way test in Connecticut

2012Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 265 Conn. 79, 104 , 828 A.2d 31 (2003). “[T]he general rule is that [a] counterclaim should be pleaded in exactly the same way the claim would be pleaded in the complaint in an independent action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Oil Co. v. Todd, 195 Conn. 333, 341 , 487 A.2d 1095 (1985).

2012Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 265 Conn. 79, 104 , 828 A.2d 31 (2003). “[T]he general rule is that [a] counterclaim should be pleaded in exactly the same way the claim would be pleaded in the complaint in an independent action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Oil Co. v. Todd, 195 Conn. 333, 341 , 487 A.2d 1095 (1985).

2002In Drahan v. Board of Education , 42 Conn. App. 480 , 498 n. 17, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921 (1996), the Appellate Court stated that a motion for summary judgment was "a proper way to test the legal CT Page 3861 sufficiency" of a count which the Court found failed to state a cause of action.

2001"The defendants' motion for summary judgment was a proper way to test the legal sufficiency of this count of the second amended complaint." Drahan v. Board of Education , 42 Conn. App. 480 , 498 n. 17, 680 A.2d 316 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921 , 682 A.2d 1000 (1996)).

2012Although “the proper way to challenge subject matter jurisdiction is by a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion for summary judgment”; Booth v. Flanagan, 19 Conn. App. 413, 415 , 562 A.2d 592 (1989); it is not improper to treat a motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss.

2012Although “the proper way to challenge subject matter jurisdiction is by a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion for summary judgment”; Booth v. Flanagan, 19 Conn. App. 413, 415 , 562 A.2d 592 (1989); it is not improper to treat a motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss.

2001Nowak v. Nowak , 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , 394 A.2d 716 (1978), see also Connecticut National Bank v. Voog , 233 Conn. 352 , 354-55 , CT Page 9499 659 A.2d 172 (1995).

2001Nowak v. Nowak , 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , 394 A.2d 716 (1978), see also Connecticut National Bank v. Voog , 233 Conn. 352 , 354-55 , CT Page 9499 659 A.2d 172 (1995).

2001"The defendants' motion for summary judgment was a proper way to test the legal sufficiency of this count of the second amended complaint." Drahan v. Board of Education , 42 Conn. App. 480 , 498 n. 17, 680 A.2d 316 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921 , 682 A.2d 1000 (1996)).

2000The Connecticut Appellate Court has held that the "motion for summary judgment was a proper way to test the legal sufficiency of . . . the . . . complaint." Drahan v. Board of Education , 42 Conn. App. 480 , 498 n. 17, 680 A.2d 316 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921 , 682 A.2d 1000 (1996), citing Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer , 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971).

2000“Civil contempt is conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party.” Bunche v. Bunche, 36 Conn. App. 322, 324 , 650 A.2d 917 (1994).

2000“Civil contempt is conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party.” Bunche v. Bunche, 36 Conn. App. 322, 324 , 650 A.2d 917 (1994).

1995"Summary judgment is the proper way to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint . . . if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and any other proof show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hoey v. Textron, Inc., 9 CSCR 423 (March 17, 1994, Rodriguez, J.), citing Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971); but see Burke v. Avitable, 32 Conn. App. 765 , 772 , 630 A.2d 624 (1993) (stating "[t]he office of motion for summary judgment is not to test the legal sufficiency of the complai

1994"Summary judgment is the proper way to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint before trial after the pleadings are CT Page 11830 closed if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and any other supporting proof show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hoey v. Textron, Inc. , 9 CSCR 423 (March 17, 1994, Rodriguez, J.), citing Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer , 160 Conn. 404 , 409 (1971).

1994Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 (1971); Camp v. Chase, 39 Conn. Sup. 264 , 267 n. 1 (1984).

1992Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404 , 409 , 279 A.2d 540 (1971); Camp v. Chase, 39 Conn. Sup. 264 , 267 n. 1 476 A.2d 1087 (Super Ct. 1983).

2020Yet [w]e previously have recognized [that] . . . if the com- plaint puts the defendant on notice of the relevant claims, then a plaintiff’s failure specifically to allege a particular fact or issue is not fatal to his claims unless it results in prejudice to the defendant.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Solaire Development, LLC, 156 Conn. App. 17 , 34, 111 A.3d 533 (2015). ‘‘[T]he general rule is that [a] counterclaim should be pleaded in exactly the same way the claim would be pleaded in the complaint in an independent action.’’ (Internal quotation marks om

2020Yet [w]e previously have recognized [that] . . . if the com- plaint puts the defendant on notice of the relevant claims, then a plaintiff’s failure specifically to allege a particular fact or issue is not fatal to his claims unless it results in prejudice to the defendant.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Solaire Development, LLC, 156 Conn. App. 17 , 34, 111 A.3d 533 (2015). ‘‘[T]he general rule is that [a] counterclaim should be pleaded in exactly the same way the claim would be pleaded in the complaint in an independent action.’’ (Internal quotation marks om

2012Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 265 Conn. 79, 104 , 828 A.2d 31 (2003). “[T]he general rule is that [a] counterclaim should be pleaded in exactly the same way the claim would be pleaded in the complaint in an independent action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Oil Co. v. Todd, 195 Conn. 333, 341 , 487 A.2d 1095 (1985).

2012Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 265 Conn. 79, 104 , 828 A.2d 31 (2003). “[T]he general rule is that [a] counterclaim should be pleaded in exactly the same way the claim would be pleaded in the complaint in an independent action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Oil Co. v. Todd, 195 Conn. 333, 341 , 487 A.2d 1095 (1985).

2011See, e.g., Priest v. Edmonds, 295 Conn. 132, 137 , 989 A.2d 588 (2010); Langewisch v. New England Residential Services, Inc., 113 Conn. App. 290, 294 , 966 A.2d 318 (2009). 6 Generally, a motion to dismiss is the proper way to challenge the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

2011See, e.g., Priest v. Edmonds, 295 Conn. 132, 137 , 989 A.2d 588 (2010); Langewisch v. New England Residential Services, Inc., 113 Conn. App. 290, 294 , 966 A.2d 318 (2009). 6 Generally, a motion to dismiss is the proper way to challenge the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

2002In Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 (2001), the court upheld the granting of summary judgment against a plaintiff who made virtually the same claim that the plaintiff makes in count eight.

2002Practice Book § 10-10 states, in pertinent part, "In any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff . . . provided that each such counterclaim . . . arises out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiffs complaint. . . ." "If the claim arises out of the same transaction described in the complaint, it is characterized as a counterclaim." 225 Associates v. Connecticut CT Page 7279 Housing Finance Authority , 65 Conn. App. 112 , 121 , 782 A.2d 189 (2001).

2002Practice Book § 10-10 states, in pertinent part, "In any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff . . . provided that each such counterclaim . . . arises out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiffs complaint. . . ." "If the claim arises out of the same transaction described in the complaint, it is characterized as a counterclaim." 225 Associates v. Connecticut CT Page 7279 Housing Finance Authority , 65 Conn. App. 112 , 121 , 782 A.2d 189 (2001).

2001Nowak v. Nowak , 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , 394 A.2d 716 (1978), see also Connecticut National Bank v. Voog , 233 Conn. 352 , 354-55 , CT Page 9499 659 A.2d 172 (1995).

2001Nowak v. Nowak , 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , 394 A.2d 716 (1978), see also Connecticut National Bank v. Voog , 233 Conn. 352 , 354-55 , CT Page 9499 659 A.2d 172 (1995).

2001Drahan v. Board of Education , 42 Conn. App. 480 , 498 n. 17, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921 , citing Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer , 160 Conn. 404 , 409 . "[I]n order to state . . . a claim [for negligent infliction of emotional distress], the plaintiff has the burden of pleading that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm." Parsons v. United Technologies Corp ., 243 Conn. 66 , 88 . "[R]ecovery for unintentionally caused emotional distress does no

2001Drahan v. Board of Education , 42 Conn. App. 480 , 498 n. 17, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921 , citing Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer , 160 Conn. 404 , 409 . "[I]n order to state . . . a claim [for negligent infliction of emotional distress], the plaintiff has the burden of pleading that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm." Parsons v. United Technologies Corp ., 243 Conn. 66 , 88 . "[R]ecovery for unintentionally caused emotional distress does no

1996However, "[o]nce the matter of lack of subject matter jurisdiction comes to the attention of the trial court . . . the trial court can proceed no further until the issue is resolved." Ertel v. Carothers, 34 Conn. App. 18 , 21 , 639 A.2d 1055 (1994).

1996However, "[o]nce the matter of lack of subject matter jurisdiction comes to the attention of the trial court . . . the trial court can proceed no further until the issue is resolved." Ertel v. Carothers, 34 Conn. App. 18 , 21 , 639 A.2d 1055 (1994).

1995See Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 614 A.2d 50 (1992); Cohen v. Security Title Guaranty Company, 212 Conn. 436 , 562 A.2d 51 (1989); Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 207 Conn. 179 , 540 A.2d 693 (1988); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 204 Conn. 460 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Company, 202 Conn. 190 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 1 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Preston v. Phelp's Dodge Copper Products Company, 35 Conn. App. 850 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994)

1995See Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 614 A.2d 50 (1992); Cohen v. Security Title Guaranty Company, 212 Conn. 436 , 562 A.2d 51 (1989); Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 207 Conn. 179 , 540 A.2d 693 (1988); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 204 Conn. 460 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Company, 202 Conn. 190 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 1 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Preston v. Phelp's Dodge Copper Products Company, 35 Conn. App. 850 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994)

1995See Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 614 A.2d 50 (1992); Cohen v. Security Title Guaranty Company, 212 Conn. 436 , 562 A.2d 51 (1989); Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 207 Conn. 179 , 540 A.2d 693 (1988); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 204 Conn. 460 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Company, 202 Conn. 190 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 1 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Preston v. Phelp's Dodge Copper Products Company, 35 Conn. App. 850 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994)

1995See Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 614 A.2d 50 (1992); Cohen v. Security Title Guaranty Company, 212 Conn. 436 , 562 A.2d 51 (1989); Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 207 Conn. 179 , 540 A.2d 693 (1988); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 204 Conn. 460 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Company, 202 Conn. 190 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 1 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Preston v. Phelp's Dodge Copper Products Company, 35 Conn. App. 850 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994)

1995See Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 614 A.2d 50 (1992); Cohen v. Security Title Guaranty Company, 212 Conn. 436 , 562 A.2d 51 (1989); Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 207 Conn. 179 , 540 A.2d 693 (1988); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 204 Conn. 460 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Company, 202 Conn. 190 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 1 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Preston v. Phelp's Dodge Copper Products Company, 35 Conn. App. 850 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994)

1995See Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 614 A.2d 50 (1992); Cohen v. Security Title Guaranty Company, 212 Conn. 436 , 562 A.2d 51 (1989); Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 207 Conn. 179 , 540 A.2d 693 (1988); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 204 Conn. 460 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Company, 202 Conn. 190 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 1 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Preston v. Phelp's Dodge Copper Products Company, 35 Conn. App. 850 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994)

1995See Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 614 A.2d 50 (1992); Cohen v. Security Title Guaranty Company, 212 Conn. 436 , 562 A.2d 51 (1989); Verrastro v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 207 Conn. 179 , 540 A.2d 693 (1988); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 204 Conn. 460 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Company, 202 Conn. 190 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Barry v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 36 Conn. App. 1 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Preston v. Phelp's Dodge Copper Products Company, 35 Conn. App. 850 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994); Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769 , ___ A.2d ___ (1994)

1995As a general rule, a "counterclaim should be pleaded in exactly the same way the claim would be pleaded in the complaint in an independent action." Home Oil Co. v. Todd, 195 Conn. 333 , 341 , 487 A.2d 109 (1985); see also Practice Book § 168.