retroactivity analysis in Texas

2015However, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically declined to do so, opting instead to “adhere to the retroactivity analysis in Chaidez and its holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively.” De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d at 679 .

2014Shortly after Chaidez, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted Chaidez’s reasoning: “We adhere to the retroactivity analysis in Chaidez and its holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively.” Ex parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d at 679 .

2025Laws 2395 , 2398 (H.B. 2249) (“SECTION 10. (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b) of this section, the changes in law made by this Act apply to a pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship regardless of whether the suit was filed before, on, or after the effective date of this Act.”)). 23 In its 2010 opinion about the retroactivity clause, Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., the supreme court held: “[I]n determining whether a statute violates the prohibition against retroactive laws in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution, courts must consider three factors in light of the p

2025Laws 2395 , 2398 (H.B. 2249) (“SECTION 10. (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b) of this section, the changes in law made by this Act apply to a pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship regardless of whether the suit was filed before, on, or after the effective date of this Act.”)). 23 In its 2010 opinion about the retroactivity clause, Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., the supreme court held: “[I]n determining whether a statute violates the prohibition against retroactive laws in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution, courts must consider three factors in light of the p

2008See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Hurst, 949 So.2d 279, 281 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2007, pet.denied).

2008See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Hurst, 949 So.2d 279, 281 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2007, pet.denied).

2015In Davis, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished the exclusionary rule from the retroactivity rule for newly created Fourth Amendment precedent first announced in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987).

2015In Davis, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished the exclusionary rule from the retroactivity rule for newly created Fourth Amendment precedent first announced in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987).

2025Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018) (“When a statute is not ambiguous on its face, it is inappropriate to use extrinsic aids to construe the unambiguous statutory language.”); see also Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 473 (J.

2025Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018) (“When a statute is not ambiguous on its face, it is inappropriate to use extrinsic aids to construe the unambiguous statutory language.”); see also Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 473 (J.

2025Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018) (“When a statute is not ambiguous on its face, it is inappropriate to use extrinsic aids to construe the unambiguous statutory language.”); see also Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 473 (J.

2025Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018) (“When a statute is not ambiguous on its face, it is inappropriate to use extrinsic aids to construe the unambiguous statutory language.”); see also Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 473 (J.

2006See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. State, 711 S.W.2d at 425 .

2006See Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. State, 711 S.W.2d at 425 .

2018See id.

2017Ibid. 40 In its opinion, the Court concluded that declaring a statute unconstitutional on its face creates a “new” rule that warrants a retroactivity analysis.

2010In Barshop v. Medina Underground Water Conservation District, we upheld the Edwards Aquifer Act against a retroactivity challenge where landowners above the Edwards Aquifer argued that the Act affected their vested right to withdraw unlimited amounts of water from the Aquifer. 925 S.W.2d 618, 634 (Tex.1996).

2010In Barshop v. Medina Underground Water Conservation District, we upheld the Edwards Aquifer Act against a retroactivity challenge where landowners above the Edwards Aquifer argued that the Act affected their vested right to withdraw unlimited amounts of water from the Aquifer. 925 S.W.2d 618, 634 (Tex.1996).

2025Laws 2395 , 2398 (H.B. 2249) (“SECTION 10. (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b) of this section, the changes in law made by this Act apply to a pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship regardless of whether the suit was filed before, on, or after the effective date of this Act.”)). 23 In its 2010 opinion about the retroactivity clause, Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., the supreme court held: “[I]n determining whether a statute violates the prohibition against retroactive laws in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution, courts must consider three factors in light of the p

2022It protects only “settled expectations.” Id. at 145 ; see A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361 (“A law that does not upset a person’s settled expectations in reasonable reliance upon the law is not unconstitutionally retroactive.”).

2021Nevertheless, a retroactivity analysis is “‘not always a simple or mechanical test’”; one Justice has noted that “the question is a complex one.” Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d at 61 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994)).

2021See id. at 67 (citing Deacon, 405 S.W.2d at 62 ).

2021Nevertheless, a retroactivity analysis is “‘not always a simple or mechanical test’”; one Justice has noted that “the question is a complex one.” Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d at 61 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994)).

2021No. 1, 622 S.W.3d 25 , 41 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.) (concluding El Paso County Emergency Services Districts do not have standing to raise due process and equal protection challenges because “Texas law is well-settled that municipal corporations and other units of government are not vested with constitutional rights under the Texas or United States Constitutions”); City of Irving v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd., 894 S.W.2d 456, 465 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, writ denied) (“[A] municipal 5 like a municipal corporation, asserts a retroactivity challenge, as evidenced by Honors Aca

2021See id. at 67 (citing Deacon, 405 S.W.2d at 62 ).

2017Griffith v. Kentucky articulated the retroactivity rule for federal constitutional errors in criminal cases, and it is one of limited retrospectivity: a newly announced federal constitutional rule for conducting criminal prosecutions must be retroactively applied to all cases pending on direct 40 Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 163 (Tex. Crim.

2017App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by, Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim.

2008The true traditional view is that prospective decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts have no authority to engage in the practice.” Id. at 105-106, 113 S.Ct. 2510 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted); see also Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 333 (5th Cir.1999) (noting that the Supreme Court has “substantially rejected] ... departures [from the retroactivity doctrine] and return[ed] to the general rule of adjudicative retroac-tivity, leaving only an indistinct possibility of the application of pure prospectivity in an extremely unusual and u

2008The true traditional view is that prospective decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts have no authority to engage in the practice." Id. at 105-106, 113 S.Ct. 2510 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted); see also Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 333 (5th Cir.1999) (noting that the Supreme Court has "substantially reject[ed] ... departures [from the retroactivity doctrine] and return[ed] to the general rule of adjudicative retroactivity, leaving only an indistinct possibility of the application of pure prospectivity in an extremely unusual and u

1998See McDonald v. Denton, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 421 , 132 S.W. 823 (1910), error denied 104 Tex. 206 , 135 S.W. 1148 ; Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas, 104 Tex. 290 , 137 S.W. 342 (1911)(If an executive agency or a local government should take action in the suspension of a law, independently of any delegation by the Legislature, that action could be nullified under Article 1, Section 28 of the Texas Constitution without a consideration of the question of legislative declaration of power.) Therefore, we hold that the retroactivity clause of section 7(A) does not affect appellant's criminal

1998See McDonald v. Denton, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 421 , 132 S.W. 823 (1910), error denied 104 Tex. 206 , 135 S.W. 1148 ; Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas, 104 Tex. 290 , 137 S.W. 342 (1911)(If an executive agency or a local government should take action in the suspension of a law, independently of any delegation by the Legislature, that action could be nullified under Article 1, Section 28 of the Texas Constitution without a consideration of the question of legislative declaration of power.) Therefore, we hold that the retroactivity clause of section 7(A) does not affect appellant's criminal

1998See McDonald v. Denton, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 421 , 132 S.W. 823 (1910), error denied 104 Tex. 206 , 135 S.W. 1148 ; Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas, 104 Tex. 290 , 137 S.W. 342 (1911)(If an executive agency or a local government should take action in the suspension of a law, independently of any delegation by the Legislature, that action could be nullified under Article 1, Section 28 of the Texas Constitution without a consideration of the question of legislative declaration of power.) Therefore, we hold that the retroactivity clause of section 7(A) does not affect appellant's criminal

1998See McDonald v. Denton, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 421 , 132 S.W. 823 (1910), error denied 104 Tex. 206 , 135 S.W. 1148 ; Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas, 104 Tex. 290 , 137 S.W. 342 (1911)(If an executive agency or a local government should take action in the suspension of a law, independently of any delegation by the Legislature, that action could be nullified under Article 1, Section 28 of the Texas Constitution without a consideration of the question of legislative declaration of power.) Therefore, we hold that the retroactivity clause of section 7(A) does not affect appellant's criminal

1997Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1965).

1997Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex.Crim.App. 1965).