not sanction new procedures that are of "dubious constitutional validity." ( In re Amber S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1266, 19 Cal.R

2017Additionally, Craig does not "mark[ ] the outer boundary" of when alternative procedures to face-to-face confrontation are constitutionally permissible. ( Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 , 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) Trial courts have "constitutionally conferred, inherent authority to 'create new forms of procedure' in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court. [Citations.]" ( *974 Id . at p. 1507, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) But courts may not sanction new procedures that are of "dubious constitutional validity." ( In re Amber S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1266, 19 Cal.R

2017Additionally, Craig does not "mark[ ] the outer boundary" of when alternative procedures to face-to-face confrontation are constitutionally permissible. ( Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 , 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) Trial courts have "constitutionally conferred, inherent authority to 'create new forms of procedure' in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court. [Citations.]" ( *974 Id . at p. 1507, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) But courts may not sanction new procedures that are of "dubious constitutional validity." ( In re Amber S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1266, 19 Cal.R

2017Additionally, Craig does not "mark[ ] the outer boundary" of when alternative procedures to face-to-face confrontation are constitutionally permissible. ( Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 , 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) Trial courts have "constitutionally conferred, inherent authority to 'create new forms of procedure' in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court. [Citations.]" ( *974 Id . at p. 1507, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) But courts may not sanction new procedures that are of "dubious constitutional validity." ( In re Amber S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1266, 19 Cal.R

2017Such an arbitrary rule would "commit[ ] the very sin the Supreme Court condemned in Coy -that is, making a 'generalized finding' about the level of trauma certain groups of *63 witnesses experience when confronting defendants." ( Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1506 , 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 , citing Coy , supra , 487 U.S. at pp. 1020-1021, 108 S.Ct. 2798 .) Such an arbitrary rule would also require the trial court to treat a witness like F.R., who had turned age 18 only two months before she testified, less favorably than a minor witness who was almost but not yet age 18.

2017Such an arbitrary rule would "commit[ ] the very sin the Supreme Court condemned in Coy -that is, making a 'generalized finding' about the level of trauma certain groups of *63 witnesses experience when confronting defendants." ( Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1506 , 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 , citing Coy , supra , 487 U.S. at pp. 1020-1021, 108 S.Ct. 2798 .) Such an arbitrary rule would also require the trial court to treat a witness like F.R., who had turned age 18 only two months before she testified, less favorably than a minor witness who was almost but not yet age 18.

2017Additionally, Craig does not "mark[ ] the outer boundary" of when alternative procedures to face-to-face confrontation are constitutionally permissible. ( Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 , 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) Trial courts have "constitutionally conferred, inherent authority to 'create new forms of procedure' in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court. [Citations.]" ( *974 Id . at p. 1507, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) But courts may not sanction new procedures that are of "dubious constitutional validity." ( In re Amber S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1266, 19 Cal.R

2017Additionally, Craig does not "mark[ ] the outer boundary" of when alternative procedures to face-to-face confrontation are constitutionally permissible. ( Lujan , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 , 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) Trial courts have "constitutionally conferred, inherent authority to 'create new forms of procedure' in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court. [Citations.]" ( *974 Id . at p. 1507, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 727 .) But courts may not sanction new procedures that are of "dubious constitutional validity." ( In re Amber S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1266, 19 Cal.R

1989(Greenbaum v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d 543, 550 ; see In re Nadrich (1988) 44 Cal.3d 271, 277, fn. 3 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 218 , 747 P.2d 1146 ] [the court specifically noted that standard 3.2 was instructive, but only imposed a one-year actual suspension on attorney who committed a crime involving moral turpitude].) We do not apply rigid disciplinary standards, but rather resolve each case on its own facts.

1982We do not reach these issues (which have been recently decided by Division Four of this district in Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 812 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]), because we find section 707, subdivisions (b) and (c) inapplicable.

1982We do not reach these issues (which have been recently decided by Division Four of this district in Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 812 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]), because we find section 707, subdivisions (b) and (c) inapplicable.

1972Not only have we reached the point, they argue, where the exceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially perpetuated “rule” and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight of the primary statutory test of “in the course of employment.” 6 The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee’s duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs “in the course of employm

1972Not only have we reached the point, they argue, where the exceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially perpetuated “rule” and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight of the primary statutory test of “in the course of employment.” 6 The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee’s duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs “in the course of employm

1972Not only have we reached the point, they argue, where the exceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially perpetuated “rule” and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight of the primary statutory test of “in the course of employment.” 6 The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee’s duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs “in the course of employm

1972Not only have we reached the point, they argue, where the exceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially perpetuated “rule” and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight of the primary statutory test of “in the course of employment.” 6 The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee’s duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs “in the course of employm

1972Not only have we reached the point, they argue, where the exceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially perpetuated “rule” and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight of the primary statutory test of “in the course of employment.” 6 The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee’s duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs “in the course of employm

1972Not only have we reached the point, they argue, where the exceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially perpetuated “rule” and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight of the primary statutory test of “in the course of employment.” 6 The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee’s duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs “in the course of employm

1972Not only have we reached the point, they argue, where the exceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially perpetuated “rule” and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight of the primary statutory test of “in the course of employment.” 6 The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee’s duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs “in the course of employm

1972Not only have we reached the point, they argue, where the exceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially perpetuated “rule” and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight of the primary statutory test of “in the course of employment.” 6 The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee’s duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs “in the course of employm

1967Code, 190.1), having the same jury avoids repetition of evidence and is thus not an arbitrary requirement." (People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690, 712 ; see also, Report to the Board of Governors of the Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, 41 State Bar J. 798, 799.) Third and finally, it should be observed that section 1074, as interpreted by us in Riser, compels the exclusion of all prospective jurors whose "conscientious opinions" would prevent the proper exercise of the discretion contemplated by section 190.

1967Code, § 190.1), having the same jury avoids repetition of evidence and is thus not an arbitrary requirement.” (People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690, 712 ; see also, Report to the Board of Governors of the Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, 41 State Bar J. 798, 799.) Third and finally, it should be observed that section 1074, as interpreted by us in Riser , compels the exclusion of all prospective jurors whose “conscientious opinions” would prevent the proper exercise of the discretion contemplated by section 190.