retroactivity analysis in New Jersey

2026See State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 308 (2008) (explaining that when a new rule is not at issue, the court will not do a retroactivity analysis but will apply the law as it has always been); State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432 , 459 (2023) (explaining that the Court's purpose in Torres was to emphasize the importance of 'overall fairness' in guiding the Yarbough analysis).

2025"When a decision does not constitute a new rule, however, the retroactivity analysis ends." State v. Bull, 227 N.J. 555, 561 (2017) (citing Feal, 194 N.J. at 308 ).

2017On appeal, plaintiff argues she should not be barred from pursuing her palimony claim "because of an erroneous interpretation of law by the Appellate Division . . . or as a result of a potential procedural defect made in attempting to revive [her] palimony claim." Plaintiff argues the court misapplied Burstein, supra, because Maeker II, supra, did not announce a new rule of law to which a retroactivity analysis applied.

2005If that analysis yields the conclusion that a new rule of law in fact is announced, we proceed to the second step of the retroactivity analysis: If a decision indeed sets forth a “new rule,” three factors generally are considered to determine whether the rule is to be applied retroactively: “(1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice.” Although those three factors have received d

2021When appropriate, and to avoid an unfair and "mechanistic" approach to a retroactivity analysis, see Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 522 , we consider two questions to assist "in the determination whether a court should apply a statute retroactively." Twiss, 124 N.J. at 467 .

2020See Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 522-23 ; see also Twiss, 124 N.J. at 467 (explaining that a court will only conduct a retroactivity analysis “[w]hen the Legislature does not clearly express its intent to give a statute prospective application”).

2021When appropriate, and to avoid an unfair and "mechanistic" approach to a retroactivity analysis, see Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 522 , we consider two questions to assist "in the determination whether a court should apply a statute retroactively." Twiss, 124 N.J. at 467 .

2020See Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 522-23 ; see also Twiss, 124 N.J. at 467 (explaining that a court will only conduct a retroactivity analysis “[w]hen the Legislature does not clearly express its intent to give a statute prospective application”).

2020See In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 50 (1996).

2018Applying the first prong of the retroactivity standard, we recognize three circumstances that justify affording “a statute retroactive effect: (1) when the Legislature expresses its intent that the law apply retroactively, either expressly or implicitly; (2) when an amendment is curative; or (3) when the expectations of the parties so warrant.” Ibid.

2020The purpose of permitting public access to existing public records "is the bedrock principle that our government works best when its activities are well- known to the public it serves." Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009).

2020The purpose of permitting public access to existing public records "is the bedrock principle that our government works best when its activities are well- A-3950-19T4 44 known to the public it serves." Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 414 (2009).

2013We can apply a new rule in one of four ways: (1) “purely prospectively ... to cases in which the operative facts arise after the new rule has been announced”; (2) “in future cases and in the case in which the rale is announced, but not in any other litigation that is pending or has reached final judgment at the time the new rale is set forth”; (3) “ ‘pipeline retroactivity,’ rendering it applicable in all future cases, the case in which the rule is announced, and any cases still on direct appeal”; and (4) “complete retroactive effect ... to all cases.” [State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 301-02

2013We can apply a new rule in one of four ways: (1) “purely prospectively ... to cases in which the operative facts arise after the new rule has been announced”; (2) “in future cases and in the case in which the rale is announced, but not in any other litigation that is pending or has reached final judgment at the time the new rale is set forth”; (3) “ ‘pipeline retroactivity,’ rendering it applicable in all future cases, the case in which the rule is announced, and any cases still on direct appeal”; and (4) “complete retroactive effect ... to all cases.” [State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 301-02

2024"Obviously, where a new rule is not at issue, a retroactivity inquiry is unnecessary." Ibid.

2020In determining the retroactivity of a rule, a court’s threshold consideration is whether the holding constitutes a “new rule” in that it “‘breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or Federal Government.’” State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 308 (2008) (quoting State v. Lark, 117 N.J. 331, 339 (1989)).

2005Consequently, retrospectivity is acknowledged to be the "traditional" rule, see, e.g., Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 92 N.J. 390, 396 , 456 A. 2d 518 (1983).... [ Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 96 N.J. 419, 425 , 476 A. 2d 763 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1985) ( Coons II ).] The policy considerations relevant to a retroactivity analysis commonly include whether there has been (1) "justifiable reliance by the parties and the community as a whole on prior decisions," (2) whether the purpose of the new rule will be advanced by retroactive application

2005Consequently, retrospectivity is acknowledged to be the "traditional" rule, see, e.g., Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 92 N.J. 390, 396 , 456 A. 2d 518 (1983).... [ Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 96 N.J. 419, 425 , 476 A. 2d 763 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 , 105 S.Ct. 808 , 83 L.Ed. 2d 800 (1985) ( Coons II ).] The policy considerations relevant to a retroactivity analysis commonly include whether there has been (1) "justifiable reliance by the parties and the community as a whole on prior decisions," (2) whether the purpose of the new rule will be advanced by retroactive application

2011The first step of that analysis requires that we “engage in the threshold inquiry of whether the rule at issue is a ‘new rule of law' for purposes of retroactivity analysis.” Cummings, supra, 184 N.J. at 97 , 875 A.2d 906 (quoting Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 249 , 678 A.2d 642 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 307 , 944 A.2d 599 (2008) (stating that “[t]he threshold retroactivity question is always the same—whether a new rule of law has been announced”); State v. Colbert, 190 N.J. 14, 22 , 918 A.2d 14 (2007) (noting that where decision “is a well-settle

2011The first step of that analysis requires that we “engage in the threshold inquiry of whether the rule at issue is a ‘new rule of law' for purposes of retroactivity analysis.” Cummings, supra, 184 N.J. at 97 , 875 A.2d 906 (quoting Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 249 , 678 A.2d 642 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 307 , 944 A.2d 599 (2008) (stating that “[t]he threshold retroactivity question is always the same—whether a new rule of law has been announced”); State v. Colbert, 190 N.J. 14, 22 , 918 A.2d 14 (2007) (noting that where decision “is a well-settle

2011The first step of that analysis requires that we “engage in the threshold inquiry of whether the rule at issue is a ‘new rule of law' for purposes of retroactivity analysis.” Cummings, supra, 184 N.J. at 97 , 875 A.2d 906 (quoting Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 249 , 678 A.2d 642 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 307 , 944 A.2d 599 (2008) (stating that “[t]he threshold retroactivity question is always the same—whether a new rule of law has been announced”); State v. Colbert, 190 N.J. 14, 22 , 918 A.2d 14 (2007) (noting that where decision “is a well-settle

2011The first step of that analysis requires that we “engage in the threshold inquiry of whether the rule at issue is a ‘new rule of law' for purposes of retroactivity analysis.” Cummings, supra, 184 N.J. at 97 , 875 A.2d 906 (quoting Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 249 , 678 A.2d 642 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 307 , 944 A.2d 599 (2008) (stating that “[t]he threshold retroactivity question is always the same—whether a new rule of law has been announced”); State v. Colbert, 190 N.J. 14, 22 , 918 A.2d 14 (2007) (noting that where decision “is a well-settle

2019Labs., 132 N.J. 109, 123 (1993))); see also Feal, 194 N.J. at 308 ("Where a new rule is not at issue, a retroactivity inquiry is unnecessary." (alterations in original omitted)).

2012Labs., 132 N.J. 109, 123 , 623 A.2d 234 (1993). “[Where a new rule is not at issue, a retroactivity inquiry is unnecessary.” State v. Feat, 194 N.J. 293, 308 , 944 A.2d 599 (2008).

2017State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 307 , 944 A.2d 599 (2008) (citing State v. Colbert, 190 N.J. 14, 22 , 918 A.2d 14 (2007); State v. Molina, 187 N.J. 531, 542-43 , 902 A.2d 200 (2006); State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 96-97 , 875 A.2d 906 (2005)). *561 A new rule of law exists when: (1) there is a “sudden and generally unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing practice,” State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 53 , 735 A.2d 513 (1999) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 58 , 697 A.2d 529 (1997)); (2) when the rule “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government[

2017State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 307 , 944 A.2d 599 (2008) (citing State v. Colbert, 190 N.J. 14, 22 , 918 A.2d 14 (2007); State v. Molina, 187 N.J. 531, 542-43 , 902 A.2d 200 (2006); State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 96-97 , 875 A.2d 906 (2005)). *561 A new rule of law exists when: (1) there is a “sudden and generally unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing practice,” State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 53 , 735 A.2d 513 (1999) (quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 58 , 697 A.2d 529 (1997)); (2) when the rule “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government[

2004Initially we note that the retroactivity analysis is only appropriate if the principle to be applied is considered to be a "new rule of law." State v. Cupe, 289 N.J.Super. 1, 12 , 672 A. 2d 1233 (App.Div.)(citing State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 403 , 427 A. 2d 525 (1981)), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 , 677 A. 2d 761 (1996).

2004Initially we note that the retroactivity analysis is only appropriate if the principle to be applied is considered to be a "new rule of law." State v. Cupe, 289 N.J.Super. 1, 12 , 672 A. 2d 1233 (App.Div.)(citing State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 403 , 427 A. 2d 525 (1981)), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 , 677 A. 2d 761 (1996).

1997We view Comblatt as an effort, rightly or wrongly, to avoid the “slippery doctrine of retroactivity” and simply determine “whether by the very terms of its enactment, the Legislature itself applied the legislation to a given situation____” thus, not "muddy[ing] the already — murky waters of retroactivity analysis.” Phillips v. Curiale, supra, 128 N.J. at 630, 608 A.2d 895 .

1997We view Comblatt as an effort, rightly or wrongly, to avoid the “slippery doctrine of retroactivity” and simply determine “whether by the very terms of its enactment, the Legislature itself applied the legislation to a given situation____” thus, not "muddy[ing] the already — murky waters of retroactivity analysis.” Phillips v. Curiale, supra, 128 N.J. at 630, 608 A.2d 895 .

1997See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549-550 , 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2586-2587 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202, 213-214 (1982).

1997See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549-550 , 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2586-2587 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202, 213-214 (1982).

2025"When a decision does not constitute a new rule, however, the retroactivity analysis ends." State v. Bull, 227 N.J. 555, 561 (2017) (citing Feal, 194 N.J. at 308 ).

2024See James, 216 N.J. at 563 , 572- 75.

2021"The overriding goal of all statutory interpretation 'is to determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent.'" State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017) (quoting State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594 , 604 18 A-0502-19 (2014)).