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5 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences2020R]egardless of the words or legal grounds a defendant uses to challenge his conviction, I believe Ramos should apply to anyone convicted by a non- unanimous jury. 1 Here, the relevant exception suggested by Justice Harlan was ‘that a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of “those procedures that ... are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ in some situations it might be that time and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock 1992See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Taylor v. Whitley
green
1 sentence1997NOTES [1] The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane in State ex rel Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292 (La.1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 962 , 113 S.Ct. 2935 , 124 L.Ed.2d 684 (1993). [2] The four states noted by the Court were Connecticut, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Medina v. California
green
2 sentences1997The Court did not include Louisiana, although the heightened standard had been adopted in 1990. [3] In Addington , the Court held that due process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings to commit a person involuntarily. [4] In Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), the issue was whether any burden of proof could be placed on the defendant. [5] Oklahoma has reached the same conclusion in Walker v. State, supra . [6] See also State v. Howard, 93-1254 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/94) , 635 So.2d 752 , in which the issue was whether the 1997The Court did not include Louisiana, although the heightened standard had been adopted in 1990. [3] In Addington , the Court held that due process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings to commit a person involuntarily. [4] In Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), the issue was whether any burden of proof could be placed on the defendant. [5] Oklahoma has reached the same conclusion in Walker v. State, supra . [6] See also State v. Howard, 93-1254 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/94) , 635 So.2d 752 , in which the issue was whether the | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Howard
neutral
1 sentence1997The Court did not include Louisiana, although the heightened standard had been adopted in 1990. [3] In Addington , the Court held that due process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings to commit a person involuntarily. [4] In Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), the issue was whether any burden of proof could be placed on the defendant. [5] Oklahoma has reached the same conclusion in Walker v. State, supra . [6] See also State v. Howard, 93-1254 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/94) , 635 So.2d 752 , in which the issue was whether the | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Taylor v. Whitley
green
1 sentence1997NOTES [1] The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane in State ex rel Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292 (La.1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 962 , 113 S.Ct. 2935 , 124 L.Ed.2d 684 (1993). [2] The four states noted by the Court were Connecticut, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Cook v. Bachik
green
2 sentences1997NOTES [1] The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane in State ex rel Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292 (La.1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 962 , 113 S.Ct. 2935 , 124 L.Ed.2d 684 (1993). [2] The four states noted by the Court were Connecticut, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. 1997NOTES [1] The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane in State ex rel Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292 (La.1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 962 , 113 S.Ct. 2935 , 124 L.Ed.2d 684 (1993). [2] The four states noted by the Court were Connecticut, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Peart
green
1 sentence1994However, this Court may deny defendant the benefit of retroactive application of new rules of criminal procedure it creates, in cases, like Jackson, where the rules arguably have a state constitutional basis, see, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La.1993) (presumption of ineffectiveness of counsel "to apply prospectively only"), because this Court is not bound to adopt the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis when deciding the applicability of a State rule. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Butler v. McKellar
green
2 sentences1992See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990). 1992See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1988); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences1987Broussard separately held that a defendant charged under R.S. 14:74 "is entitled to counsel and if he cannot afford one, counsel must be appointed to represent him." This aspect of Broussard must be given full retroactive application. *775 In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), the United States Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of a valid waiver, a felony conviction secured in a court that denied the defendant assistance of counsel is invalid. 1987Broussard separately held that a defendant charged under R.S. 14:74 "is entitled to counsel and if he cannot afford one, counsel must be appointed to represent him." This aspect of Broussard must be given full retroactive application. *775 In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), the United States Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of a valid waiver, a felony conviction secured in a court that denied the defendant assistance of counsel is invalid. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Moore
green
1 sentence1987As we noted in Moore : Refusal to decree retroactive application is particularly logical in a situation ...in which retroactive application would effectively grant "judicial amnesty"... to those ... who previously entered voluntary guilty pleas.... 416 So.2d at 1299 n. 2. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.