retroactivity analysis in Connecticut

2022This court then reaffirmed its holding in Omar, namely, that the retroactivity analysis for P.A. 18-63 was controlled by State v. Kalil, supra, 314 Conn. 529 , and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 , along with our savings statutes, §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t).

2022This court then determined that, because P.A. 18- 63 repealed and replaced the imposition of a form of punishment for a criminal conviction, this court’s retroactivity analysis was controlled by our Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529 , 107 A.3d 343 (2014), and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 ,6 as well as our criminal savings statutes, General Statutes §§ 54-1947 and 1-1 (t).8 State v. Omar, supra, 290-92; see also State v. Smith, supra, 209 Conn. App. 307 .

2022This court then determined that, because P.A. 18- 63 repealed and replaced the imposition of a form of punishment for a criminal conviction, this court’s retroactivity analysis was controlled by our Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529 , 107 A.3d 343 (2014), and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 ,6 as well as our criminal savings statutes, General Statutes §§ 54-1947 and 1-1 (t).8 State v. Omar, supra, 290-92; see also State v. Smith, supra, 209 Conn. App. 307 .

2021It argues that, because P.A. 18-63, §§ 1 and 2, repealed and replaced the imposition of a form of punishment for a criminal conviction, this court’s retroactivity analysis is controlled by State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529 , 107 A.3d 343 (2014), and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 , along with our savings statutes, §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t).

2022This court then reaffirmed its holding in Omar, namely, that the retroactivity analysis for P.A. 18-63 was controlled by State v. Kalil, supra, 314 Conn. 529 , and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 , along with our savings statutes, §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t).

2022This court then determined that, because P.A. 18- 63 repealed and replaced the imposition of a form of punishment for a criminal conviction, this court’s retroactivity analysis was controlled by our Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529 , 107 A.3d 343 (2014), and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 ,6 as well as our criminal savings statutes, General Statutes §§ 54-1947 and 1-1 (t).8 State v. Omar, supra, 290-92; see also State v. Smith, supra, 209 Conn. App. 307 .

2015In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the retroactivity framework it previously had set forth in Teague v. Lane, supra, 489 U.S. 288 .

1997In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S. Ct. 1060 , 103 L.

2023Moreover, because it is not always apparent whether a new law has a ‘‘retrospective effect,’’ especially when the statutory changes solely alter the future, rather than the past, legal consequences of previous transactions or occurrences, this court looked to the approaches taken by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products ( 511 U.S. 244 ), in which the majority concluded that a new statute has a retroactive effect if it impairs established rights of the parties, imposes new duties or obligations that they could not reasonably have anticipated, or disturbs other reasona

2022He argues that this was in error because, (1) to the extent that retroactivity, or its lack thereof, must be pleaded, it is the respondent’s burden to raise it, (2) his pleading implied a retroactivity claim, and (3) he made clear on the first day of trial that he sought to claim that State v. Harris, supra, 330 Conn. 91 , applied retroactively to his case.

2022To reiterate, the proper retroactivity analysis for amendments to criminal statutes that prescribe or define a punishment is controlled by our Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Kalil, supra, 314 Conn. 529 , and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 , along with our savings statutes, §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t). ‘‘It is axiomatic that, [a]s an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by Supreme Court precedent and are unable to modify it . . . . [W]e are not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court but are bound by them. . . . [I]t is not within our province to ree

2022To reiterate, the proper retroactivity analysis for amendments to criminal statutes that prescribe or define a punishment is controlled by our Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Kalil, supra, 314 Conn. 529 , and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 , along with our savings statutes, §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t). ‘‘It is axiomatic that, [a]s an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by Supreme Court precedent and are unable to modify it . . . . [W]e are not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court but are bound by them. . . . [I]t is not within our province to ree

2022To reiterate, the proper retroactivity analysis for amendments to criminal statutes that prescribe or define a punishment is controlled by our Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Kalil, supra, 314 Conn. 529 , and State v. Bischoff, supra, 337 Conn. 739 , along with our savings statutes, §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t). ‘‘It is axiomatic that, [a]s an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by Supreme Court precedent and are unable to modify it . . . . [W]e are not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court but are bound by them. . . . [I]t is not within our province to ree

2021Held that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence: contrary to the defendant’s claim, State v. Nathaniel S. ( 323 Conn. 290 ) did not control this court’s retroactivity analysis because our Supreme Court found that the juvenile transfer statute at issue in that case was automatic and, by its nature, procedural, permitting the amendment to that statute to be applied retroactively, whereas the special parole punishment at issue in the present case was not automatic, rather, prior to the enactment of P.A. 18-63, choosing to impose it was an act of jud

2021Held that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence: contrary to the defendant’s claim, this court’s retroactivity analysis was not controlled by the doctrine of clarifications because P.A. 18-63 was a change in the law, rather than clarifying legislation, as the legislature did not incorporate into the act an explicit statement of its intent to clarify §§ 53a-28 (b) and 54-125e (b), the prior language of those statutes was already clear, and, through the enactment of P.A. 18-63, the legislature added language to change such statutes by narrowing the

2011Id., at 228, 121 S.Ct. 712 .

2011The analysis applied by numerous other courts reflects a clear understanding that the due process question is determinative of whether retroactivity is even implicated. 3 See, e.g., Henry v. Ricks, 578 F.3d 134, 138-41 (2d Cir. 2009); Chapman v. LeMaster, 302 F.3d 1189, 1195-98 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 , 123 S. Ct. 1782 , 155 L.

2011The analysis applied by numerous other courts reflects a clear understanding that the due process question is determinative of whether retroactivity is even implicated. 3 See, e.g., Henry v. Ricks, 578 F.3d 134, 138-41 (2d Cir. 2009); Chapman v. LeMaster, 302 F.3d 1189, 1195-98 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 , 123 S. Ct. 1782 , 155 L.

2011The analysis applied by numerous other courts reflects a clear understanding that the due process question is determinative of whether retroactivity is even implicated. 3 See, e.g., Henry v. Ricks, 578 F.3d 134, 138-41 (2d Cir. 2009); Chapman v. LeMaster, 302 F.3d 1189, 1195-98 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 , 123 S. Ct. 1782 , 155 L.

2010If a state legislature is barred by the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause from passing such a law, it must follow that a [s]tate Supreme Court is barred by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bouie v. Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. at 353-54 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 . [12] In analyzing the claim, the trial court cited to state and federal vagueness jurisprudence. [13] The trial court also rejected the defendant's retroactivity claim.

2010If a state legislature is barred by the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause from passing such a law, it must follow that a [s]tate Supreme Court is barred by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bouie v. Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. at 353-54 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 . [12] In analyzing the claim, the trial court cited to state and federal vagueness jurisprudence. [13] The trial court also rejected the defendant's retroactivity claim.

1989Lupien v. Lupien, 192 Conn. 443 , 472 A.2d 18 (1984), upon which the defendant relies, does not persuade us otherwise.

1989Lupien v. Lupien, 192 Conn. 443 , 472 A.2d 18 (1984), upon which the defendant relies, does not persuade us otherwise.

1985II I also disagree with the opinion of the majority in disposing of the retroactivity claim raised by the defendant Roy, holding that because liability for damages is not adjudged until after a trial, “[i]t follows, therefore, that a defendant has no ‘obligation’ in accordance with § 55-3 to pay damages until that time.” (Emphasis in original.) We have previously held that “[a] right of action, including one for personal injuries, is a vested property interest, before as well as after judgment .... ” Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 147 , 3 A.2d 839 (1939).

1985II I also disagree with the opinion of the majority in disposing of the retroactivity claim raised by the defendant Roy, holding that because liability for damages is not adjudged until after a trial, “[i]t follows, therefore, that a defendant has no ‘obligation’ in accordance with § 55-3 to pay damages until that time.” (Emphasis in original.) We have previously held that “[a] right of action, including one for personal injuries, is a vested property interest, before as well as after judgment .... ” Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 147 , 3 A.2d 839 (1939).