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23 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1893–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyergreen2 sentences2021Therefore the way the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true nature.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 , 72 S. Ct. 863, 897 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 2021Therefore the way the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true nature.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 , 72 S. Ct. 863, 897 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stessmangreen2 sentences2017State v. Stessman, 460 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Iowa 1990). 2017State v. Stessman, 460 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Iowa 1990). | 2 | 2 |
Steven Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicinegreen2 sentences2014Palmer’s generalized application did little to satisfy its obligation of individualized investigation here. 9 See, e.g., 9We think it important to emphasize here Palmer’s apparent concession that provision of Cannon’s requested accommodations would not fundamentally alter its 27 Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26 (explaining institution must seek means of reasonably accommodating individual and “[i]f the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials within the institution considered alternative means . . . the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met 2014Palmer’s generalized application did little to satisfy its obligation of individualized investigation here.9 See, e.g., 9We think it important to emphasize here Palmer’s apparent concession that provision of Cannon’s requested accommodations would not fundamentally alter its 27 Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26 (explaining institution must seek means of reasonably accommodating individual and “[i]f the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials within the institution considered alternative means . . . the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met | 2 | 2 |
Sofia P. Pandazides v. Virginia Board Of Educationgreen2 sentences2014Palmer’s generalized application did little to satisfy its obligation of individualized investigation here. 9 See, e.g., 9We think it important to emphasize here Palmer’s apparent concession that provision of Cannon’s requested accommodations would not fundamentally alter its 27 Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26 (explaining institution must seek means of reasonably accommodating individual and “[i]f the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials within the institution considered alternative means . . . the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met 2014Palmer’s generalized application did little to satisfy its obligation of individualized investigation here.9 See, e.g., 9We think it important to emphasize here Palmer’s apparent concession that provision of Cannon’s requested accommodations would not fundamentally alter its 27 Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26 (explaining institution must seek means of reasonably accommodating individual and “[i]f the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials within the institution considered alternative means . . . the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met | 2 | 2 |
Kalloch v. Elwardgreen2 sentences2004See Krebs, 256 Iowa at 962 , 129 N.W.2d at 747 (in upholding determination service was invalid, nonetheless noting that “[tjhere is however no claim or proof of conduct on the part of either defendant which might constitute a waiver or estoppel”); see also DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1974) (“A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.” (quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 A. 256, 258 (Me.1919))). 2004See Krebs, 256 Iowa at 962 , 129 N.W.2d at 747 (in upholding determination service was invalid, nonetheless noting that “[tjhere is however no claim or proof of conduct on the part of either defendant which might constitute a waiver or estoppel”); see also DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1974) (“A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.” (quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 A. 256, 258 (Me.1919))). | 1 | 3 |
Berryhill v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See id. § 822.8; Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999); Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Osborn v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See id. § 822.8; Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999); Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See Doe v. State, 688 N.W.2d 265 , 268–71 (Iowa 2004) (affirming the dismissal of an inmate’s PCR application and rejecting claims that the chapter 229A process violated various constitutional rights).6 In Belk, the court was not convinced by the State’s assertions that an administrative appeal was the proper way to challenge the SOTP issue because the court stated the applicant’s “complaint is really with the [the department of corrections] rather than the [board of parole].” 905 N.W.2d at 191; see also id. at 192 (“[I]t is important to note, Belk’s claim is not about the actions of the [boar | 1 | 1 |
State v. Truesdellgreen1 sentence2014See State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2004) (“To preserve error on a claim of insufficient evidence for appellate review in a criminal case, the defendant must make a motion for judgment of acquittal at trial . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. City of Birminghamgreen2 sentences2006See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-21 , 87 S.Ct. 1824, 1830-32 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 1217-20 (1967) (holding the way to challenge an unconstitutional ordinance and injunction issued under it was to apply to have injunction modified or dissolved, not to violate the injunction and assert its unconstitutionality as a defense in contempt proceedings; stating “respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom”). 2006See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-21 , 87 S.Ct. 1824, 1830-32 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 1217-20 (1967) (holding the way to challenge an unconstitutional ordinance and injunction issued under it was to apply to have injunction modified or dissolved, not to violate the injunction and assert its unconstitutionality as a defense in contempt proceedings; stating “respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom”). | 1 | 1 |
DeWall v. Prenticegreen1 sentence2004See Krebs, 256 Iowa at 962 , 129 N.W.2d at 747 (in upholding determination service was invalid, nonetheless noting that “[tjhere is however no claim or proof of conduct on the part of either defendant which might constitute a waiver or estoppel”); see also DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1974) (“A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.” (quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 A. 256, 258 (Me.1919))). | 1 | 1 |
Krebs v. Town of Mansongreen2 sentences2004See Krebs, 256 Iowa at 962 , 129 N.W.2d at 747 (in upholding determination service was invalid, nonetheless noting that “[tjhere is however no claim or proof of conduct on the part of either defendant which might constitute a waiver or estoppel”); see also DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1974) (“A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.” (quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 A. 256, 258 (Me.1919))). 2004See Krebs, 256 Iowa at 962 , 129 N.W.2d at 747 (in upholding determination service was invalid, nonetheless noting that “[tjhere is however no claim or proof of conduct on the part of either defendant which might constitute a waiver or estoppel”); see also DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1974) (“A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.” (quoting Kallock v. Elward, 118 Me. 346 , 108 A. 256, 258 (Me.1919))). | 1 | 1 |
Heumphreus v. Stategreen2 sentences1984Heumphreus v. State, 334 N.W.2d 757, 758 (Iowa 1983). 1984Heumphreus v. State, 334 N.W.2d 757, 758 (Iowa 1983). | 1 | 1 |
Jansen v. Harmongreen2 sentences1983Jansen v. Harmon, 164 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Iowa 1969). 1983Jansen v. Harmon, 164 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Iowa 1969). | 1 | 1 |
Furey v. Crawford Countygreen2 sentences1979See Furey v. Crawford County, 208 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Iowa 1973). 1979See Furey v. Crawford County, 208 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Iowa 1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Iowa v. Andrew William Schlachter
green
1 sentence2024The issue here is that Polkinghorn objects to how his criminal history was made part of the record—a procedural challenge constrained by Tindell and its progeny. 5 Even if we came out the other way on the error-preservation question, we would affirm on the merits. “[A] sentencing court has a right to know a defendant’s criminal record prior to sentencing.” Schlachter, 884 N.W.2d at 786 ; see Iowa Code § 901.2 (1) (“[T]he court shall receive from the state . . . any information which may be offered which is relevant to the question of sentencing.”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State of Iowa v. Sayvon Andre Propps
green
1 sentence2018State v. Propps , 897 N.W.2d 91 , 97 (Iowa 2017) (citing Iowa R. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Estate of Carpenter
green
2 sentences1974Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268 , 90 N.W. 833 , 62 L.R.A. 395 [ 94 Am.St.Rep. 293 ]; In re Estate of Carpenter, 210 Iowa 553 , 231 N.W. 376 ; Swift v. Petersen, 240 Iowa 715 , 37 N.W.2d 258 . “ ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kallock v. Elward, 118 Maine 346 [348], 108 A. 256, 258 , 8 A.L.R. 750 [752]. “ ‘A defendant may be estopped by his agreement, representations, or conduct from asserting the bar of the statute of limitations. * * * However, before the doctrine of estoppel to pl 1974Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268 , 90 N.W. 833 , 62 L.R.A. 395 [ 94 Am.St.Rep. 293 ]; In re Estate of Carpenter, 210 Iowa 553 , 231 N.W. 376 ; Swift v. Petersen, 240 Iowa 715 , 37 N.W.2d 258 . “ ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kallock v. Elward, 118 Maine 346 [348], 108 A. 256, 258 , 8 A.L.R. 750 [752]. “ ‘A defendant may be estopped by his agreement, representations, or conduct from asserting the bar of the statute of limitations. * * * However, before the doctrine of estoppel to pl | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Swift v. Petersen
green
2 sentences1974Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268 , 90 N.W. 833 , 62 L.R.A. 395 [ 94 Am.St.Rep. 293 ]; In re Estate of Carpenter, 210 Iowa 553 , 231 N.W. 376 ; Swift v. Petersen, 240 Iowa 715 , 37 N.W.2d 258 . “ ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kallock v. Elward, 118 Maine 346 [348], 108 A. 256, 258 , 8 A.L.R. 750 [752]. “ ‘A defendant may be estopped by his agreement, representations, or conduct from asserting the bar of the statute of limitations. * * * However, before the doctrine of estoppel to pl 1974Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268 , 90 N.W. 833 , 62 L.R.A. 395 [ 94 Am.St.Rep. 293 ]; In re Estate of Carpenter, 210 Iowa 553 , 231 N.W. 376 ; Swift v. Petersen, 240 Iowa 715 , 37 N.W.2d 258 . “ ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kallock v. Elward, 118 Maine 346 [348], 108 A. 256, 258 , 8 A.L.R. 750 [752]. “ ‘A defendant may be estopped by his agreement, representations, or conduct from asserting the bar of the statute of limitations. * * * However, before the doctrine of estoppel to pl | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Holman v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Railway & Bridge Co.
green
2 sentences1974Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268 , 90 N.W. 833 , 62 L.R.A. 395 [ 94 Am.St.Rep. 293 ]; In re Estate of Carpenter, 210 Iowa 553 , 231 N.W. 376 ; Swift v. Petersen, 240 Iowa 715 , 37 N.W.2d 258 . “ ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kallock v. Elward, 118 Maine 346 [348], 108 A. 256, 258 , 8 A.L.R. 750 [752]. “ ‘A defendant may be estopped by his agreement, representations, or conduct from asserting the bar of the statute of limitations. * * * However, before the doctrine of estoppel to pl 1974Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268 , 90 N.W. 833 , 62 L.R.A. 395 [ 94 Am.St.Rep. 293 ]; In re Estate of Carpenter, 210 Iowa 553 , 231 N.W. 376 ; Swift v. Petersen, 240 Iowa 715 , 37 N.W.2d 258 . “ ‘A statute cannot stand in the way of waiver or equitable estoppel when the facts demand their application in the interest of justice and right.’ Kallock v. Elward, 118 Maine 346 [348], 108 A. 256, 258 , 8 A.L.R. 750 [752]. “ ‘A defendant may be estopped by his agreement, representations, or conduct from asserting the bar of the statute of limitations. * * * However, before the doctrine of estoppel to pl | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles
green
2 sentences1968Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 involving the right to counsel was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), supra. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 involving procedure for determination of voluntariness of a confession was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , involving the right of an indigent to a transcript and record for purpose of appeal was held retroactive by Eskridge v. Washington State Board o 1968Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 involving the right to counsel was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), supra. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 involving procedure for determination of voluntariness of a confession was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , involving the right of an indigent to a transcript and record for purpose of appeal was held retroactive by Eskridge v. Washington State Board o | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Griffin v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1968Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 involving the right to counsel was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), supra. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 involving procedure for determination of voluntariness of a confession was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , involving the right of an indigent to a transcript and record for purpose of appeal was held retroactive by Eskridge v. Washington State Board o 1968Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 involving the right to counsel was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), supra. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 involving procedure for determination of voluntariness of a confession was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , involving the right of an indigent to a transcript and record for purpose of appeal was held retroactive by Eskridge v. Washington State Board o | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences1968Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 involving the right to counsel was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), supra. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 involving procedure for determination of voluntariness of a confession was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , involving the right of an indigent to a transcript and record for purpose of appeal was held retroactive by Eskridge v. Washington State Board o 1968Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 involving the right to counsel was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), supra. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 involving procedure for determination of voluntariness of a confession was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , involving the right of an indigent to a transcript and record for purpose of appeal was held retroactive by Eskridge v. Washington State Board o | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences1968Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 involving the right to counsel was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), supra. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 involving procedure for determination of voluntariness of a confession was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , involving the right of an indigent to a transcript and record for purpose of appeal was held retroactive by Eskridge v. Washington State Board o 1968Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 involving the right to counsel was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), supra. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 involving procedure for determination of voluntariness of a confession was held to apply retroactively by Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , involving the right of an indigent to a transcript and record for purpose of appeal was held retroactive by Eskridge v. Washington State Board o | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Sackett v. Farmers State Bank of Boone
green
1 sentence1930Obviously, plaintiff could not hold and recover judgment against the bank on the bank draft which was taken in payment of the sight draft, and at the same time claim that the bank draft was not paid, and that it was entitled to judgment against the drawee of the sight draft or for the car of poultry which the sight draft represented (Sacket b v. Farmers State Bank of Boone, 209 Iowa 487 ); and plaintiff does not in its petition make such inconsistent claims. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Cashman v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co.
neutral
1 sentence1917Appellant cites again Miller v. Cedar Rapids Sash & Door Co., 158 Iowa 742 , a part of which we have before quoted and will not now repeat, In Cashman v. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., 169 Iowa 306 , the question was as to whether plaintiff was doing his work in the customary way under instruction from the foreman, and it was held that it was a question for the jury whether plaintiff was using reasonable care, himself. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Kansas & Texas Coal Co. v. Chandler
neutral
2 sentences1909We said in a recent case that If' one remains at work under a rock which he knows is liable to fall at any moment, his injury from the fall of the rock is a consequence of his own carelessness, and prevents a recovery on his part.’ Kansas Coal Co. v. Chandler, 71 Ark. 518 ( 77 S. W. 912 ). 1909We said in a recent case that If' one remains at work under a rock which he knows is liable to fall at any moment, his injury from the fall of the rock is a consequence of his own carelessness, and prevents a recovery on his part.’ Kansas Coal Co. v. Chandler, 71 Ark. 518 ( 77 S. W. 912 ). | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Warner v. Wilson
neutral
1 sentence1893In Warner v. Wilson, 73 Iowa 719 , the cattle were separately described by color, age and name; and this court held the description insufficient, because of “no statement as to the present or past ownership of the property, nor of the place where it is now or has been kept.’ ’ It is hardly necessary to pursue the thought further. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.