way test in Illinois

2019People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 344 (2007). ¶ 32 In Cox, we rejected the defendant’s similar claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding “the only way that defense counsel’s decision not to object to the certification could possibly be ineffective assistance was if defendant actually had a FOID card and the certification was in error.

2019We afford counsel’s strategic decisions a high degree of deference and evaluate counsel’s “performance from his perspective at the time, rather than through the lens of hindsight.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 344 (2007). ¶ 28 In the instant case, the only way defense counsel’s decision not to object to the admission of the certification letter could be said to be the result of ineffective assistance is if defendant actually possessed a valid FOID card.

2015An appeal is a continuation of the proceeding.” ¶ 74 Monteiro argues that, according to Eskandani v. Phillips, 61 Ill. 2d 183, 195 (1975), when an Illinois circuit court orders the requested discovery in a petition under Rule 204(b), that order constitutes a “final judgment” for purposes of Rule 301, because the discovery is all that is sought before the Illinois circuit court. ¶ 75 In Eskandani, our supreme court explained that “if the main action were pending in Illinois the order would be interlocutory and not appealable,” and the only way to test the correctness of the order would be throu

2015An appeal is a continuation of the proceeding." ¶ 74 Monteiro argues that, according to Eskandani v. Phillips, 61 Ill. 2d 183, 195 (1975), when an Illinois circuit court orders the requested discovery in a petition under Rule 204(b), that order constitutes a "final judgment" for purposes of Rule 301, because the discovery is all that is sought before the Illinois circuit court. ¶ 75 In Eskandani, our supreme court explained that "if the main action were pending in Illinois the order would be interlocutory and not appealable," and the only way to test the correctness of the order would be throu

2020People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 327 (2011). “[D]ecisions regarding what matters to object to and when to object are matters of trial strategy,” and “will typically not support a claim of ineffective representation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Macias, 2015 IL App (1st) 132039, ¶ 82 . ¶ 25 When considering a similar claim in Cox, we found that “the only way that defense counsel’s decision not to object to the certification could possibly be ineffective assistance was if defendant actually had a FOID card and the certification was in error.” (Emphasis omitted.) Cox, 2017 IL

2019App. 3d 45, 47 (2010); see also Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 88 (noting, the only way that defense counsel’s decision not to object to the certification could possibly be ineffective assistance was if the defendant actually had a FOID card; otherwise, waiver was a matter of trial strategy).

2014Likewise, "[w]hether there was adverse use of the way under a claim of right for a period of 20 years, or the use of the way is - 17 - only permissive, is almost wholly a question of fact." Petersen v. Corrubia, 21 Ill. 2d 525, 532 , 173 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1961).

2014Likewise, "[w]hether there was adverse use of the way under a claim of right for a period of 20 years, or the use of the way is - 17 - only permissive, is almost wholly a question of fact." Petersen v. Corrubia, 21 Ill. 2d 525, 532 , 173 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1961).

2018See Henderson, 2017 IL App (1st) 142259 , ¶ 181 (citing People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 304 (2007)). ¶ 88 Lastly, the only way that defense counsel’s decision not to object to the certification could possibly be ineffective assistance was if defendant actually had a FOID card and the certification was in error.

2017See Henderson , 2016 IL App (1st) 142259 , ¶ 181, 413 Ill.Dec. 239 , 77 N.E.3d 1046 (citing People v. Stechly , 225 Ill. 2d 246 , 304, 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (2007) ). ¶ 88 Lastly, the only way that defense counsel's decision not to object to the certification could possibly be ineffective assistance was if defendant actually had a FOID card and the certification was in error.

2015Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill. 2d 40, 43 (1965); see also Unger v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85 (1985) (explaining that the “line of duty” test has been interpreted in the same way as the test of compensability: that is, an injury will be found to be compensable if it arose out of and in the course of employment). ¶ 19 Although this court equated “compensable” with “line of duty,” the sole question raised in those cases was whether the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of or in -6- the course of his employment.

2015Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill. 2d 40, 43 (1965); see also Unger v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85 (1985) (explaining that the “line of duty” test has been interpreted in the same way as the test of compensability: that is, an injury will be found to be compensable if it arose out of and in the course of employment). ¶ 19 Although this court equated “compensable” with “line of duty,” the sole question raised in those cases was whether the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of or in the course of his employment.

2015Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill. 2d 40, 43 (1965); see also Unger v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85 (1985) (explaining that the “line of duty” test has been interpreted in the same way as the test of compensability: that is, an injury will be found to be compensable if it arose out of and in the course of employment). ¶ 19 Although this court equated “compensable” with “line of duty,” the sole question raised in those cases was whether the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of or in -6- the course of his employment.

2015Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill. 2d 40, 43 (1965); see also Unger v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85 (1985) (explaining that the “line of duty” test has been interpreted in the same way as the test of compensability: that is, an injury will be found to be compensable if it arose out of and in the course of employment). ¶ 19 Although this court equated “compensable” with “line of duty,” the sole question raised in those cases was whether the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of or in the course of his employment.

2006See, e.g., In re Michelle J., 209 Ill.2d 428, 437 , 283 Ill.Dec. 699 , 808 N.E.2d 987 (2004).

2006See, e.g., In re Michele J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 437 (2004).

2005See People v. Rodriguez , 355 Ill.

2005See People v. Rodriguez, 355 Ill.

2021Graham, 560 U.S. at 82, held that life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes violated the eighth amendment.

2020People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 327 (2011). “[D]ecisions regarding what matters to object to and when to object are matters of trial strategy,” and “will typically not support a claim of ineffective representation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Macias, 2015 IL App (1st) 132039, ¶ 82 . ¶ 25 When considering a similar claim in Cox, we found that “the only way that defense counsel’s decision not to object to the certification could possibly be ineffective assistance was if defendant actually had a FOID card and the certification was in error.” (Emphasis omitted.) Cox, 2017 IL

2017See Henderson , 2016 IL App (1st) 142259 , ¶ 181, 413 Ill.Dec. 239 , 77 N.E.3d 1046 (citing People v. Stechly , 225 Ill. 2d 246 , 304, 312 Ill.Dec. 268 , 870 N.E.2d 333 (2007) ). ¶ 88 Lastly, the only way that defense counsel's decision not to object to the certification could possibly be ineffective assistance was if defendant actually had a FOID card and the certification was in error.

2015Notably, however, Miller does not suggest that a traverse in the original proceeding is the only way to challenge the condemning entity's authority and does not mention a section 2-1401 petition. ¶ 60 The District similarly cites an earlier decision, also from our court's Second District, which held —although not in the context of a section 2-1401 petition — that "[a]n objection to a - 21 - 1-13-1925 condemnation proceeding is waived by the failure to raise it at the appropriate time during the eminent domain proceedings." Towne v. Town of Libertyville, 190 Ill.

1996See Free, 12 F.3d at 705-06 ; Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 311-14 (7th Cir. 1993).

1996See Free, 12 F.3d at 705-06 ; Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 311-14 (7th Cir. 1993).