Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hardingreen2 sentences1982In People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (1980), the Supreme Court adopted the retroactivity rule set out in Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 , 92 S.Ct. 916 , 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973). 1982In People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (1980), the Supreme Court adopted the retroactivity rule set out in Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 , 92 S.Ct. 916 , 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973). | 1 | 2 |
Teague v. Lanegreen1 sentence2025See People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113 , ¶ 9 (holding the retroactivity analysis in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 (1989), on which the postconviction court relied, applies “only to new rules of criminal procedure involving constitutional rights”). | 1 | 1 |
Shell Western E&P, Inc. v. Dolores County Board of Commissionersgreen1 sentence2012Bd. of Comm'rs, 948 P.2d 1002, 1012 (Colo.1997) (the second step in a retroactivity analysis is to determine "whether the statute, as applied, violates the constitutional prohibition"). | 1 | 1 |
Continental Title Co. v. District Court in & for the City & County of Denvergreen2 sentences2009Retroactivity analysis turns in part on whether any changes were "substantive" rather than "only procedural or remedial." See, e.g., Continental Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Colo.1982); Saxe v. Bd. of Trustees, 179 P.3d 67, 74 (Colo.App.2007). 2009Retroactivity analysis turns in part on whether any changes were "substantive" rather than "only procedural or remedial." See, e.g., Continental Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Colo. 1982); Saxe v. Bd. of Trustees, 179 P.3d 67, 74 (Colo.App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Saxe v. Board of Trusteesgreen2 sentences2009Retroactivity analysis turns in part on whether any changes were "substantive" rather than "only procedural or remedial." See, e.g., Continental Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Colo.1982); Saxe v. Bd. of Trustees, 179 P.3d 67, 74 (Colo.App.2007). 2009Retroactivity analysis turns in part on whether any changes were "substantive" rather than "only procedural or remedial." See, e.g., Continental Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Colo. 1982); Saxe v. Bd. of Trustees, 179 P.3d 67, 74 (Colo.App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Walkergreen2 sentences1984Most recently, in People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 117 (Colo.1983), we adopted the retroactivity analysis set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), which considers “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” 10 In United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 587 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), however, the United States Supreme Court abandoned this thr 1984Most recently, in People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 117 (Colo. 1983), we adopted the retroactivity analysis set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), which considers "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the *216 effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." [10] In United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), however, the United States Supreme Court abandoned | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982This rule gives retroactive effect to the new rule where the “major purpose in new Constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials . ... ” Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 , 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 , 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 395 (1971). 1982This rule gives retroactive effect to the new rule where the “major purpose in new Constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials . ... ” Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 , 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 , 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 395 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde
green
2 sentences2021Reynoldsville Casket , 514 U.S. at 759 , 115 S.Ct. 1745 . 5 Post- Obergefell , same-sex couples must be allowed to enter into the lawful relationship of marriage. 2021Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 759 . 10 after-the-fact surprise cannot be brushed aside. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Beasley v. Best Car Buys, LTD
green
2 sentences2016Thus, were the retroactivity inquiry confined to the date of the testator’s death under section 15-17-101(2)(a), and if the testator’s death predated the amendment, whether the amendment represented a rule of construction would be irrelevant because the date of death would always control. ¶ 26 But an appellate court must interpret statutes to “avoid rendering any part superfluous.” Roalstad v. City of Lafayette , 2015 COA 146 , ¶ 42. 2016Thus, were the retroactivity inquiry confined to the date of the testator's death under section 15-17-101(2)(a), and if the testator's death predated the amendment, whether the amendment represented a rule of construction would be irrelevant because the date of death would always control. ¶ 26 But an appellate court must interpret statutes to "avoid rendering any part superfluous." Roalstad v. City of Lafayette, 2015 COA 146 , ¶ 42, 363 P.3d 790 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Union Pacific Railroad v. Martin
green
1 sentence2020R.R. v. Martin, 209 P.3d 185 , 188–89 (Colo. 2009) (distinguishing legislative clarification from law change in the context of a retroactivity analysis); City of Colorado Springs v. Powell, 156 P.3d 461 , 464–65 (Colo. 2007) (same). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
City of Colorado Springs v. Powell
green
1 sentence2020R.R. v. Martin, 209 P.3d 185 , 188–89 (Colo. 2009) (distinguishing legislative clarification from law change in the context of a retroactivity analysis); City of Colorado Springs v. Powell, 156 P.3d 461 , 464–65 (Colo. 2007) (same). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Roalstad v. City of Lafayette, Colorado
green
1 sentence2016Thus, were the retroactivity inquiry confined to the date of the testator's death under section 15-17-101(2)(a), and if the testator's death predated the amendment, whether the amendment represented a rule of construction would be irrelevant because the date of death would always control. ¶ 26 But an appellate court must interpret statutes to "avoid rendering any part superfluous." Roalstad v. City of Lafayette, 2015 COA 146 , ¶ 42, 363 P.3d 790 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Stovall v. Denno
green
2 sentences1984Most recently, in People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 117 (Colo.1983), we adopted the retroactivity analysis set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), which considers “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” 10 In United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 587 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), however, the United States Supreme Court abandoned this thr 1984Most recently, in People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 117 (Colo.1983), we adopted the retroactivity analysis set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), which considers “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” 10 In United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 587 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), however, the United States Supreme Court abandoned this thr | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Moreno
green
2 sentences1984See, e.g., People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (1980); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488 , 491 P.2d 575 (1971). 1984See, e.g., People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (1980); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488 , 491 P.2d 575 (1971). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
United States v. Johnson
red
2 sentences1984Most recently, in People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 117 (Colo.1983), we adopted the retroactivity analysis set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), which considers “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” 10 In United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 587 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), however, the United States Supreme Court abandoned this thr 1984Most recently, in People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 117 (Colo.1983), we adopted the retroactivity analysis set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), which considers “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” 10 In United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 587 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), however, the United States Supreme Court abandoned this thr | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Tafoya
yellow
1 sentence1983In People v. Tafoya, 654 P.2d 1342 (Colo.App.1982), the Colorado Court of Appeals applied the retroactivity rule announced in Adams v. Illinois, supra, to the decision in Chavez I. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Adams v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1982In People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (1980), the Supreme Court adopted the retroactivity rule set out in Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 , 92 S.Ct. 916 , 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973). 1982In People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229 , 607 P.2d 1291 (1980), the Supreme Court adopted the retroactivity rule set out in Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 , 92 S.Ct. 916 , 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.