retroactivity analysis in Florida

2025“We have said this retroactivity analysis is supposed to balance the justice system’s dual goals of fairness and finality.” Id. (citing Witt, 387 So. 2d at 926 ).

2025“We have said this retroactivity analysis is supposed to balance the justice system’s dual goals of fairness and finality.” Id. (citing Witt, 387 So. 2d at 926 ).

2019In Hughes v. State , for example, the Florida Supreme Court concluded Apprendi v. New Jersey did not apply retroactively. 901 So.2d 837 , 838 (Fla. 2005) (evaluating Apprendi , 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ).

2013Florida courts “rarely [find] a change in decisional law to require retroactive application.” Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837, 846 (Fla.2005) (quoting Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So.2d 521, 529 (Fla.2001)). “[T]o determine whether a new rule applies retroactively to final cases in postcon-viction proceedings ... courts in Florida conduct a retroactivity analysis under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980).” Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399, 403 (Fla.2011)).

2020Regarding the third prong of the Witt analysis, a decision is of fundamental significance when it either (1) places beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or to impose certain penalties or (2) when the rule is of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application under the retroactivity test of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).

2017Developments of fundamental significance are likely to fall within one of two categories: changes of law that either “place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties” or are “of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application” under the retroactivity test of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).

2013Florida courts “rarely [find] a change in decisional law to require retroactive application.” Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837, 846 (Fla.2005) (quoting Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So.2d 521, 529 (Fla.2001)). “[T]o determine whether a new rule applies retroactively to final cases in postcon-viction proceedings ... courts in Florida conduct a retroactivity analysis under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980).” Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399, 403 (Fla.2011)).

2012Accordingly, “[t]o determine whether a new rule applies retroactively to final cases in postconviction proceedings, ... courts in Florida conduct a retroactivity analysis under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980).” Hernandez, 61 So.3d at 1150 (citation omitted); see also State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399, 403 (Fla.2011).

2024Because the answer to the certified question is the same whether we apply the retroactivity standard we adopted in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), or the one set out by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), we need not choose 2.

2016However, while I agree with the majority that Hurst v. Florida is not retroactive to pre-Ring cases under Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), I believe that the retroactivity analysis the United States Supreme Court announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is the proper and applicable test.

2016In addressing whether Ring should apply retroactively, this Court announced in Johnson that despite the federal courts’ use of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), to determine retroactivity, this Court would “continue to apply our longstanding Witt14 analysis, which provides more expansive retroactivity standards than those adopted in Teague.” Johnson, 904 So. 2d at 409 (emphasis added).15 However, our application of Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), was significantly impacted by our attempt to reconcile the holding of Ring with the holding of Hildwin.

2011According to State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399, 403 (Fla.2011), “[t]o determine whether a new rule applies retroactively to final cases in postconviction proceedings, ... courts in Florida conduct a retroactivity analysis under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980).” While federal courts and many state courts prefer to use the newer retroactivity standard articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the Florida Supreme Court continues to stand by Witt because it “provides more expansive retro-activity standards than those adopted in Teague.” Johnson v.

2005Federal courts use the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion), under which a new rule is not retroactive unless it (1) places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority," or (2) "requires the observance of `those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'" and "implicate[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial." Id. at 307, 311-312 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692, 693 , 91 S.Ct. 1160 , 28 L.

2005Federal courts use the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion), under which a new rule is not retroactive unless it (1) places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority," or (2) "requires the observance of `those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'" and "implicate[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial." Id. at 307, 311-312 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692, 693 , 91 S.Ct. 1160 , 28 L.

2023In 1920, this Court again stated, “A statute is not to be given retrospective effect, unless its terms show clearly that such an effect was intended.” In re Seven Barrels of Wine, 79 Fla. 1 , 83 So. 627, 632 (Fla. 1920).

2023In 1920, this Court again stated, “A statute is not to be given retrospective effect, unless its terms show clearly that such an effect was intended.” In re Seven Barrels of Wine, 79 Fla. 1 , 83 So. 627, 632 (Fla. 1920).

2014Geter quoted the Third District's previous retroactivity analysis of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), but added the requirement that miscarriages of justice requiring retroactive application can only apply to "substantive criminal law.” 115 So.3d at 378-79 (quoting Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)).

2012Accordingly, “[t]o determine whether a new rule applies retroactively to final cases in postconviction proceedings, ... courts in Florida conduct a retroactivity analysis under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980).” Hernandez, 61 So.3d at 1150 (citation omitted); see also State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399, 403 (Fla.2011).

2005See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo.2003) (concluding that Ring should apply retroactively under the Stovall/Linkletter test and rejecting the applicability of Teague ).

2005See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo.2003) (concluding that Ring should apply retroactively under the Stovall/Linkletter test). [32] Some published accounts have indicated that there are only a small number of individuals in this position.

2005My view continues to be as stated in my opinions in Bottoson v. Moore, 824 So.2d 115, 122-27 (Fla.2002) (Wells, J., dissenting), and Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 696-99 (Fla.2002) (Wells, J., concurring specially).

2005Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 717 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in result only) (footnote omitted). [31] I would note that the only state court that has examined Ring under a retroactivity test similar to Florida's has found that Ring should be applied retroactively.

2024In other words, courts would give retroactive effect only to those decisions that “alter ‘the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.’ ” Edwards, 593 U.S. at 276 (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353 ).

2005Applying the test for retroactivity under Teague , the United States Supreme Court recently held in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), that Ring does not apply retroactively for purposes of federal law.

2023Devon, 67 So. 3d at 194-95 .

2023Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

2023See id.; see also In re Holder, 945 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 2006) (“Of course, we have long subscribed to a principle of judicial restraint by which we avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds.” (citing cases)).

2020See id.; Hernandez v. State, 124 So. 3d 757, 764 (Fla. 2012); Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929 .

2019"Applying the retroactivity analysis of Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), we hold that the decision in [Lewars] is an evolutionary refinement in . . . law and not a development of fundamental significance, a major constitutional change, or jurisprudential upheaval that requires retroactive application to cases on collateral review." See Flowers v. State, 54 So. 3d 1049, 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

2019The Trial Court’s Order After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court sought to determine whether “the Amendment should apply to all pending cases or . . . only to cases where the conduct at issue occurred after the effective date.” The trial court cited Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 255-64 (1994), and Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Federal Housing Corp., 737 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1999), for the proposition that the first step in a retroactivity analysis is to determine whether there is a clear expression of legislative intent regarding retroactivity.

2019We simply cannot apply the law as it was and is not anymore.”); cf. Pace v. Jordan, 999 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to apply a statutory amendment because the amendment occurred while the case was pending in the trial court and no argument regarding the amendment was preserved).

2019Thompson v. State, 985 A.2d 32, 42 (Md. 2009) (“[T]o say that Thompson cannot receive the benefit of the remedial provisions of CP Section 8–201 simply because he failed to foresee the enactment of this legislation in characterizing his motion, would be contrary to the retroactivity analysis we just made.”); Beatty v. State, 627 So. 2d 355, 358 (Miss. 1993) (“The application of Section 27–27–12 and the resultant amendment to Section 97–33–7 is not a charitable raising of an issue not raised but is a necessary application of existing law to which the appellant is entitled.

2019Thompson v. State, 985 A.2d 32, 42 (Md. 2009) (“[T]o say that Thompson cannot receive the benefit of the remedial provisions of CP Section 8–201 simply because he failed to foresee the enactment of this legislation in characterizing his motion, would be contrary to the retroactivity analysis we just made.”); Beatty v. State, 627 So. 2d 355, 358 (Miss. 1993) (“The application of Section 27–27–12 and the resultant amendment to Section 97–33–7 is not a charitable raising of an issue not raised but is a necessary application of existing law to which the appellant is entitled.