arbitrary rule in Wisconsin

1997Heretofore we have required that the public policy be evidenced by a statutory or constitutional provision as a means to protect the public from frivolous lawsuits by allowing the circuit court to screen cases on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. [Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574 ].

1988If such were the case, pure comparative negligence would render defendants the insurers of any who chose to commence an action.” Vincent, 47 Wis. 2d at 129 .

1988If such were the case, pure comparative negligence would render defendants the insurers of any who chose to commence an action." Vincent, 47 Wis. 2d at 129 .

1976Previously in State v. Kwitek (1972), 53 Wis.2d 563, 571 , 193 N.W.2d 682 , this court held that if a specific period of time is to be adopted in determining speedy trial issues it must be done by the legislature and that a court would not “. . . fix such an arbitrary standard and base it upon judicial reasons.” In the instant case the period of time that elapsed from the arrest to the date of trial was twenty-two months.

1976Previously in State v. Kwitek (1972), 53 Wis.2d 563, 571 , 193 N.W.2d 682 , this court held that if a specific period of time is to be adopted in determining speedy trial issues it must be done by the legislature and that a court would not “. . . fix such an arbitrary standard and base it upon judicial reasons.” In the instant case the period of time that elapsed from the arrest to the date of trial was twenty-two months.

1972In United States v. Ewell (1966), 383 U. S. 116, 120 , 86 Sup. Ct. 773, 15 L.

1972In United States v. Ewell (1966), 383 U. S. 116, 120 , 86 Sup. Ct. 773, 15 L.

1971See also: page 324, the summary: “But an arbitrary rule of exclusion no longer has much support in the more recent authorities.” 16 Brown v. Appleton Masonic Temple Asso. (1943), 243 Wis. 147 , 9 N. W. 2d 637 . 17 “. . .

1971See also: page 324, the summary: “But an arbitrary rule of exclusion no longer has much support in the more recent authorities.” 16 Brown v. Appleton Masonic Temple Asso. (1943), 243 Wis. 147 , 9 N. W. 2d 637 . 17 “. . .

1963In Iowa County Bank v. Graber (1926), 189 Wis. 277 , 206 N. W. 835 , it is stated (p. 285): “Quotations of general principles contained in . . . decisions are of little value unless the facts are closely . . . analyzed.” The court found the oral promise to be within the statute of frauds.

1963In Iowa County Bank v. Graber (1926), 189 Wis. 277 , 206 N. W. 835 , it is stated (p. 285): “Quotations of general principles contained in . . . decisions are of little value unless the facts are closely . . . analyzed.” The court found the oral promise to be within the statute of frauds.

1906Next we bave Wilson v. Eau, Claire, 89 Wis. 47 , 61 N. W. 290 .

1906Next we bave Wilson v. Eau, Claire, 89 Wis. 47 , 61 N. W. 290 .

1893The jury alone are to determine, not only the credibility of the witnesses, but also the weight which should be given to the testimony of each; ” and, finally, “ that the above instruction invaded the province of the jury in that respect, and was an unwarrantable interference with their peculiar functions.” In Ely v. Tesch, 17 Wis. 202 , Mr. JusticePaine said:“It was improper for the court to say to the jury that when one witness testified on one side and another on the opposite side, and the two are equally credible, the testimony of a third necessarily creates a preponderance on either side.

1885From that it appears that the assessor of the town for that year valued the real estate therein at “ what it would have sold for right off, then and there, — ■ a quick sale.” This was not equivalent to an arbitrary rule of assessment, regardless of value, as in Hersey v. Sup’rs, 37 Wis. 75 .

1885It was not' equivalent to assessing the property at one third or one half its real value, as in Schettler v. Fort Howard, 43 Wis. 48 ; Single v. Stettin, 49 Wis. 645 ; and Clarke v. Lincoln Co. 54 Wis. 580 .

1885It was not' equivalent to assessing the property at one third or one half its real value, as in Schettler v. Fort Howard, 43 Wis. 48 ; Single v. Stettin, 49 Wis. 645 ; and Clarke v. Lincoln Co. 54 Wis. 580 .

1885It was not' equivalent to assessing the property at one third or one half its real value, as in Schettler v. Fort Howard, 43 Wis. 48 ; Single v. Stettin, 49 Wis. 645 ; and Clarke v. Lincoln Co. 54 Wis. 580 .