way waiver in Arkansas

1998In Sirmon , the court held that one of the parties had waived the statutory right to notice of termination, stating: "`A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice.'" Sirmon v. Roberts, 209 Ark. at 588 , quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 .

1996In Sirmon , the court held that one of the parties had waived the statutory right to notice of termination, stating: "`A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice.'" Sirmon v. Roberts, 209 Ark. at 588 , quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 .

1998In Sirmon , the court held that one of the parties had waived the statutory right to notice of termination, stating: "`A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice.'" Sirmon v. Roberts, 209 Ark. at 588 , quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 .

1998In Sirmon , the court held that one of the parties had waived the statutory right to notice of termination, stating: "`A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice.'" Sirmon v. Roberts, 209 Ark. at 588 , quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 Atl. 256 , 8 A.L.R. 750 .

2003This court, in construing the statute in question in the case of Arkansas Power Light Company v. Paragould , 146 Ark. 1 , 225 S.W. 435 , gave the word "maintenance" a much broader meaning than the word "repair" by saying that the purpose and meaning of the statute was to authorize the council to keep the system up to an established standard, and, in its sound discretion, to determine the way in which the standard of efficiency should be maintained.

2003This court, in construing the statute in question in the case of Arkansas Power Light Company v. Paragould , 146 Ark. 1 , 225 S.W. 435 , gave the word "maintenance" a much broader meaning than the word "repair" by saying that the purpose and meaning of the statute was to authorize the council to keep the system up to an established standard, and, in its sound discretion, to determine the way in which the standard of efficiency should be maintained.

2003In the recent case of Anderson v. American State Bank , 178 Ark. 652 , 11 S.W.2d 444 , in construing the scope of the word "maintenance" in a similar statute, it was ruled that authority was conferred on the county court to purchase a tractor on the theory that it was impossible to maintain highways without machinery.

2003In the recent case of Anderson v. American State Bank , 178 Ark. 652 , 11 S.W.2d 444 , in construing the scope of the word "maintenance" in a similar statute, it was ruled that authority was conferred on the county court to purchase a tractor on the theory that it was impossible to maintain highways without machinery.

2015Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 300 Ark. 405 , 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989) (declaring that an action for mandamus and declaratory relief was the proper way to challenge a candidate's eligibility prior to the November 8, 1988 elec- • tion, holding that the controversy was moot, and declining to rule on the candidates' eligibility).

2015Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 300 Ark. 405 , 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989) (declaring that an action for mandamus and declaratory relief was the proper way to challenge a candidate's eligibility prior to the November 8, 1988 elec- • tion, holding that the controversy was moot, and declining to rule on the candidates' eligibility).

2015Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 300 Ark. 405 , 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989) (declaring that an action for mandamus and declaratory relief was the proper way to challenge a candidate’s eligibility prior to the November 8, 1988 election, holding that the controversy was moot, and declining to rule on the candidates’ eligibility). 10 Cite as 2015 Ark. 426 relief requested.

2008However, in light of the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Riegel, supra, that state-law tort claims are, in fact, preempted by the MDA, we are compelled to grant Soundtec’s petition for rehearing and issue this substituted opinion whereby we affirm the trial court’s order granting Soundtec’s motion for summary judgment. 1 Hannah, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.

1992In Johnson v. City of Pine Bluff, 258 Ark. 346 , 525 S.W.2d 76 (1975), we held that, even though the appellant's motion for a jury trial was not timely, such was of no moment with respect to the absolute jury trial right which is accorded to a defendant in a circuit court unless it is waived.

1992In Johnson v. City of Pine Bluff, 258 Ark. 346 , 525 S.W.2d 76 (1975), we held that, even though the appellant's motion for a jury trial was not timely, such was of no moment with respect to the absolute jury trial right which is accorded to a defendant in a circuit court unless it is waived.

1976This Court quoted with approval from the case of Hensley v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 243 Ark. 408 , 420 S.W. 2d 76 (1967), as follows: This provision in the policy avails appellee nothing in the way of defense in this case as the insured property was a total loss.

1976This Court quoted with approval from the case of Hensley v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 243 Ark. 408 , 420 S.W. 2d 76 (1967), as follows: This provision in the policy avails appellee nothing in the way of defense in this case as the insured property was a total loss.

1962Heard v. Farmers Bank of Hardy, 174 Ark. 194 , 295 S. W. 38 .

1962Heard v. Farmers Bank of Hardy, 174 Ark. 194 , 295 S. W. 38 .

1946R. 750) said that “A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice.” The distinction between waiver and estoppel is discussed by Mr. Justice Wood in Ms opinion on rehearing in Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, v. Newsom, 142 Ark. 132 , at pages 156-7-8, 219 S. W. 759 , 14 A. L.

1946R. 750) said that “A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice.” The distinction between waiver and estoppel is discussed by Mr. Justice Wood in Ms opinion on rehearing in Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, v. Newsom, 142 Ark. 132 , at pages 156-7-8, 219 S. W. 759 , 14 A. L.

1945In these circumstances, we think that the rule announced in the case of Boullioun v. Constantine, 186 Ark. 625 , 54 S. W. 2d 986 , is controlling here.

1945In these circumstances, we think that the rule announced in the case of Boullioun v. Constantine, 186 Ark. 625 , 54 S. W. 2d 986 , is controlling here.