9 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gabbard v. Knightgreen2 sentences2024Co., 236 Va. 221, 226 (1988))), with Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718 (2007) (“Generally, the appropriate way to test the sufficiency of evidence” during or after a trial on the merits “is by a motion to strike or by a motion to set aside a verdict.”), and Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 43 (1960) (noting that “a motion to strike is an appropriate way of testing the sufficiency of relevant evidence to sustain an adverse verdict” on the merits and that “a motion to set aside the verdict [i]s an equally appropriate method of testing the sufficiency of the evidence” following a trial on the merit 2024Co., 236 Va. 221, 226 (1988))), with Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718 (2007) (“Generally, the appropriate way to test the sufficiency of evidence” during or after a trial on the merits “is by a motion to strike or by a motion to set aside a verdict.”), and Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 43 (1960) (noting that “a motion to strike is an appropriate way of testing the sufficiency of relevant evidence to sustain an adverse verdict” on the merits and that “a motion to set aside the verdict [i]s an equally appropriate method of testing the sufficiency of the evidence” following a trial on the merit | 4 | 4 |
Andrews v. American Health & Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2024Co., 236 Va. 221, 226 (1988))), with Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718 (2007) (“Generally, the appropriate way to test the sufficiency of evidence” during or after a trial on the merits “is by a motion to strike or by a motion to set aside a verdict.”), and Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 43 (1960) (noting that “a motion to strike is an appropriate way of testing the sufficiency of relevant evidence to sustain an adverse verdict” on the merits and that “a motion to set aside the verdict [i]s an equally appropriate method of testing the sufficiency of the evidence” following a trial on the merit 2024Co., 236 Va. 221, 226 (1988))), with Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718 (2007) (“Generally, the appropriate way to test the sufficiency of evidence” during or after a trial on the merits “is by a motion to strike or by a motion to set aside a verdict.”), and Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 43 (1960) (noting that “a motion to strike is an appropriate way of testing the sufficiency of relevant evidence to sustain an adverse verdict” on the merits and that “a motion to set aside the verdict [i]s an equally appropriate method of testing the sufficiency of the evidence” following a trial on the merit | 3 | 3 |
Little v. Cookegreen2 sentences2024Co., 236 Va. 221, 226 (1988))), with Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718 (2007) (“Generally, the appropriate way to test the sufficiency of evidence” during or after a trial on the merits “is by a motion to strike or by a motion to set aside a verdict.”), and Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 43 (1960) (noting that “a motion to strike is an appropriate way of testing the sufficiency of relevant evidence to sustain an adverse verdict” on the merits and that “a motion to set aside the verdict [i]s an equally appropriate method of testing the sufficiency of the evidence” following a trial on the merit 2024Co., 236 Va. 221, 226 (1988))), with Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718 (2007) (“Generally, the appropriate way to test the sufficiency of evidence” during or after a trial on the merits “is by a motion to strike or by a motion to set aside a verdict.”), and Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 43 (1960) (noting that “a motion to strike is an appropriate way of testing the sufficiency of relevant evidence to sustain an adverse verdict” on the merits and that “a motion to set aside the verdict [i]s an equally appropriate method of testing the sufficiency of the evidence” following a trial on the merit | 3 | 3 |
Mundy v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2020We agree that such an instruction is “not appropriate where involuntary [manslaughter is] charged” because “you can have an accident where there is a conviction and the way the instruction reads, if there’s an accident, it’s to be dismissed.” See Noakes v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 338, 345 (2010) (“We have defined the common law crime of involuntary manslaughter as ‘the killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, in the prosecution of some unlawful, but not felonious, act; or in the improper performance of a lawful act.’” (quoting Mundy v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 609, 615 | 1 | 1 |
Noakes v. Com.green1 sentence2020We agree that such an instruction is “not appropriate where involuntary [manslaughter is] charged” because “you can have an accident where there is a conviction and the way the instruction reads, if there’s an accident, it’s to be dismissed.” See Noakes v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 338, 345 (2010) (“We have defined the common law crime of involuntary manslaughter as ‘the killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, in the prosecution of some unlawful, but not felonious, act; or in the improper performance of a lawful act.’” (quoting Mundy v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 609, 615 | 1 | 1 |
McGee v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011See generally McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317 , 357 S.E.2d 738 (1987) (holding that a motion to strike is not the only way to test the sufficiency of evidence to sustain an adverse verdict). 2011See generally McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317 , 357 S.E.2d 738 (1987) (holding that a motion to strike is not the only way to test the sufficiency of evidence to sustain an adverse verdict). | 1 | 1 |
Virginia Department of Corrections v. Crowleygreen2 sentences2001Proceeding by motion is also a proper way to challenge jurisdiction over the person, even when the motion is made in a different case pending before a different court, and "[i]t is immaterial that the order was not attacked by direct appeal or by a bill in equity." Crowley, 227 Va. at 261-62 , 316 S.E.2d at 443 (citations omitted). 2001Proceeding by motion is also a proper way to challenge jurisdiction over the person, even when the motion is made in a different case pending before a different court, and "[i]t is immaterial that the order was not attacked by direct appeal or by a bill in equity." Crowley, 227 Va. at 261-62 , 316 S.E.2d at 443 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Slaughter v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1984Proceeding by motion is also a proper way to challenge jurisdiction over the person, even when the motion is made in a different case pending before a different *262 court, and “[i]t is immaterial that the order was not attacked by direct appeal or by a bill in equity.” Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 787, 793 , 284 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1981). 1984Proceeding by motion is also a proper way to challenge jurisdiction over the person, even when the motion is made in a different case pending before a different *262 court, and “[i]t is immaterial that the order was not attacked by direct appeal or by a bill in equity.” Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 787, 793 , 284 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Douglas v. California
green
2 sentences1967The Court said in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 728 , 86 S.Ct. at 1778 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 889 : "* * * Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." The right to assistance of counsel at various stages of a criminal prosecution has been given retroactive application by the Supreme Court where lack of counsel affected "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" and there was present "the 1967The Court said in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 728 , 86 S.Ct. at 1778 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 889 : "* * * Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." The right to assistance of counsel at various stages of a criminal prosecution has been given retroactive application by the Supreme Court where lack of counsel affected "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" and there was present "the | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Hamilton v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1967The Court said in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 728 , 86 S.Ct. at 1778 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 889 : "* * * Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." The right to assistance of counsel at various stages of a criminal prosecution has been given retroactive application by the Supreme Court where lack of counsel affected "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" and there was present "the 1967The Court said in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 728 , 86 S.Ct. at 1778 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 889 : "* * * Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." The right to assistance of counsel at various stages of a criminal prosecution has been given retroactive application by the Supreme Court where lack of counsel affected "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" and there was present "the | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Johnson v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1967The Court said in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 728 , 86 S.Ct. at 1778 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 889 : "* * * Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." The right to assistance of counsel at various stages of a criminal prosecution has been given retroactive application by the Supreme Court where lack of counsel affected "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" and there was present "the 1967The Court said in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 728 , 86 S.Ct. at 1778 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 889 : "* * * Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." The right to assistance of counsel at various stages of a criminal prosecution has been given retroactive application by the Supreme Court where lack of counsel affected "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" and there was present "the | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Escobedo v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1967On the other hand, in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 721 , 86 S.Ct. at 1775 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 885 , the Court held that the decisions in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , would not be applied retroactively. 1967On the other hand, in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 721 , 86 S.Ct. at 1775 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 885 , the Court held that the decisions in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , would not be applied retroactively. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences1967The Court said in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 728 , 86 S.Ct. at 1778 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 889 : "* * * Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." The right to assistance of counsel at various stages of a criminal prosecution has been given retroactive application by the Supreme Court where lack of counsel affected "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" and there was present "the 1967The Court said in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 728 , 86 S.Ct. at 1778 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 889 : "* * * Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." The right to assistance of counsel at various stages of a criminal prosecution has been given retroactive application by the Supreme Court where lack of counsel affected "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" and there was present "the | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1967On the other hand, in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 721 , 86 S.Ct. at 1775 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 885 , the Court held that the decisions in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , would not be applied retroactively. 1967On the other hand, in Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 721 , 86 S.Ct. at 1775 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 885 , the Court held that the decisions in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , would not be applied retroactively. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.