Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Feldman v. South Carolina Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences2010Tax Commission, 203 S.C. 49, 54 , 26 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1943)) ("The last legislative expression rule, however, `is purely an arbitrary rule of construction and is to be resorted to only when there is clearly an irreconcilable conflict, and all other means of interpretation have been exhausted.'"). 2010Tax Commission, 203 S.C. 49, 54 , 26 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1943)) ("The last legislative expression rule, however, `is purely an arbitrary rule of construction and is to be resorted to only when there is clearly an irreconcilable conflict, and all other means of interpretation have been exhausted.'"). | 3 | 4 |
Parentini v. S. Klein Dept. Storesgreen2 sentences2014The *634 failure to call a witness does “not justify an arbitrary presumption of suppression of evidence.” Parentini v. S. Klein Dep't Stores, Inc., 94 N.J.Super. 452 , 228 A.2d 725, 727 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1967) (citation omitted). 2014The *634 failure to call a witness does “not justify an arbitrary presumption of suppression of evidence.” Parentini v. S. Klein Dep't Stores, Inc., 94 N.J.Super. 452 , 228 A.2d 725, 727 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1967) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Elliottgreen2 sentences2011See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (defining "murder" as "the killing of any person with malice aforethought either express or implied. ") (emphasis added); see also State v. Elliott, 346 S.C. 603 , 552 S.E.2d 727 (2001) (Pleicones, J., dissenting) ("The recognition of these lesser grades of homicide, and their accompanying lesser punishments, developed as the common law recognized that some killings were more heinous than others: `The distinction between murder and manslaughter . . . is not merely an arbitrary rule, but is founded on a thorough knowledge of the human heart, and framed in compassion 2011See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (defining "murder" as "the killing of any person with malice aforethought either express or implied. ") (emphasis added); see also State v. Elliott, 346 S.C. 603 , 552 S.E.2d 727 (2001) (Pleicones, J., dissenting) ("The recognition of these lesser grades of homicide, and their accompanying lesser punishments, developed as the common law recognized that some killings were more heinous than others: `The distinction between murder and manslaughter . . . is not merely an arbitrary rule, but is founded on a thorough knowledge of the human heart, and framed in compassion | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leegreen2 sentences2011Law (2 Hill) 619, 621-22 (1835))), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); State v. Lee, 79 S.C. 223 , 60 S.E. 524, 524 (1908) (affirming the following jury instruction: "`Homicide,' Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, is the killing of any human being. 2011Law (2 Hill) 619, 621-22 (1835))), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); State v. Lee, 79 S.C. 223 , 60 S.E. 524, 524 (1908) (affirming the following jury instruction: "`Homicide,' Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, is the killing of any human being. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Islandgreen2 sentences2005However, “the Last Legislative Expression Rule requires that in instances where it is not possible to harmonize two sections of a statute, the later legislation supersedes the earlier enactment.” Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 311 S.C. 417, 421 , 429 S.E.2d 802, 804 (1993). 2005However, “the Last Legislative Expression Rule requires that in instances where it is not possible to harmonize two sections of a statute, the later legislation supersedes the earlier enactment.” Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 311 S.C. 417, 421 , 429 S.E.2d 802, 804 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munngreen2 sentences2001I, § 11; S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-10 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Munn, 292 S.C. 497 , 357 S.E.2d 461 (1987). [6] S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161 , 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987), subsequent history omitted. [7] See, e.g., State v. Banks, 84 S.C. 543 , 66 S.E. 999 (1910)(where allegations of indictment are appropriate to two offenses but only one is sufficiently stated, only sufficient charge may be upheld). [8] The recognition of these lesser grades of homicide, and their accompanying lesser punishments, developed as the common law recognized that some killings wer 2001I, § 11; S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-10 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Munn, 292 S.C. 497 , 357 S.E.2d 461 (1987). [6] S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161 , 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987), subsequent history omitted. [7] See, e.g., State v. Banks, 84 S.C. 543 , 66 S.E. 999 (1910)(where allegations of indictment are appropriate to two offenses but only one is sufficiently stated, only sufficient charge may be upheld). [8] The recognition of these lesser grades of homicide, and their accompanying lesser punishments, developed as the common law recognized that some killings wer | 1 | 1 |
State v. Owensgreen2 sentences2001I, § 11; S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-10 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Munn, 292 S.C. 497 , 357 S.E.2d 461 (1987). [6] S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161 , 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987), subsequent history omitted. [7] See, e.g., State v. Banks, 84 S.C. 543 , 66 S.E. 999 (1910)(where allegations of indictment are appropriate to two offenses but only one is sufficiently stated, only sufficient charge may be upheld). [8] The recognition of these lesser grades of homicide, and their accompanying lesser punishments, developed as the common law recognized that some killings wer 2001I, § 11; S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-10 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Munn, 292 S.C. 497 , 357 S.E.2d 461 (1987). [6] S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161 , 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987), subsequent history omitted. [7] See, e.g., State v. Banks, 84 S.C. 543 , 66 S.E. 999 (1910)(where allegations of indictment are appropriate to two offenses but only one is sufficiently stated, only sufficient charge may be upheld). [8] The recognition of these lesser grades of homicide, and their accompanying lesser punishments, developed as the common law recognized that some killings wer | 1 | 1 |
State v. Banksgreen2 sentences2001I, § 11; S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-10 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Munn, 292 S.C. 497 , 357 S.E.2d 461 (1987). [6] S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161 , 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987), subsequent history omitted. [7] See, e.g., State v. Banks, 84 S.C. 543 , 66 S.E. 999 (1910)(where allegations of indictment are appropriate to two offenses but only one is sufficiently stated, only sufficient charge may be upheld). [8] The recognition of these lesser grades of homicide, and their accompanying lesser punishments, developed as the common law recognized that some killings wer 2001I, § 11; S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-10 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Munn, 292 S.C. 497 , 357 S.E.2d 461 (1987). [6] S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985); see, e.g., State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161 , 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987), subsequent history omitted. [7] See, e.g., State v. Banks, 84 S.C. 543 , 66 S.E. 999 (1910)(where allegations of indictment are appropriate to two offenses but only one is sufficiently stated, only sufficient charge may be upheld). [8] The recognition of these lesser grades of homicide, and their accompanying lesser punishments, developed as the common law recognized that some killings wer | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ramsey v. County of McCormick
green
1 sentence2012However, the last legislative expression rule “is purely an arbitrary rule of construction and is to be resorted to only when there is clearly an irreconcilable conflict, and all other means of interpretation have been exhausted.” Id. (quoting Feldman v. S.C. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Gentry
green
2 sentences2011Law (2 Hill) 619, 621-22 (1835))), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); State v. Lee, 79 S.C. 223 , 60 S.E. 524, 524 (1908) (affirming the following jury instruction: "`Homicide,' Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, is the killing of any human being. 2011Law (2 Hill) 619, 621-22 (1835))), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); State v. Lee, 79 S.C. 223 , 60 S.E. 524, 524 (1908) (affirming the following jury instruction: "`Homicide,' Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, is the killing of any human being. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Breitenberg v. Parker
green
2 sentences2008Yet where the law does not positively prescribe the length of time a jury shall spend in deliberation, the courts will not apply an arbitrary rule based upon the limits of time. 237 Ark. at 265 , 372 S.W.2d at 832 (quoting Beach v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.2d 587 (Ky.1952)). 2008Yet where the law does not positively prescribe the length of time a jury shall spend in deliberation, the courts will not apply an arbitrary rule based upon the limits of time. 237 Ark. at 265 , 372 S.W.2d at 832 (quoting Beach v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.2d 587 (Ky.1952)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Beach v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2008Yet where the law does not positively prescribe the length of time a jury shall spend in deliberation, the courts will not apply an arbitrary rule based upon the limits of time. 237 Ark. at 265 , 372 S.W.2d at 832 (quoting Beach v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.2d 587 (Ky.1952)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Locklair
green
2 sentences2001Law (2 Hill) 619, 621-622 (1835). [9] See, e.g., State v. Locklair, 341 S.C. 352 , 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000). [10] See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-60 (Supp.1999). [11] At trial, respondent's indictment was amended from a charge of first degree AWCSC to third degree. 2001Law (2 Hill) 619, 621-622 (1835). [9] See, e.g., State v. Locklair, 341 S.C. 352 , 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000). [10] See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-60 (Supp.1999). [11] At trial, respondent's indictment was amended from a charge of first degree AWCSC to third degree. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hutto v. Ray
neutral
1 sentence1940This is an arbitrary rule of law unconnected with and independent of the donor’s or testator’s intention.” This case has been frequently cited, and the forégoing definition was quoted with approval in the quite recent case of Hutto v. Ray, 192 S. C., 364, 6 S. E. (2d), 747 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Cooper v. Hamilton, Etc., B. & L. Ass'n
neutral
1 sentence1937Among the small number of cases supporting the minority view, counsel cite us to the case of Cooper v. Hamilton Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 97 Tenn., 285, 37 S. W., 12 , 13, 33 L. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Sharkey v. Skilton
green
2 sentences1924In Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn., 503 ; 77 Atl., 950 , it is said : “But it is competent for legislative authority to determine that a defined course of conduct under given conditions is an essential requisite of ordinary care under those conditions, * * * thus establishing an arbitrary standard for the test of conduct as related to due care, and this has been done repeatedly.” The Supreme Court of the United States has said in the case of Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S., 159 ; 29 Sup. Ct., 270; 53 L. 1924In Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn., 503 ; 77 Atl., 950 , it is said : “But it is competent for legislative authority to determine that a defined course of conduct under given conditions is an essential requisite of ordinary care under those conditions, * * * thus establishing an arbitrary standard for the test of conduct as related to due care, and this has been done repeatedly.” The Supreme Court of the United States has said in the case of Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S., 159 ; 29 Sup. Ct., 270; 53 L. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms
green
2 sentences1924In Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn., 503 ; 77 Atl., 950 , it is said : “But it is competent for legislative authority to determine that a defined course of conduct under given conditions is an essential requisite of ordinary care under those conditions, * * * thus establishing an arbitrary standard for the test of conduct as related to due care, and this has been done repeatedly.” The Supreme Court of the United States has said in the case of Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S., 159 ; 29 Sup. Ct., 270; 53 L. 1924In Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn., 503 ; 77 Atl., 950 , it is said : “But it is competent for legislative authority to determine that a defined course of conduct under given conditions is an essential requisite of ordinary care under those conditions, * * * thus establishing an arbitrary standard for the test of conduct as related to due care, and this has been done repeatedly.” The Supreme Court of the United States has said in the case of Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S., 159 ; 29 Sup. Ct., 270; 53 L. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
MacOn v. Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1922Brown v. Railroad Co., 91 S. C., 377, 74 S. E., 754 ; Macon v. Railway Co., 81 S. C., 167, 62 S. E., 6 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Brown v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
green
2 sentences1922Brown v. Railroad Co., 91 S. C., 377, 74 S. E., 754 . 1922Brown v. Railroad Co., 91 S. C., 377, 74 S. E., 754 ; Macon v. Railway Co., 81 S. C., 167, 62 S. E., 6 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.