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62 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1896–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shapp v. Sloangreen2 sentences2019It is in this way that the doctrine of separation of powers functions." Id. 2008It is in this way that the doctrine of separation of powers functions.” Id. | 2 | 5 |
London v. Philadelphiagreen2 sentences2023See London v. City of Phila., . . . 194 A.2d 901, 902-03 ([Pa.] 1963) (holding that claim that could have been asserted in previous federal court action could not be 18 Petitioner cites to this Court’s decision in Grosso v. Love, 667 A.2d 43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), for the proposition that “these defenses are not to be raised [s]ua [s]ponte by the Court.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 3.) There, this Court held that a trial court may not dismiss a complaint as frivolous pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j) after it has granted an in forma pauperis petition. 2018See London v. City of Phila. , 412 Pa. 496 , 194 A.2d 901 , 902-03 (1963) (holding that claim that could have been asserted in previous federal court action could not be litigated in subsequent state court action). | 2 | 2 |
Brinkley v. Kinggreen2 sentences2001On appeal, this court affirmed and the supreme court granted allocatur in order to review “the way in which the presumption of paternity functions in Pennsylvania law.” Id. ¶ 7 A divided supreme court vacated and remanded the case. 2001On appeal, this court affirmed and the supreme court granted allocatur in order to review "the way in which the presumption of paternity functions in Pennsylvania law." Id. ¶ 7 A divided supreme court vacated and remanded the case. | 1 | 5 |
Sauber v. Nouskajian Et Ux.green2 sentences1951In Sauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449, 454-455 (1926), Mr. Chief Justice Moschzisker stated: “The method which plaintiff sought to pursue, of obtaining a judgment against his debtor and then taking in execution the property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed by the latter, was the usual, and, prior to the passage of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 1921, P. L. Í045, the exclusive method of procedure in Pennsylvania (Hyde v. Baker, 212 Pa. 224, 226 ; Kemmler v. McGovern, 238 Pa. 460, 461 ) ; therefore, plaintiff was entitled to follow it.” At page 454 the opinion writer stated: “We 1941Co., 298 Pa. 182 , 148 A. 94 , it is said: “The established way to test the question of whether real property has been conveyed in fraud of creditors is for one claiming to be a creditor to obtain a judgment and issue execution against the premises in question as the property of his debtor, this to be followed by an ejectment at the suit of the purchaser at sheriff’s sale.” And further, in referring to the Act of 1921, supra: “That statute gives an additional optional remedy, by bill, to set aside the conveyance to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim (Sauber v. Nouskajian, 286 | 1 | 4 |
Johnson v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences1974Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact upon the administration of criminal justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 , 86 S. Ct. 1772, 1778 (1966). 1974Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact upon the administration of criminal justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 , 86 S. Ct. 1772, 1778 (1966). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Blackgreen1 sentence2025More than once.”); id. at 153 (G.P. testifying that she sent photos showing her full body, sometimes covering her face). - 31 - J-A08003-25 Specifically, Taylor argues that, under Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396, 401 (Pa. Super. 1985), this evidence was relevant to attack both G.P.’s and her mother’s credibility; was not overly prejudicial; and he did not have an alternative way to challenge the credibility of G.P. and her mother. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Einhorngreen1 sentence2025See N.T., Day 1, at 40 (defense counsel stating that “unavailability has to be based on the finding that the judge believes that her inability to remember is not genuine”), 57 (prosecutor stating, “The way the rule [803.1(4)(c)] works is she’s deemed unavailable”), 58 (court finding Lomax “not credible”); Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 4/16/24, at 6 (“Lomax was live and present in the courtroom”); Commonwealth v. Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960, 972 (Pa.Super. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Grosso v. Lovegreen1 sentence2023See London v. City of Phila., . . . 194 A.2d 901, 902-03 ([Pa.] 1963) (holding that claim that could have been asserted in previous federal court action could not be 18 Petitioner cites to this Court’s decision in Grosso v. Love, 667 A.2d 43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), for the proposition that “these defenses are not to be raised [s]ua [s]ponte by the Court.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 3.) There, this Court held that a trial court may not dismiss a complaint as frivolous pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j) after it has granted an in forma pauperis petition. | 1 | 1 |
In re Estate of Pelesgreen2 sentences2023The assertion in footnote five of In re Estate of Peles, 739 A.2d 1071 , 1074 (Pa. Super. 1999) that this section ‘does not govern the time period in which to submit a later codicil for probate’ was inconsistent with the intent of this section and § 3138, which set forth alternative and not exclusionary procedures. 2023The assertion in footnote five of In re Estate of Peles, 739 A.2d 1071, 1074 (Pa. Super. 1999) that this section ‘does not govern the time period in which to submit a later codicil for probate’ was inconsistent with the intent of this section and § 3138, which set forth alternative and not exclusionary procedures. | 1 | 1 |
Warminster Fiberglass v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Jorge)green1 sentence2022Warminster Fiberglass v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Jorge), 708 A.2d 517, 521 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Andersongreen1 sentence2020The competency investigation by the court was designed to question the children in such a way to test their "(1) capacity to observe or perceive the occurrence with a substantial degree of accuracy; (2) ability to remember the event which was observed or perceived; (3) ability to understand questions and to communicate intelligent answers about the occurrence, and (4) consciousness of the duty to speak the truth." Commonwealth v. Anderson, 381 Pa.Super 1, 8, 552 A.2d 1064, 1068 (1988), alloc. denied, 524 Pa. 616 , 571 A.2d 379 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mechanikgreen2 sentences2020While conveying an appreciation that such exactions are often unavoidable, the Commonwealth argues nonetheless that “the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial.” Brief for Appellee at 11-12 (quoting U.S. v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 , 106 S. Ct. 938, 942-43 (1986)). 2020While conveying an appreciation that such exactions are often unavoidable, the Commonwealth argues nonetheless that “the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial.” Brief for Appellee at 11-12 (quoting U.S. v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 , 106 S. Ct. 938, 942-43 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Pewgreen1 sentence2018Id. cmt;32 see also 20 Pa.C.S. § 3133(b) (“The probate of a will shall be conclusive as to all property, real or personal, devised or bequeathed by it, unless an appeal shall be taken from probate as provided in section 908 (relating to appeals)”); In re Hickman’s Estate, 162 A. 168, 170 (Pa. 1932) (holding, “probate is not conclusive as to extraneous matters or matters dehors the record; nor is it conclusive as to matters not involved in, nor properly determinable upon, probate.” (citations omitted)); Estate of Pew, 655 A.2d 521, 547 (Pa. Super. 1994) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Robin v. Browngreen1 sentence2018Id. cmt;32 see also 20 Pa.C.S. § 3133(b) (“The probate of a will shall be conclusive as to all property, real or personal, devised or bequeathed by it, unless an appeal shall be taken from probate as provided in section 908 (relating to appeals)”); In re Hickman’s Estate, 162 A. 168, 170 (Pa. 1932) (holding, “probate is not conclusive as to extraneous matters or matters dehors the record; nor is it conclusive as to matters not involved in, nor properly determinable upon, probate.” (citations omitted)); Estate of Pew, 655 A.2d 521, 547 (Pa. Super. 1994) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. State Farm Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2013Co., 410 Pa.Super. 300 , 599 A.2d 1001, 1006 (1991), for the proposition that a petition to compel arbitration is the functional equivalent of a complaint, and that the proper way to challenge venue in a civil action is through a preliminary objection. 2013Co., 410 Pa.Super. 300 , 599 A.2d 1001, 1006 (1991), for the proposition that a petition to compel arbitration is the functional equivalent of a complaint, and that the proper way to challenge venue in a civil action is through a preliminary objection. | 1 | 1 |
Stivason v. Timberline Post & Beam Structures Co.green1 sentence2009Brief for Appellees at 10. ¶ 12 This Court recently articulated the standard for statutory construction in Stivason v. Timberline Post and Beam Structures Co., 947 A.2d 1279, 1281-1282 (2008) (emphasis added) as follows: The rules set forth in the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (“SCA”) guide our present inquiry. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq. | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Marlon Louis Johnson, and Bennie Johnson, Timothy Duane Neal, Witness-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. MacPhersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Dg Acquisition Corp. Debtor. Dg Creditor Corp., Trustee for the Dg Creditor Trust v. Ivette Dabah, Barbara Dabah, Renee Dabah, and Yvette Dabahgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jane Doe, a Minor, by and Through Her Guardian and Mother, Alisa Rudy-Glanzer v. Elroy \Bud\" Glazergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boyce v. St. Paul Property & Liability Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Dardengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trant v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stovall v. Dennogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co.
green
2 sentences1994In Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co., 417 Pa. 135 , 208 A.2d 252 (1965) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the proper way to challenge jurisdiction is by preliminary objections pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1994In Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co., 417 Pa. 135 , 208 A.2d 252 (1965) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the proper way to challenge jurisdiction is by preliminary objections pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. | 2 | 1988–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Douglass
green
2 sentences1988Only in this way can the requirement of a separate review of the statement rise above mere formalism and achieve its substantive purpose of limiting discretionary review on the merits to “exceptional case[s].” 370 Pa.Superior Ct. at 456-459, 535 A.2d at 1176-1177 ; see also Commonwealth v. Darden, supra, 366 Pa.Superior Ct. at 603-604, 531 A.2d at 1147. 1988Only in this way can the requirement of a separate review of the statement rise above mere formalism and achieve its substantive purpose of limiting discretionary review on the merits to "exceptional case[s]." 370 Pa.Superior Ct. at 456-459, 535 A.2d at 1176-1177 ; see also Commonwealth v. Darden, supra, 366 Pa.Superior Ct. at 603-604, 531 A.2d at 1147. | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Hyde v. Baker
neutral
2 sentences1951In Sauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449, 454-455 (1926), Mr. Chief Justice Moschzisker stated: “The method which plaintiff sought to pursue, of obtaining a judgment against his debtor and then taking in execution the property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed by the latter, was the usual, and, prior to the passage of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 1921, P. L. Í045, the exclusive method of procedure in Pennsylvania (Hyde v. Baker, 212 Pa. 224, 226 ; Kemmler v. McGovern, 238 Pa. 460, 461 ) ; therefore, plaintiff was entitled to follow it.” At page 454 the opinion writer stated: “We 1951In Sauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449, 454-455 (1926), Mr. Chief Justice Moschzisker stated: “The method which plaintiff sought to pursue, of obtaining a judgment against his debtor and then taking in execution the property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed by the latter, was the usual, and, prior to the passage of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 1921, P. L. Í045, the exclusive method of procedure in Pennsylvania (Hyde v. Baker, 212 Pa. 224, 226 ; Kemmler v. McGovern, 238 Pa. 460, 461 ) ; therefore, plaintiff was entitled to follow it.” At page 454 the opinion writer stated: “We | 2 | 1926–1951 |
Mantz v. Kistler
neutral
2 sentences1951In Sauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449, 454-455 (1926), Mr. Chief Justice Moschzisker stated: “The method which plaintiff sought to pursue, of obtaining a judgment against his debtor and then taking in execution the property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed by the latter, was the usual, and, prior to the passage of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 1921, P. L. Í045, the exclusive method of procedure in Pennsylvania (Hyde v. Baker, 212 Pa. 224, 226 ; Kemmler v. McGovern, 238 Pa. 460, 461 ) ; therefore, plaintiff was entitled to follow it.” At page 454 the opinion writer stated: “We 1926We have repeatedly held that the established way to test the question of whether real property has been conveyed in fraud of creditors is for one claiming to be a creditor to obtain a judgment and issue execution against the premises in question as the property of his debtor, this to be followed by an ejectment at the suit of the purchaser at sheriff’s sale: Hyde v. Baker, 212 Pa. 224, 226 ; Mantz v. Kistler, 221 Pa. 142, 144 ; Kemmler v. McGovern, 238 Pa. 460, 461 ; Handel, etc., B. & L. | 2 | 1926–1951 |
Kemmler v. McGovern
neutral
2 sentences1951In Sauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449, 454-455 (1926), Mr. Chief Justice Moschzisker stated: “The method which plaintiff sought to pursue, of obtaining a judgment against his debtor and then taking in execution the property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed by the latter, was the usual, and, prior to the passage of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 1921, P. L. Í045, the exclusive method of procedure in Pennsylvania (Hyde v. Baker, 212 Pa. 224, 226 ; Kemmler v. McGovern, 238 Pa. 460, 461 ) ; therefore, plaintiff was entitled to follow it.” At page 454 the opinion writer stated: “We 1951In Sauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449, 454-455 (1926), Mr. Chief Justice Moschzisker stated: “The method which plaintiff sought to pursue, of obtaining a judgment against his debtor and then taking in execution the property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed by the latter, was the usual, and, prior to the passage of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 1921, P. L. Í045, the exclusive method of procedure in Pennsylvania (Hyde v. Baker, 212 Pa. 224, 226 ; Kemmler v. McGovern, 238 Pa. 460, 461 ) ; therefore, plaintiff was entitled to follow it.” At page 454 the opinion writer stated: “We | 2 | 1926–1951 |
Handel & Hayden Building & Loan Ass'n v. Elleford
green
2 sentences1951Assn. v. Elleford, 258 Pa. 143, 147 ; Am. 1926Assn. v. Elleford, 258 Pa. 143, 147 ; Am. | 2 | 1926–1951 |
United States v. Lamons
green
1 sentence2025Wallace, 289 A.3d at 907 (citing Lamons 532 F.3d at 1265 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Com. v. Smith, S.
green
1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 , 618 (Pa. 2020) (stating that the PCRA is not the exclusive way to challenge the constitutionality of sex offender registration requirements); Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 A.3d 654 , 657- 658 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that SORNA requirements are collateral consequences of a sentence and therefore do not fall within the purview of the PCRA statute). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Way
green
2 sentences2023We concluded that the search warrant was invalid because there was a “lack of substantial nexus between the street crime and the premises to be searched.” Way, 492 A.2d at 1154 . 2023We concluded that the search warrant was invalid because there was a “lack of substantial nexus between the street crime and the premises to be searched.” Way, 492 A.2d at 1154 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Moeller v. Washington County
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 1092–93. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Hock
green
2 sentences2019Commonwealth v. Hock, 556 Pa. 409 , 414 n.2, 728 A.2d 943 , 945 n.2 (1999). 2019Commonwealth v. Hock, 556 Pa. 409 , 414 n.2, 728 A.2d 943 , 945 n.2 (1999). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Jubelirer v. Rendell
green
2 sentences2019Jubelirer v. Rendell , 598 Pa. 16 , 953 A.2d 514 , 529-30 (2008) (emphasis added). 2019Jubelirer v. Rendell , 598 Pa. 16 , 953 A.2d 514 , 529-30 (2008) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In the Matter of: L.Z., Appeal of: L.Z.
green
1 sentence2018She argues “[i]f an ALJ can disregard the word of an appellant simply because they [sic] are not there for entirely altruistic motives[,] then the right to rebuttal might as well not exist.” (Id. at 16-17.) Mother cites the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2015), for support that 10 “This Court’s review is limited to determining whether legal error has been committed, whether constitutional rights have been violated, or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” F.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Kubik v. Route 252, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Lox, Stock & Bagels, Inc. v. Kotten MacHine Co. of California, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Jones v. Trojak green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| John M. v. Paula T. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Commonwealth v. Perry neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Lorah ex rel. Evans v. Nissley green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Commonwealth v. Hess green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Blackledge v. Perry green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Hudock v. Donegal Mutual Insurance green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Borst v. Borst green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| United States v. Johnson green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Gould v. Randal neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co. green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Pennsylvania Railroad v. Ewing green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Huff's Estate green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Brennan v. Brennan neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Artman v. Giles neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| American Trust Co. v. Kaufman green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Schenecker neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Philadelphia Parkway green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Attorney General v. Benn green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Delaney v. Gault neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Emrick v. Dicken neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Hering v. Chambers green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| In re a Public Road from the Armstrong & Indiana Turnpike to a Public Road from David Cumming's to Indiana neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| In re Road in Lackawanna neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Moore v. Dunn & Fell green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.