way challenge (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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way challenge in Indiana

15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Oviatt v. BEHMEgreen
ind · 1958 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025See, e.g., Oviatt v. Behme, 147 N.E.2d 897 (Ind. 1958).

11
2444 Acquisitions, LLC v. Michael Fishgreen
indctapp · 2017 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020As this court noted in affirming the trial court order against Acquisitions to turn over to Fish the surplus tax sale funds, the administrative process was not the only way to claim surplus tax sale funds and a claimant could go directly to the trial court. 2444 Acquisitions, LLC v. Fish, 84 N.E.3d 1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). [7] Indiana Trial Rule 20(A)(2) permits joinder of defendants, if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect or, or arising out of, the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrence

11
Hardley v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); see also Receveur v. Buss, 919 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. [6] Because Jenkins’s petition is essentially one for post-conviction relief, we will treat the trial court’s dismissal as a denial of post-conviction relief under Post- Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A05-1703-MI-478 | September 6, 2017 Page 3 of 5 Conviction Rule 1(4)(f), which provides, in part, “If the pleadings conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief, the court may deny the petition without further proceedi

11
Receveur v. Bussgreen
indctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); see also Receveur v. Buss, 919 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. [6] Because Jenkins’s petition is essentially one for post-conviction relief, we will treat the trial court’s dismissal as a denial of post-conviction relief under Post- Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A05-1703-MI-478 | September 6, 2017 Page 3 of 5 Conviction Rule 1(4)(f), which provides, in part, “If the pleadings conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief, the court may deny the petition without further proceedi

11
Huffman v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016“If Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1965 | August 26, 2016 Page 3 of 5 there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke probation.” Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995). [8] We first address the State’s argument that Ormsby’s appeal should be dismissed because the proper way to challenge the revocation of his probation is by a post- conviction relief proceeding, and not a direct appeal, which Ormsby employs in thi

11
Braxton v. Stategreen
ind · 1995 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016“If Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1965 | August 26, 2016 Page 3 of 5 there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke probation.” Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995). [8] We first address the State’s argument that Ormsby’s appeal should be dismissed because the proper way to challenge the revocation of his probation is by a post- conviction relief proceeding, and not a direct appeal, which Ormsby employs in thi

11
Chance v. Chancegreen
indctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986See Chance v. Chance (1980), Ind. App., 400 N.E.2d 1207 .

1986See Chance v. Chance (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 1207 .

11
United States v. Ventrescagreen
scotus · 1965 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
1 sentence

1980See Ventresca, supra, 85 S.Ct. at 746.

11
Wolverton v. Wolvertongreen
ind · 1904 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1913–1913
2 sentences

1913See, also, Wolverton v. Wolverton (1904), 163 Ind. 26, 31 , 71 N. E. 123 . 4.

1913See, also, Wolverton v. Wolverton (1904), 163 Ind. 26, 31 , 71 N. E. 123 . 4.

11
Roller v. Klinggreen
· 1898 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1898–1898
1 sentence

1898Roller v. Kling, 150 Ind. 159, 163, 161 ; Pittsburgh, etc., R.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Partipilo v. Hallman green
illappct · 1987
1 sentence

2024Palmer, 1 Law of Restitution at 7-8 (1978)). “[T]he statement concerning the action of quasi-contract being equitable has been repeated many times, but merely refers to the way in which a claim should be approached ‘since it is clear that the action is at law and the relief given is a simple money judgment.’” Id. (quoting Palmer, supra at 9).

12024–2024
Nehi Beverage Co., Inc. v. Petri green
indctapp · 1989
2 sentences

2009Furthermore, "[T}he statement concerning the action of quasi-contract being equitable has been repeated many times, but merely refers to the way in which a claim should be approached, since it is clear that the action is at law and the relief given is a simple money judgment." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

2009Furthermore, "[T]he statement concerning the action of quasi-contract being equitable has been repeated many times, but merely refers to the way in which a claim should be approached, since it is clear that the action is at law and the relief given is a simple money judgment." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

12009–2009
Collins v. State green
ind · 2004
2 sentences

2007On November 9, 2004, our supreme court decided Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.2004) which held that the way to challenge a sentence after a guilty plea where the court has had discretion in fixing the term of the sentence is by direct appeal or, if the time for filing a direct appeal has run, by filing an appeal under P-C.R. 2. 817 N.E.2d at 233 .

2007On November 9, 2004, our supreme court decided Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230 (Ind.2004) which held that the way to challenge a sentence after a guilty plea where the court has had discretion in fixing the term of the sentence is by direct appeal or, if the time for filing a direct appeal has run, by filing an appeal under P-C.R. 2. 817 N.E.2d at 233 .

12007–2007
Stovall v. Denno green
scotus · 1967
2 sentences

1987Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must meritably vary with the dictate involved. 388 U.S. at 297 , 87 S.Ct. at 1970 .

1987Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must meritably vary with the dictate involved. 388 U.S. at 297 , 87 S.Ct. at 1970 .

11987–1987
Swoboda v. Brown green
· 1935
2 sentences

1975There the court quoted with approval the case of Swoboda v. Brown (1935), 129 Ohio St. 512 , 196 N.E. 274 , for an explanation of the distinction that we think is controlling in the case at bar: “The distinction between negligence and ‘negligence per se’ is the means and method of ascertainment.

1975There the court quoted with approval the case of Swoboda v. Brown (1935), 129 Ohio St. 512 , 196 N.E. 274 , for an explanation of the distinction that we think is controlling in the case at bar: “The distinction between negligence and ‘negligence per se’ is the means and method of ascertainment.

11975–1975
Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas green
ind · 1911
2 sentences

1950The opinion and the transcript in Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas (1911), 175 Ind. 319 , 94 N. E. 406 , disclose no demurrer was filed to any objection, and there was no discussion of the procedure to be followed *285 in attacking the legal sufficiency of an objection which attempted to state a cause of defense.

1950The opinion and the transcript in Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas (1911), 175 Ind. 319 , 94 N. E. 406 , disclose no demurrer was filed to any objection, and there was no discussion of the procedure to be followed *285 in attacking the legal sufficiency of an objection which attempted to state a cause of defense.

11950–1950
Wadler v. Mogul Rubber Corporation green
indctapp · 1945
2 sentences

1949Skelton v. Bank’s Estate (1945), 116 *692 Ind App. 280, 63 N. E. 2d 546 ; Walder v. Mogul Rubber Corp. (1945), 116 Ind. App. 152 , 61 N. E. 2d 472 ; Dept. of Ins. v. Indiana Trav.

1949Skelton v. Bank’s Estate (1945), 116 *692 Ind App. 280, 63 N. E. 2d 546 ; Walder v. Mogul Rubber Corp. (1945), 116 Ind. App. 152 , 61 N. E. 2d 472 ; Dept. of Ins. v. Indiana Trav.

11949–1949
Skelton v. Banks' Estate neutral
indctapp · 1945
1 sentence

1949Skelton v. Bank’s Estate (1945), 116 *692 Ind App. 280, 63 N. E. 2d 546 ; Walder v. Mogul Rubber Corp. (1945), 116 Ind. App. 152 , 61 N. E. 2d 472 ; Dept. of Ins. v. Indiana Trav.

11949–1949

Where else courts name it

TX 79 (1922–2026) PA 62 (1896–2025) CA 58 (1892–2025) IL 57 (1905–2021) NY 42 (1848–2026) OH 34 (1912–2026) CT 34 (1859–2020) IA 23 (1893–2025) FL 22 (1958–2014) LA 20 (1919–2022) OR 18 (1952–2025) TN 17 (1950–2026) AL 17 (1893–2018) MA 16 (1904–2025) MD 16 (1966–2023) CO 15 (1900–2021) NC 15 (1903–2021) IN 15 (1898–2025) WA 15 (1963–2024) MO 14 (1913–2024) AR 14 (1932–2025) WY 11 (1936–2021) UT 11 (1932–2025) WI 11 (1899–2020) NJ 11 (1979–2021) MN 10 (1985–2025) GA 10 (1913–2026) VA 9 (1967–2024) AZ 8 (1933–2015) KS 7 (1930–2023) ID 7 (1907–2023) DC 7 (1987–2025) MI 7 (1901–2024) MS 6 (1890–1992) OK 6 (1959–2007) VT 6 (1941–2025) AK 6 (1993–2022) WV 5 (1978–2004) SC 5 (2008–2025) NM 5 (1894–2022) ME 5 (1997–2025) NE 4 (1964–2014) KY 4 (1930–2012) RI 4 (1968–2001) SD 3 (1936–2024) NV 3 (2013–2022) DE 3 (1993–2024) MT 2 (1944–1960) ND 2 (1986–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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