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12 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences2013In particular, he contends that Danforth, supra at 282 , allows us to continue to apply the retroactivity framework from Teague, supra, but nevertheless reach a divergent conclusion from Chaidez . 2011The Supreme Judicial Court has announced that it will follow the retroactivity rule articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-311 (1989) (plurality opinion), under which a “new rule” of constitutional law will not be applied retroactively. | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Braygreen2 sentences2011However, we have yet to evaluate the rule in Sandstrom under the retroactivity rule adopted in Commonwealth v. Bray, supra. Because we conclude that any error in the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we decline to do so today. 1992Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the rules announced in those cases do not fall within the second exception to the retroactivity rule discussed in Bray, supra at 303 , because they are not central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt in the basic due process sense. | 2 | 4 |
Danforth v. Minnesotagreen2 sentences2026See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279-280 (2008) (concluding that "considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant [collateral] relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by [the retroactivity test under Federal law]"). 2013In particular, he contends that Danforth, supra at 282 , allows us to continue to apply the retroactivity framework from Teague, supra, but nevertheless reach a divergent conclusion from Chaidez . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Nolingreen1 sentence2011“An unconstitutional burden-shifting instruction is not grounds to upset a verdict if it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 218 (2007), quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clarkegreen1 sentence2011See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30 , 34 n.7 (2011). | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiared1 sentence2011“An unconstitutional burden-shifting instruction is not grounds to upset a verdict if it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 218 (2007), quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Winthrop Corp. v. Lowenthalgreen1 sentence1999Co., 382 Mass. 340, 344 (1981), the clear language of the retroactivity provision coupled with the resolve of the Legislature to give the plaintiffs their day in court constitute the “compelling or extraordinary circumstances” required for relief under rule 60(b) in “the interests of justice.” Winthrop Corp. v. Lowenthal, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 188-189 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Galvin v. Welsh Manufacturing Co.green1 sentence1999Co., 382 Mass. 340, 344 (1981), the clear language of the retroactivity provision coupled with the resolve of the Legislature to give the plaintiffs their day in court constitute the “compelling or extraordinary circumstances” required for relief under rule 60(b) in “the interests of justice.” Winthrop Corp. v. Lowenthal, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 188-189 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Robinsongreen1 sentence1992See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 408 Mass. 245, 248 (1990) (Henson rule); Commonwealth v. Bray, supra at 303 (Grey rule). | 1 | 1 |
Penry v. Lynaughred1 sentence1990In Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944 (1989), a capital case, the Court stated: “Because Penry is before us on collateral review, we must determine, as a threshold matter, whether granting him the relief he seeks would create a ‘new rule.’ Teague v. Lane, [supra]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chaidez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026But see Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 358 (2013) (holding that, for purposes of Federal law, Padilla announced new rule and therefore did not apply retroactively to defendants whose convictions became final prior to issuance of that decision). 15 carries a risk of deportation" (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 794138
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 35-36 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cigna Healthcare of Texas, Inc., Dba Cigna Corp. v. Calad
green
1 sentence2013Although we consider the retroactivity framework established in Teague to be sound in principle, the Supreme Court’s post Teague expansion of what qualifies as a “new” rule has become so broad that “decisions defining a constitutional safeguard rarely merit application on collateral review.” Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 818 , cert. denied, 540 U.S. 981 (2003). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences2013Prior to Teague , the Supreme Court’s retroactivity test was set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 2013Under the Linkletter case, retroactivity was “determined on a case-by-case basis by examining the purpose of the rule, the reliance of the States on the prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the rule.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 273 (2008) (Danforth), citing Linkletter v. Walker, supra at 629 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Colwell v. State
green
1 sentence2013Although we consider the retroactivity framework established in Teague to be sound in principle, the Supreme Court’s post Teague expansion of what qualifies as a “new” rule has become so broad that “decisions defining a constitutional safeguard rarely merit application on collateral review.” Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 818 , cert. denied, 540 U.S. 981 (2003). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
1 sentence2005The Court noted: “[W]hile it thus appears that Sergeant Doty had a reasonable expectation that the Colonel would continue to [appoint sequentially from the list without varying from the rank order], the Colonel’s statutory discretion to reach down beyond her number on the promotional list undermines the vested nature of her entitlement to appointment for purposes of the retroactivity analysis that underlies the resolution of the issue before me.” See Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 355 Mass. 94 , 100 and 103 (1968). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence1998In this appeal the defendant argues again that the jury instruction in his 1973 trial was constitutionally flawed under Commonwealth v. Ferreira, supra, and also that, under Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), constitutional error of this kind can never be harmless. 3 Finally, the defendant argues that the holdings in these cases were insufficiently developed at the time of his various motions for a new trial such that he has not waived the right to argue these issues on collateral appeal. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Commonwealth v. Ferreira
green
1 sentence1998In this appeal the defendant argues again that the jury instruction in his 1973 trial was constitutionally flawed under Commonwealth v. Ferreira, supra, and also that, under Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), constitutional error of this kind can never be harmless. 3 Finally, the defendant argues that the holdings in these cases were insufficiently developed at the time of his various motions for a new trial such that he has not waived the right to argue these issues on collateral appeal. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Stovall v. Denno
green
2 sentences1990In fact, the Supreme Court had declared in Stovall v. Denno, supra at 300 , that “no distinction is justified between convictions now final . . . and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.” The Court characterized such a distinction as “unsupportable.” Id. at 300-301 . 1990In fact, the Supreme Court had declared in Stovall v. Denno, supra at 300 , that “no distinction is justified between convictions now final . . . and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.” The Court characterized such a distinction as “unsupportable.” Id. at 300-301 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Kagan v. United Vacuum Appliance Corp.
green
1 sentence1980In these circumstances we are of the opinion that it was correct to apply the retroactivity principle stated in Kagan v. United Vacuum Appliance Corp., 357 Mass. at 684 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.