arbitrary rule in Kansas

1887It was well said by Mr. Justice Nelson in the case of Railroad Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90 , that ‘the damages must depend very much on the good sense and sound judgment of the jury, upon all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.’ ” (K.

1877It was well said by Mr. Justice Nelson in the case of Railroad Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90 , in language quoted in the charge in this case, that “ the damages must depend very much on the good sense and sound judgment of the jury, upon all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” The instructions as given in this case find abundant support in the latest and best decisions, and do not present matters other than those proper for the consideration of the jury.

1994Ed. 2d 37 , 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987), for the proposition that a State may not apply an arbitrary rule of competence to exclude a material defense witness from taking the stand or apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his or her testimony.

1940Such general proffer is not a sufficient basis for appellate review in criminal or civil cases. (.Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 251 , 187 Pac. 692 ; State v. Ball, 110 Kan. 428, 432 , 204 Pac. 701 ; State, ex rel., v. Wright, 140 Kan. 679, 683, 684 , 38 P. 2d 125 .)” (p. 56.) (See, also, Carson v. City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 215 , 80 P. 2d 1114 .) This is not just -an arbitrary rule.

1940Such general proffer is not a sufficient basis for appellate review in criminal or civil cases. (.Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 251 , 187 Pac. 692 ; State v. Ball, 110 Kan. 428, 432 , 204 Pac. 701 ; State, ex rel., v. Wright, 140 Kan. 679, 683, 684 , 38 P. 2d 125 .)” (p. 56.) (See, also, Carson v. City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 215 , 80 P. 2d 1114 .) This is not just -an arbitrary rule.

1940Such general proffer is not a sufficient basis for appellate review in criminal or civil cases. (.Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 251 , 187 Pac. 692 ; State v. Ball, 110 Kan. 428, 432 , 204 Pac. 701 ; State, ex rel., v. Wright, 140 Kan. 679, 683, 684 , 38 P. 2d 125 .)” (p. 56.) (See, also, Carson v. City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 215 , 80 P. 2d 1114 .) This is not just -an arbitrary rule.

1940Such general proffer is not a sufficient basis for appellate review in criminal or civil cases. (.Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 251 , 187 Pac. 692 ; State v. Ball, 110 Kan. 428, 432 , 204 Pac. 701 ; State, ex rel., v. Wright, 140 Kan. 679, 683, 684 , 38 P. 2d 125 .)” (p. 56.) (See, also, Carson v. City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 215 , 80 P. 2d 1114 .) This is not just -an arbitrary rule.

1940Such general proffer is not a sufficient basis for appellate review in criminal or civil cases. (.Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 251 , 187 Pac. 692 ; State v. Ball, 110 Kan. 428, 432 , 204 Pac. 701 ; State, ex rel., v. Wright, 140 Kan. 679, 683, 684 , 38 P. 2d 125 .)” (p. 56.) (See, also, Carson v. City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 215 , 80 P. 2d 1114 .) This is not just -an arbitrary rule.

1940Such general proffer is not a sufficient basis for appellate review in criminal or civil cases. (.Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 251 , 187 Pac. 692 ; State v. Ball, 110 Kan. 428, 432 , 204 Pac. 701 ; State, ex rel., v. Wright, 140 Kan. 679, 683, 684 , 38 P. 2d 125 .)” (p. 56.) (See, also, Carson v. City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 215 , 80 P. 2d 1114 .) This is not just -an arbitrary rule.

1940Such general proffer is not a sufficient basis for appellate review in criminal or civil cases. (.Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 251 , 187 Pac. 692 ; State v. Ball, 110 Kan. 428, 432 , 204 Pac. 701 ; State, ex rel., v. Wright, 140 Kan. 679, 683, 684 , 38 P. 2d 125 .)” (p. 56.) (See, also, Carson v. City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 215 , 80 P. 2d 1114 .) This is not just -an arbitrary rule.

1937To go beyond this, and lay down an arbitrary rule for valuing the life of the deceased, a rule applicable to all cases alike, however satisfactory it might be because of its uniformity, would in many instances operate to defeat the accomplishment of the wholesome purposes sought by this act.” (p. 91.) In the case of Railway Co. v. Ryan, 62 Kan. 682 , 64 Pac. 603 , it was said: “It is not, however, a case of excessive damages given under the influence of passion and prejudice, and, therefore, to be set aside under the statute, but it is a failure to make proof of substantial damages, and theref

1937To go beyond this, and lay down an arbitrary rule for valuing the life of the deceased, a rule applicable to all cases alike, however satisfactory it might be because of its uniformity, would in many instances operate to defeat the accomplishment of the wholesome purposes sought by this act.” (p. 91.) In the case of Railway Co. v. Ryan, 62 Kan. 682 , 64 Pac. 603 , it was said: “It is not, however, a case of excessive damages given under the influence of passion and prejudice, and, therefore, to be set aside under the statute, but it is a failure to make proof of substantial damages, and theref

1928Supp. 582 , after re ferring to the general rule that damages may not be recovered for mere fright or physical conditions resulting therefrom, announced in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N. Y. 107 , being the same rule as stated in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co., 168 Mass. 285 , it was said: "Where, however, there is a physical injury caused by the negligent act of the defendant, and also fright producing illness, recovery may be had both for the physical injury and the results of the fright.

1928J., in Homans v. Boston Elevated Railway, 180 Mass. 456 , 457: ‘It is an arbitrary exception, based upon a notion of what is practicable, that prevents a recovery for visible illness resulting from nervous shook alone.’ (See Driscoll v. Gaffey, supra.) In the Homans case it was recognized that the ultimate basis of the rule was whether there had been a wrongful application of force to the plaintiff.” (p. 31.) In Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 211 N. Y.

1928J., in Homans v. Boston Elevated Railway, 180 Mass. 456 , 457: ‘It is an arbitrary exception, based upon a notion of what is practicable, that prevents a recovery for visible illness resulting from nervous shook alone.’ (See Driscoll v. Gaffey, supra.) In the Homans case it was recognized that the ultimate basis of the rule was whether there had been a wrongful application of force to the plaintiff.” (p. 31.) In Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 211 N. Y.

1928Supp. 582 , after re ferring to the general rule that damages may not be recovered for mere fright or physical conditions resulting therefrom, announced in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N. Y. 107 , being the same rule as stated in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co., 168 Mass. 285 , it was said: "Where, however, there is a physical injury caused by the negligent act of the defendant, and also fright producing illness, recovery may be had both for the physical injury and the results of the fright.

1928J., in Homans v. Boston Elevated Railway, 180 Mass. 456 , 457: ‘It is an arbitrary exception, based upon a notion of what is practicable, that prevents a recovery for visible illness resulting from nervous shook alone.’ (See Driscoll v. Gaffey, supra.) In the Homans case it was recognized that the ultimate basis of the rule was whether there had been a wrongful application of force to the plaintiff.” (p. 31.) In Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 211 N. Y.

1915A third construction is that which was adopted by the court below in this case, and which we regard as much more sound than either of the others.” (p. 599.) The second of these three recognized rules or methods of construction had already received the approval of the same court in Ross et al. v. Duval et al., 38 U. S. 45 , 10 L.

1915A third construction is that which was adopted by the court below in this case, and which we regard as much more sound than either of the others.” (p. 599.) The second of these three recognized rules or methods of construction had already received the approval of the same court in Ross et al. v. Duval et al., 38 U. S. 45 , 10 L.

1890(Wagstaff v. Challiss, 31 Kas. 212 ; Wilson v. Sparkman, 17 Fla. 871 ; Calloway v. Byram, 95 Ind. 423 ; Elderkin v. Spurbeck, 2 Wis. 129 .) The plaintiffs concede that oi’dinarily the jurisdiction that the district court obtains by virtue of an appeal is simply that of the justice’s court; but they claim that because the defendant appealed and sought the district court as the forum in which to try the action, he has waived this rule.

1890(Wagstaff v. Challiss, 31 Kas. 212 ; Wilson v. Sparkman, 17 Fla. 871 ; Calloway v. Byram, 95 Ind. 423 ; Elderkin v. Spurbeck, 2 Wis. 129 .) The plaintiffs concede that oi’dinarily the jurisdiction that the district court obtains by virtue of an appeal is simply that of the justice’s court; but they claim that because the defendant appealed and sought the district court as the forum in which to try the action, he has waived this rule.

1890(Wagstaff v. Challiss, 31 Kas. 212 ; Wilson v. Sparkman, 17 Fla. 871 ; Calloway v. Byram, 95 Ind. 423 ; Elderkin v. Spurbeck, 2 Wis. 129 .) The plaintiffs concede that oi’dinarily the jurisdiction that the district court obtains by virtue of an appeal is simply that of the justice’s court; but they claim that because the defendant appealed and sought the district court as the forum in which to try the action, he has waived this rule.

1890(Wagstaff v. Challiss, 31 Kas. 212 ; Wilson v. Sparkman, 17 Fla. 871 ; Calloway v. Byram, 95 Ind. 423 ; Elderkin v. Spurbeck, 2 Wis. 129 .) The plaintiffs concede that oi’dinarily the jurisdiction that the district court obtains by virtue of an appeal is simply that of the justice’s court; but they claim that because the defendant appealed and sought the district court as the forum in which to try the action, he has waived this rule.