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92 California opinions name it 3 courts 1967–2026 34 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cawkwellgreen2 sentences2022The fact . . . that he was briefly eligible for pretrial diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, as originally enacted, is irrelevant to the retroactivity analysis.” (Ibid.; see Cawkwell, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054 [“Cawkwell could not have relied on the possibility of receiving pretrial mental health diversion when he” committed the charged offenses].) We agree with McShane and Cawkwell that applying the amendments to section 1001.36 to Simmons is not an ex post facto violation. 2022The fact . . . that he was briefly eligible for pretrial diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, as originally enacted, is irrelevant to the retroactivity analysis.” (Ibid.; see Cawkwell, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054 [“Cawkwell could not have relied on the possibility of receiving pretrial mental health diversion when he” committed the charged offenses].) We agree with McShane and Cawkwell that applying the amendments to section 1001.36 to Simmons is not an ex post facto violation. | 5 | 6 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2022(See Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 328 .) 23 ‘This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.” ’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) For reasons similar to the retroactivity analysis set out above, we decide the California Supreme Court’s decision in Brown forecloses Orellana’s equal protection challenge. 2017Sandee also supports her argument by relying on In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 , in which our Supreme Court held that when a criminal statute is amended to lessen punishment for a crime, the newly enacted law is to be applied retroactively to criminal prosecutions not yet final on appeal. ( Id . at p. 745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ; see also People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 , 325, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 824 , 278 P.3d 1182 .) The retroactivity principle discussed in Estrada is not applicable here because the ECPA does not have the effect of lessening | 2 | 5 |
In Re Estradagreen2 sentences2026We are once again called upon to consider “the intersection of [the] statutory scheme of plea bargaining and the retroactivity rule of [In re] Estrada [(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 .]” (People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961 , 971 (Prudholme).) Defendant Sunee Lynn Mitchell accepted a plea bargain, entered the standard waivers, and agreed to an upper term sentence on one felony count of a multicount information. 2026It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient 1 should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) The Estrada majority was not swayed by the dissent’s argument that under this retroactivity rule, defendants “have all to gain and nothing to lose by seeking every avenue of delay through appeals and legal maneuvers of all kinds, for, who knows, the Legislature might in the meantime reduce the punishment.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d a | 1 | 21 |
People v. Hurlicgreen2 sentences2019As its second reason, the Hurlic court concluded allowing the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion would encourage defendants to enter plea bargains (or at least not dissuade them from doing so) because otherwise a defendant would have to go through the "additional step of seeking and obtaining a certificate of probable cause to avail himself or herself of the advantage of ameliorative laws like Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) that are otherwise indisputably applicable to him or her ...." ( Hurlic, supra , 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 58 , 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 255 .) We seriously qu 2019Both Stamps and Hurlic acknowledged that a certificate of probable cause is required when an appellant challenges a specific negotiated sentence, but nonetheless concluded that this mandate can be ignored when the challenge is based on a retroactive change in the law. ( Stamps , at p. 121, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 ; Hurlic , at pp. 55-57, 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 255 .) The retroactivity analysis of Stamps and Hurlic does not persuade me. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Grantgreen2 sentences2010The majority opinion reaches this conclusion purportedly by examining the "plain language" of section 3003.5(b) under which, it says, "any convicted sex offender already subject to the lifetime registration requirement who is released from custody on parole, whether it be after serving a term in custody for an initial sex offense conviction, a new sex offense conviction, or a new nonsex offense conviction, becomes subject to the new mandatory residency restrictions for the duration of his term." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1272.) Citing People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 , 2010The majority opinion reaches this conclusion purportedly by examining the "plain language" of section 3003.5(b) under which, it says, "any convicted sex offender already subject to the lifetime registration requirement who is released from custody on parole, whether it be after serving a term in custody for an initial sex offense conviction, a new sex offense conviction, or a new nonsex offense conviction, becomes subject to the new mandatory residency restrictions for the duration of his term." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1272.) Citing People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 , | 1 | 3 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen2 sentences1988(Cf. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., supra, 30 Cal.2d 388, 396 [“it must be assumed that the Legislature was acquainted with the settled rules of statutory interpretation, and that it would have expressly provided for retrospective operation of the amendment if it had so intended.”].) Since the drafters declined to insert such a provision in the proposition—perhaps in order to avoid the adverse political consequences that might have flowed from the inclusion of such a provision—it would appear improper for this court to read a retroactivity clause into the enactment at this juncture. 1988(Cf. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., supra, 30 Cal.2d 388, 396 ["it must be assumed that the Legislature was acquainted with the settled rules of statutory interpretation, and that it would have expressly provided for retrospective operation of the amendment if it had so intended."].) Since the drafters declined to insert such a provision in the proposition perhaps in order to avoid the adverse political consequences that might have flowed from the inclusion of such a provision it would appear improper for this court to read a retroactivity clause into the enactment at this juncture. | 1 | 3 |
Landgraf v. USI Film Productsgreen2 sentences2025(Valiente, supra, 54 F.4th at pp. 584-585.) The Ninth Circuit analyzed the question under the rubric of retroactivity and applied the retroactivity test set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244, 263-264 (Landgraf). 2007Cyr court employed the retroactivity analysis of Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 229 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 ]. | 1 | 2 |
People v. McKenziegreen2 sentences2025(See People v. McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46 [“In criminal actions, the terms ‘judgment’ and ‘ “sentence” ’ are generally considered ‘synonymous’ . . ., and there is no ‘judgment of conviction’ without a sentence”]; A.M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 564-566 [treating motion to recall remittitur to seek relief under Proposition 57 as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and finding that the superior court’s subsequent conditional reversal of minor defendant’s conviction and sentence rendered the case nonfinal for purposes of the Estrada’s retroactivity rule]; J.M., supra, 103 Cal.App.5t 2021(See Winn, supra, at p. 872.) In People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40 , the Supreme Court held that in cases where the trial court has placed the defendant on probation and suspended the imposition of the sentence, the case is not yet final for purposes of the retroactivity rule. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.green2 sentences2023“In 2016, the voters of California enacted Proposition 57, a measure that amended the law governing the punishment of juvenile offenses in adult criminal court by requiring hearings to determine whether the offenses should instead be heard in juvenile court.” (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158 .) 4 Two years later, the Supreme Court concluded that the retroactivity rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 applied to Proposition 57, making its “provisions applicable to all cases in which the judgment was not final when the proposition went into effect.” (Padilla, at p. 158; People 2023(Id., § 231.7, subd. (e).) It also provides that “[t]he denial of an objection made under this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Id., § 231.7, subd. (j).) Banuelos argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 applies to his case based on the retroactivity principle set forth in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 . “ ‘The Estrada rule rests on an inference that, in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law | 1 | 2 |
People v. Stampsgreen2 sentences2023(Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In Stamps, the defendant pled guilty, and the parties agreed to a nine-year stipulated sentence, which included a mandatory five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a); see Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 693 .) While that case was on appeal, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013), which “removed provisions that prohibited a trial court from striking a serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 1385.” (Stamps, at p. 700.) Th 2023(Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In Stamps, the defendant pled guilty, and the parties agreed to a nine-year stipulated sentence, which included a mandatory five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a); see Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 693 .) While that case was on appeal, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013), which “removed provisions that prohibited a trial court from striking a serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 1385.” (Stamps, at p. 700.) Th | 1 | 2 |
Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.green2 sentences2021Instead, our case law calls for application of the presumption where applying the new law implicates fundamental fairness concerns, including by “foist[ing] upon past conduct new and onerous legal consequences.” ( Pitts, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 835–836.) In Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th 828 , for instance, the retroactive legal change in question subjected tobacco sellers to tort liability for prior acts performed when they enjoyed the protection of an immunity statute. 2021Instead, our case law calls for application of the presumption where applying the new law implicates fundamental fairness concerns, including by “foist[ing] upon past conduct new and onerous legal consequences.” ( Pitts, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 835–836.) In Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th 828 , for instance, the retroactive legal change in question subjected tobacco sellers to tort liability for prior acts performed when they enjoyed the protection of an immunity statute. | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Mutchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whorton v. Bocktinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Tyrone A. Miller On Habeas Corpusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Hansengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Baldiviagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stampsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Melvin J.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dennis C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Thornton v. Valenzuelagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Dewinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| John L. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Good v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Caspari v. Bohlengreen | 1 | 1 |
| McClung v. Employment Development Departmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hayesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Propst v. Stillmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences2022In Linkletter, the high court set forth several factors relevant to the retroactivity analysis, including “the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” (Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 629 .) The court noted that “in each of the three areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively the principle that we applied went to the fairness of the trial — the very integrity of the fact-finding process.” (Id. at p. 639, fn. omitted.) And the court suggested that this basic-fairness-and- reliability 2018(See, e.g., In re Lucero, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 45 , 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 [applying the old federal standard to determine whether the rule created in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 should be given retroactive effect].) Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, we will engage in an analysis of the Sanchez decision under that standard. *800 Applying that standard, the retroactivity analysis is informed by three factors: 1) The purpose of the new rule, 2) the reliance placed on the old rule, and 3) the effect retroactive application would have on | 6 | 1977–2022 |
Tapia v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2022The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (Id. at p. 745.) Further, the Supreme Court has expanded the application of the retroactivity doctrine broadly “to statutes changing the law to the benefit of defendants.” (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 301 .) Thus, the retroactivity principle applies to ameliorative changes in enhancements as well as to substantive offenses. 2022The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (Id. at p. 745.) Further, the Supreme Court has expanded the application of the retroactivity doctrine broadly “to statutes changing the law to the benefit of defendants.” (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 301 .) Thus, the retroactivity principle applies to ameliorative changes in enhancements as well as to substantive offenses. | 6 | 2017–2022 |
Schriro v. Summerlin
green
2 sentences2020(See id. at p. 410 [adopting and quoting the three-factor retroactivity test set forth in Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 (Desist)].) In Johnson, our Supreme Court held that the first factor in the retroactivity analysis is the “ ‘ “purpose to be served by the new standards,” ’ ” and explained that under United States Supreme Court precedent, “[f]ully retroactive decisions are seen as vindicating a right which is essential to a reliable determination of whether an accused should suffer a penal sanction.” (Johnson, at pp. 410–411.) Under the Teague formulation, procedural rules give 2020Perhaps more importantly, in deciding Schriro, the Supreme Court specifically found its decision in DeStefano—which was “decided under [the] pre-Teague retroactivity framework”—to be “on point” and “germane” to its analysis of whether to give retroactive effect to Ring (and, by extension, Apprendi). ( Schriro, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 356–357.) As noted above, the “pre-Teague retroactivity framework” referred to in Schriro is precisely the three-factor test adopted in 1970 by our Supreme Court in Johnson. | 6 | 2015–2020 |
People v. Padilla
green
2 sentences2026Retroactivity of Ameliorative Changes in Sentencing Statutes Despite our finding that the trial court correctly read our remand instructions as being focused on section 1385, this is not the end of the inquiry. “[N]ew laws that reduce the punishment for a crime are presumptively to be applied to defendants whose judgments are not yet final.” (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158 .) When that presumption applies, the retroactivity rule extends to all “ ‘nonfinal judgments.’ ” (Ibid.) And as the California Supreme Court recently clarified, “[t]he scope of the superior court’s jurisdictio 2025(See Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 161-163; People v. Guillory (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 326 , 335-336 [defendant’s original judgment remained final through the granting of an order to show cause and would only be subject to retroactivity if his conviction was vacated pursuant to section 1172.6, subd. (d)].) We believe the final paragraph of Padilla was intended to allay concerns that the defendant, in that case, would request a new adjudication of his guilt in the juvenile court itself and was not intended to divorce the court’s retroactivity analysis from instances in which the retroactive r | 5 | 2023–2026 |
People v. Nasalga
green
2 sentences2022This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology.” (Id. at p. 745.) In subsequent years, the court has expanded the application of this doctrine broadly “to statutes changing the law to the benefit of defendants.” (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 301 .) Thus, the retroactivity principle applies to ameliorative changes in enhancements as well as to substantive offenses (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 ), and to changes in the law tha 2022This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology.” (Id. at p. 745.) In subsequent years, the court has expanded the application of this doctrine broadly “to statutes changing the law to the benefit of defendants.” (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 301 .) Thus, the retroactivity principle applies to ameliorative changes in enhancements as well as to substantive offenses (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 ), and to changes in the law tha | 4 | 2022–2022 |
Stovall v. Denno
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., In re Lucero, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 45 , 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 [applying the old federal standard to determine whether the rule created in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 should be given retroactive effect].) Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, we will engage in an analysis of the Sanchez decision under that standard. *800 Applying that standard, the retroactivity analysis is informed by three factors: 1) The purpose of the new rule, 2) the reliance placed on the old rule, and 3) the effect retroactive application would have on 2018(See, e.g., In re Lucero, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 45 , 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 [applying the old federal standard to determine whether the rule created in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 should be given retroactive effect].) Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, we will engage in an analysis of the Sanchez decision under that standard. *800 Applying that standard, the retroactivity analysis is informed by three factors: 1) The purpose of the new rule, 2) the reliance placed on the old rule, and 3) the effect retroactive application would have on | 3 | 2018–2022 |
In Re Johnson
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., In re Lucero, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 45 , 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 [applying the old federal standard to determine whether the rule created in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 should be given retroactive effect].) Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, we will engage in an analysis of the Sanchez decision under that standard. *800 Applying that standard, the retroactivity analysis is informed by three factors: 1) The purpose of the new rule, 2) the reliance placed on the old rule, and 3) the effect retroactive application would have on 2018(See, e.g., In re Lucero, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 45 , 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 [applying the old federal standard to determine whether the rule created in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 , 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 should be given retroactive effect].) Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, we will engage in an analysis of the Sanchez decision under that standard. *800 Applying that standard, the retroactivity analysis is informed by three factors: 1) The purpose of the new rule, 2) the reliance placed on the old rule, and 3) the effect retroactive application would have on | 3 | 2008–2020 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2018Both the federal and state retroactivity doctrines have their roots in Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 ( Linkletter ), where the U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the new rule established in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ( Mapp ) to cases already subject to final judgment. 2018(Id. at pp. 792-799.) Nevertheless, we part ways with our colleagues in refusing to apply the retroactivity doctrine that governs federal habeas practice in favor of California’s own retroactivity rules under the state habeas statute. 10 Both the federal and state retroactivity doctrines have their roots in Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618 (Linkletter), where the U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the new rule established in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 (Mapp) to cases already subject to final judgment. | 3 | 1977–2018 |
People v. Esquivel
green
2 sentences2026(People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 678 ; see also Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 397 [“[W]hen any aspect of a case is on appeal from sentencing, the ‘case’ or ‘prosecution’ has not been reduced to final judgment ….”].) Thus, the scope of our prior remittitur does not prevent defendant from gaining the benefit of other ameliorative legislation as applied to his sentence. 2022(People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 680 .) Thus, where a statutory amendment mitigates or lessens punishment and there is no apparent intent that it operate prospectively only, “the amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 748 .) We conclude that the retroactivity rule of Estrada does not apply to Senate Bill 317 because “the statutory amendment does not mitigate or lessen the penalty for a particular crime or offense but rather facilitates the accrual of conduct credits by extending section 4019 to a group p | 2 | 2022–2026 |
People v. Conley
green
2 sentences2024(People v. Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 657-659.) Third, the parties’ interpretation would unconstitutionally amend the trial court’s discretion not to reduce a third strike sentence if “resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) Moreno points out that in most of the prior published cases, the Three Strikes defendants being resentenced under section 1172.75 had previously been denied relief under section 1170.126 based on findings that they posed a danger to society. 2023Thus, . . . the presumption does not govern when the statute at issue includes a ‘saving clause’ providing that the amendment should be applied only prospectively.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 .) Here, without even reaching the question of whether Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 effectuates “ameliorative changes to the criminal law” presumed to have retroactive application (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 10 p. 308), we reject Banuelos’s contention that Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 applies retroactively to his case because the Legislature clearly set forth a contrary | 2 | 2023–2024 |
People v. Francis
green
2 sentences2022This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology.” (Id. at p. 745.) In subsequent years, the court has expanded the application of this doctrine broadly “to statutes changing the law to the benefit of defendants.” (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 301 .) Thus, the retroactivity principle applies to ameliorative changes in enhancements as well as to substantive offenses (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 ), and to changes in the law tha 2022This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology.” (Id. at p. 745.) In subsequent years, the court has expanded the application of this doctrine broadly “to statutes changing the law to the benefit of defendants.” (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 301 .) Thus, the retroactivity principle applies to ameliorative changes in enhancements as well as to substantive offenses (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 ), and to changes in the law tha | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. McShane
green
2 sentences2022(Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2)(A).) Vega nevertheless contends he is entitled to the benefit of the original version of section 1001.36 in effect from June 27, 2018 to December 31, 2018, because application of the restrictive amendments “would violate basic principles against retroactivity and state and federal constitutional bars as to ex post facto legislation.” The same argument was rejected as a “feat of argumentative gymnastics” in People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245 , where the Fourth District, Division Two, concluded “[t]he fact . . . that he was briefly el 2022(Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2)(A).) Vega nevertheless contends he is entitled to the benefit of the original version of section 1001.36 in effect from June 27, 2018 to December 31, 2018, because application of the restrictive amendments “would violate basic principles against retroactivity and state and federal constitutional bars as to ex post facto legislation.” The same argument was rejected as a “feat of argumentative gymnastics” in People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245 , where the Fourth District, Division Two, concluded “[t]he fact . . . that he was briefly el | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Buycks
green
2 sentences2022In making this argument, she relies primarily on People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks). 2021In making this argument, she relies primarily on People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks). | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Teague v. Lane
green
2 sentences2009The appellate court applied the retroactivity test established in Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288 [ 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 ] (Teague), and employed by federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings, in reviewing state court judgments. 2009The appellate court applied the retroactivity test established in Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288 [ 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 ] (Teague), and employed by federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings, in reviewing state court judgments. | 2 | 2009–2020 |
People v. McKinney
green
2 sentences2019People v. McKinney (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 712 , 157 Cal.Rptr. 414 is all but on point. 2019People v. McKinney (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 712 , 157 Cal.Rptr. 414 is all but on point. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Evangelatos v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018In Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188 , this court refused to read a retroactivity clause into a voter-approved initiative for tort reform where the measure was silent as to whether it had any retroactive effect. 2009(Cf., e.g., Good v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1504 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 125 ] [where the measure at issue stated that “ ‘[subdivision (a) and all of its paragraphs shall have retroactive application’ ” and shall apply “ ‘regardless of when the person was convicted of the qualifying offense’ ”].) Thus, under the rule of interpretation set forth above, the measure cannot be construed to apply retroactively “unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that... the voters must have intended a retroactive application.” ( Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209 .) Interveners conten | 2 | 2009–2018 |
People v. Babylon
green
2 sentences2017Citing People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719 , 722, 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 , and People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81 , 91, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 , 146 P.3d 531 , Sandee also contends that the principal set forth in Estrada applies when a statute decriminalizes conduct altogether or defenses have been expanded. 2017Citing People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719 , 722, 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 , and People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81 , 91, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 , 146 P.3d 531 , Sandee also contends that the principal set forth in Estrada applies when a statute decriminalizes conduct altogether or defenses have been expanded. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Wright
green
2 sentences2017Citing People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719 , 722, 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 , and People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81 , 91, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 , 146 P.3d 531 , Sandee also contends that the principal set forth in Estrada applies when a statute decriminalizes conduct altogether or defenses have been expanded. 2017Citing People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719 , 722, 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 , and People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81 , 91, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 , 146 P.3d 531 , Sandee also contends that the principal set forth in Estrada applies when a statute decriminalizes conduct altogether or defenses have been expanded. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Schmidt v. Bank of America, N.A.
green
2 sentences2017(See Schmidt, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498 .) Marotta's argument does not contain any legal analysis of the standards for liability under the HSAA or any citation to legal authority on that issue. 2017(See Schmidt, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498 .) Marotta's argument does not contain any legal analysis of the standards for liability under the HSAA or any citation to legal authority on that issue. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| State of Iowa v. Jeffrey K. Ragland green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Miller v. Alabama green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Jones v. State green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Bourquez v. Superior Court green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Mills green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Sandoval red | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Pitts v. Perluss green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Woosley v. State of California green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Desist v. United States green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Harris v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Clark green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Anthony green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Martinez green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Banks green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In re Lucero green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In re Corpus green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Chun red | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Cervantes green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Park green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Montgomery v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.