15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassellgreen2 sentences2008Nonetheless, they maintain that a retroactivity analysis of Lassen II is not necessary or appropriate because the express language of the Act itself mandates the remedy — “conveyances not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of the Act ... shall be null and void.” In essence, plaintiffs argue that the Act thereby specifies how past conveyances, found later to violate the Act, must be treated and this court is bound by its express language. ¶ 68 To support this argument, the plaintiffs rely on Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596 , 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990). 2008Nonetheless, they maintain that a retroactivity analysis of Lassen II is not necessary or appropriate because the express language of the Act itself mandates the remedy — “conveyances not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of the Act ... shall be null and void.” In essence, plaintiffs argue that the Act thereby specifies how past conveyances, found later to violate the Act, must be treated and this court is bound by its express language. ¶ 68 To support this argument, the plaintiffs rely on Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596 , 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
Arizona State University ex rel. Arizona Board of Regents v. Arizona State Retirement Systemgreen1 sentence2018Accordingly, the APA currently applies to the Board, and if the Frameworks qualify as rules, the Board must follow the APA’s rulemaking provisions in promulgating them.15 See ASU, 237 Ariz. at 252, ¶ 24 . ¶23 Under A.R.S. § 41-1001, a “rule” is “an agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.” A.R.S. § 41-1001(19). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Shane B.green1 sentence2011See Shane B., 198 Ariz. at 87-88, ¶¶ 6, 8 , 7 P.3d at 96-97 . | 1 | 1 |
Southern Pacific Company v. Cochise Countygreen2 sentences1990In one case, this court found that a taxing practice constituted a "willful, systematic and intentional violation of the law"; however, because the court also found that the remedy of refunding appellant's and similar claims "threatens the financial solvency of many taxing units of the state, particularly those in rural and undeveloped areas," the court concluded it could make its decision prospective in application "where great hardship will result if caused from long continued failure to exert a legal right." Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz. 395, 406 , 377 P.2d 770, 778 (1963 1990In one case, this court found that a taxing practice constituted a "willful, systematic and intentional violation of the law"; however, because the court also found that the remedy of refunding appellant's and similar claims "threatens the financial solvency of many taxing units of the state, particularly those in rural and undeveloped areas," the court concluded it could make its decision prospective in application "where great hardship will result if caused from long continued failure to exert a legal right." Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz. 395, 406 , 377 P.2d 770, 778 (1963 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences1990Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, this court has previously addressed this question and found that “[bjecause Hunter established a new constitutional principle, it is a ‘significant change in the law’ requiring application of a retroactivity analysis.” State v. Garcia, 152 Ariz. 245, 248 , 731 P.2d 610, 613 (App.1986). 1990Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, this court has previously addressed this question and found that “[bjecause Hunter established a new constitutional principle, it is a ‘significant change in the law’ requiring application of a retroactivity analysis.” State v. Garcia, 152 Ariz. 245, 248 , 731 P.2d 610, 613 (App.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Gurule v. Illinois Mutual Life & Casualty Co.green2 sentences1987Life and Casualty Co., 152 Ariz. 600 , 603 n. 3, 734 P.2d 85 , 88 n. 3 (1987) (“At any rate, the distinction between preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence is unimportant here because we find the evidence insufficient to meet even the preponderance threshold.”) Since we find that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages by either burden of proof, we need not consider the retroactivity of the requirement that punitive damages must be found by clear and convincing evidence as opposed to the lesser preponderance of the evidence rules. 1987Life and Casualty Co., 152 Ariz. 600 , 603 n. 3, 734 P.2d 85 , 88 n. 3 (1987) (“At any rate, the distinction between preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence is unimportant here because we find the evidence insufficient to meet even the preponderance threshold.”) Since we find that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages by either burden of proof, we need not consider the retroactivity of the requirement that punitive damages must be found by clear and convincing evidence as opposed to the lesser preponderance of the evidence rules. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dosztalgreen2 sentences1986Dosztal, 144 Ariz. 242, 243 , 697 P.2d 325, 326 (1985). 1986Dosztal, 144 Ariz. 242, 243 , 697 P.2d 325, 326 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Linkletter v. Walkerred2 sentences1986Because Hunter established a new constitutional principle, it is a “significant change in the law” requiring application of a retroactivity analysis. 3 RETROACTIVITY “There is no constitutional requirement that a judicial decision announcing new constitutional guidelines be applied prospectively or retroactively.” State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 455 , 698 P.2d 694, 700 (1985), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 608 (1965) and State V. 1986Because Hunter established a new constitutional principle, it is a “significant change in the law” requiring application of a retroactivity analysis. 3 RETROACTIVITY “There is no constitutional requirement that a judicial decision announcing new constitutional guidelines be applied prospectively or retroactively.” State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 455 , 698 P.2d 694, 700 (1985), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 608 (1965) and State V. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gerlaughgreen2 sentences1986Because Hunter established a new constitutional principle, it is a “significant change in the law” requiring application of a retroactivity analysis. 3 RETROACTIVITY “There is no constitutional requirement that a judicial decision announcing new constitutional guidelines be applied prospectively or retroactively.” State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 455 , 698 P.2d 694, 700 (1985), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 608 (1965) and State V. 1986Because Hunter established a new constitutional principle, it is a “significant change in the law” requiring application of a retroactivity analysis. 3 RETROACTIVITY “There is no constitutional requirement that a judicial decision announcing new constitutional guidelines be applied prospectively or retroactively.” State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 455 , 698 P.2d 694, 700 (1985), citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 608 (1965) and State V. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Griffith v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2011For the purpose of this retroactivity rule, a case is final when “a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.” Id. at 321 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 708 . 2011For the purpose of this retroactivity rule, a case is final when “a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.” Id. at 321 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 708 . | 2 | 1991–2011 |
Waddell v. 38th Street Partnership
green
1 sentence2019It may make such changes retrospective, so long as, in doing so, it does not impair a vested right.” Id. at 141 . ¶25 Waddell does not support the Taxpayers’ position that a change in the law enacted after the valuation date must apply to the corresponding tax year even without a retroactivity clause. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1993Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2439 , 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991), changes the appropriate retroactivity rule in civil cases under Arizona law. 1993Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2439 , 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991), changes the appropriate retroactivity rule in civil cases under Arizona law. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Desmond v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1991We originally granted review of that portion of the court of appeals’ opinion to consider the retroactivity of the rule announced in Desmond v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 522 , 779 P.2d 1261 (1989). 1991We originally granted review of that portion of the court of appeals’ opinion to consider the retroactivity of the rule announced in Desmond v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 522 , 779 P.2d 1261 (1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
red
2 sentences1988They suggest that, through application of the retroactivity analysis of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), we should confine the application of Loudermill to terminations that follow that decision. 1988They suggest that, through application of the retroactivity analysis of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), we should confine the application of Loudermill to terminations that follow that decision. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
De Gryse v. De Gryse
green
2 sentences1984Absent express authorization such as the retroactivity clause contained in the ‘Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act’, supra, or a finding of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ as contemplated by Rule 60(c)(6), a property settlement cannot be disturbed.” 135 Ariz. at 338 , 661 P.2d 185 . 1984Absent express authorization such as the retroactivity clause contained in the ‘Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act’, supra, or a finding of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ as contemplated by Rule 60(c)(6), a property settlement cannot be disturbed.” 135 Ariz. at 338 , 661 P.2d 185 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.