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16 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Walter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023The government’s lawful possession of a package of undeveloped film does not permit examination of the film without a warrant or warrant exception, see Walter, 447 U.S. at 651-52, 654 (plurality op.), whereas the government can freely examine the contents of a package that has already been inspected by Federal Express employees before the package was provided to the government, because the government would “learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search[,]” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111, 120 (1984) (footnote omitted). 2023The government’s lawful possession of a package of undeveloped film does not permit examination of the film without a warrant or warrant exception, see Walter, 447 U.S. at 651-52, 654 (plurality op.), whereas the government can freely examine the contents of a package that has already been inspected by Federal Express employees before the package was provided to the government, because the government would “learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search[,]” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111, 120 (1984) (footnote omitted). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Jacobsengreen2 sentences2023The government’s lawful possession of a package of undeveloped film does not permit examination of the film without a warrant or warrant exception, see Walter, 447 U.S. at 651-52, 654 (plurality op.), whereas the government can freely examine the contents of a package that has already been inspected by Federal Express employees before the package was provided to the government, because the government would “learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search[,]” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111, 120 (1984) (footnote omitted). 2023The government’s lawful possession of a package of undeveloped film does not permit examination of the film without a warrant or warrant exception, see Walter, 447 U.S. at 651-52, 654 (plurality op.), whereas the government can freely examine the contents of a package that has already been inspected by Federal Express employees before the package was provided to the government, because the government would “learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search[,]” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111, 120 (1984) (footnote omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Watersgreen2 sentences2012Cox, 60 Md. at 80 (emphasis in original); accord Wilson, 192 Md. at 226 , 64 A.2d at 137 ; Shuggars v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 45 , 234 A.2d 752, 757 (1967) (“Even though a claimant may not have been the only user, it is sufficient if he used the way under a claim of right independently of others." (citation omitted)). 2012Cox, 60 Md. at 80 (emphasis in original); accord Wilson, 192 Md. at 226 , 64 A.2d at 137 ; Shuggars v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 45 , 234 A.2d 752, 757 (1967) (“Even though a claimant may not have been the only user, it is sufficient if he used the way under a claim of right independently of others." (citation omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Shuggars v. Brakegreen2 sentences2012Cox, 60 Md. at 80 (emphasis in original); accord Wilson, 192 Md. at 226 , 64 A.2d at 137 ; Shuggars v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 45 , 234 A.2d 752, 757 (1967) (“Even though a claimant may not have been the only user, it is sufficient if he used the way under a claim of right independently of others." (citation omitted)). 2012Cox, 60 Md. at 80 (emphasis in original); accord Wilson, 192 Md. at 226 , 64 A.2d at 137 ; Shuggars v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 45 , 234 A.2d 752, 757 (1967) (“Even though a claimant may not have been the only user, it is sufficient if he used the way under a claim of right independently of others." (citation omitted)). | 1 | 3 |
Newton v. Stategreen2 sentences2019In Johnson, supra, 442 Md. at 220 , the Court of Appeals stated that it had previously held (in Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 265 (1977)): “Applying the required evidence test, it would seem clear that the felony murder and the 19 underlying felony must be deemed the same for double jeopardy purposes.” The Court of Appeals in Johnson, 442 Md. at 220 , quoted with approval this explanation from Newton, 280 Md. at 269 , as to why the conviction for the underlying felony merges into a conviction of felony murder: Therefore, to secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder do 2019In Johnson, supra, 442 Md. at 220 , the Court of Appeals stated that it had previously held (in Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 265 (1977)): “Applying the required evidence test, it would seem clear that the felony murder and the 19 underlying felony must be deemed the same for double jeopardy purposes.” The Court of Appeals in Johnson, 442 Md. at 220 , quoted with approval this explanation from Newton, 280 Md. at 269 , as to why the conviction for the underlying felony merges into a conviction of felony murder: Therefore, to secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder do | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Forrestgreen1 sentence2012Cox, 60 Md. at 80 (emphasis in original); accord Wilson, 192 Md. at 226 , 64 A.2d at 137 ; Shuggars v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 45 , 234 A.2d 752, 757 (1967) (“Even though a claimant may not have been the only user, it is sufficient if he used the way under a claim of right independently of others." (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences1973App. 31 , 267 A. 2d 808 (1970) , wherein we opined, at 36: “It is clear from Stovall v. Denno, supra, that the constitutional right to counsel, although retroactively applied with respect to the trial itself, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 , [ 83 S. Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)], ... is not necessarily to be so applied with respect to all critical stages of the prosecution.” (Emphasis supplied). 1970Each constitutional rule of criminal pro *36 cedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.” It is clear from Stovall v. Denno, supra, that the constitutional right to counsel, although retroactively applied with respect to the trial itself, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 and with respect to appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 , is not necessarily to be so applied with respect to all critical stages of the prosecu | 2 | 1970–1973 |
State v. Stringfellow
green
2 sentences2021Id., 42 A.3d at 33 . 2021Id., 42 A.3d at 33 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Twining v. State
red
2 sentences2020In Twining, id. at 100 , 198 A.2d at 293 , this Court identified three reasons for its holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask whether the prospective jurors “would give the [defendant] the benefit of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.” First, the jury instructions “fully and fairly covered” the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. 2020In Twining, id. at 100 , 198 A.2d at 293 , this Court identified three reasons for its holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask whether the prospective jurors “would give the [defendant] the benefit of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.” First, the jury instructions “fully and fairly covered” the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2019In Johnson, supra, 442 Md. at 220 , the Court of Appeals stated that it had previously held (in Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 265 (1977)): “Applying the required evidence test, it would seem clear that the felony murder and the 19 underlying felony must be deemed the same for double jeopardy purposes.” The Court of Appeals in Johnson, 442 Md. at 220 , quoted with approval this explanation from Newton, 280 Md. at 269 , as to why the conviction for the underlying felony merges into a conviction of felony murder: Therefore, to secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder do 2019In Johnson, supra, 442 Md. at 220 , the Court of Appeals stated that it had previously held (in Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 265 (1977)): “Applying the required evidence test, it would seem clear that the felony murder and the 19 underlying felony must be deemed the same for double jeopardy purposes.” The Court of Appeals in Johnson, 442 Md. at 220 , quoted with approval this explanation from Newton, 280 Md. at 269 , as to why the conviction for the underlying felony merges into a conviction of felony murder: Therefore, to secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder do | 1 | 2019–2019 |
MARIO W. v. Kaipio
green
2 sentences2012Id. 2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Walker v. State
green
2 sentences2006Walker v. State, 391 Md. at 256 , 892 A.2d at 560 . 2006Walker v. State, 391 Md. at 256 , 892 A.2d at 560 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hardy v. Metts
green
1 sentence1980See Gold Dust Corp. v. Zabawa, 159 *377 Md. 664 (1930); Tilghman v. Riggs National Bank, 261 Md. 306 (1971); Hardy v. Metis, 282 Md. 1 (1978). 1 Compare First Federated Com. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Tilghman v. Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C.
green
1 sentence1980See Gold Dust Corp. v. Zabawa, 159 *377 Md. 664 (1930); Tilghman v. Riggs National Bank, 261 Md. 306 (1971); Hardy v. Metis, 282 Md. 1 (1978). 1 Compare First Federated Com. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Lester v. Howard Bank
green
1 sentence1975In this way the principle of the rule is admitted without at all lessening its force, though its absolute and unconditional application to every case is denied.’ The Court further add, ‘That when the statute is *361 silent and contains nothing from which the contrary can be properly inferred, a contract in contravention of it is void.’ ” Lester v. Howard Bank, 33 Md. at 564-565 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Billings v. State
green
2 sentences1973Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.” See also Billings v. State, 10 Md. 1973App. 31 , 267 A. 2d 808 (1970) , wherein we opined, at 36: “It is clear from Stovall v. Denno, supra, that the constitutional right to counsel, although retroactively applied with respect to the trial itself, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 , [ 83 S. Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)], ... is not necessarily to be so applied with respect to all critical stages of the prosecution.” (Emphasis supplied). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Douglas v. California
green
1 sentence1970Each constitutional rule of criminal pro *36 cedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.” It is clear from Stovall v. Denno, supra, that the constitutional right to counsel, although retroactively applied with respect to the trial itself, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 and with respect to appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 , is not necessarily to be so applied with respect to all critical stages of the prosecu | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Stovall v. Denno
green
1 sentence1970Each constitutional rule of criminal pro *36 cedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.” It is clear from Stovall v. Denno, supra, that the constitutional right to counsel, although retroactively applied with respect to the trial itself, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 and with respect to appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 , is not necessarily to be so applied with respect to all critical stages of the prosecu | 1 | 1970–1970 |
United States v. Wade
green
1 sentence1970United States v. Wade, supra, held that a lineup was a critical stage of the proceedings against an accused; therefore the assistance of counsel at a lineup was constitutionally required. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Marshall v. Sellers
green
2 sentences1966It is argued that the decision of our predecessors in Marshall v. Sellers, 188 Md. 508 , 53 A. 2d 5 (1947) supports the right to such an instruction. 1966It is argued that the decision of our predecessors in Marshall v. Sellers, 188 Md. 508 , 53 A. 2d 5 (1947) supports the right to such an instruction. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.