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42 New York opinions name it 9 courts 1848–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vogel v. Board of Education for the Dunkirk City School Districtgreen2 sentences2015The proper way to challenge that denial would have been through an appeal or motion to reargue (see Matter of Vogel v Board of Educ. for Dunkirk City School Dist., 259 AD2d 831, 833 [1999]). * Defendant concedes that it did not pursue either of those avenues, but instead simply demanded that plaintiff pay the counsel fees and filed a lien when plaintiff refused. 2015The proper way to challenge that denial would have been through an appeal or motion to reargue (see Matter of Vogel v Board of Educ. for Dunkirk City School Dist., 259 AD2d 831, 833 [1999]). * Defendant concedes that it did not pursue either of those avenues, but instead simply demanded that plaintiff pay the counsel fees and filed a lien when plaintiff refused. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Kenneth BB.green2 sentences2013The court was entitled to rely on the testimony and report of its appointed expert that there could be no assurances that respondent would not re-offend and that the only way to test this would be to return him to SIST (see Matter of State of New York v Kenneth BB., 93 AD3d 900, 901 [3d Dept 2012]). 2013The court was entitled to rely on the testimony and report of its appointed expert that there could be no assurances that respondent would not re-offend and that the only way to test this would be to return him to SIST (see Matter of State of New York v Kenneth BB., 93 AD3d 900, 901 [3d Dept 2012]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Feldergreen2 sentences2005The Hilliard court further stated, however, that “[t]he [Town Justice’s] ruling, entered at the time of arraignment, affected defendant’s representation in such a way that the error cannot be corrected by a new trial” (id., citing People v Felder, 47 NY2d 287, 296 [1979]). 1989The court’s ruling, entered at the time of arraignment, affected defendant’s representation in such a way that the error cannot be corrected by a new trial (see, People v Felder, supra, at 296). | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences1976Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.’ ” (Johnson v New Jersey, 384 US 719, 728 .) Matter of Roy M. v People (supra) was decided January 19, 1970. 1975Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved” (Johnson v New Jersey, supra, pp 727-728), This court is not constrained by the decision in People v Bennett ( 47 AD2d 322 ) to view the standard enunciated in Ingle as mandating retroactive application. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Lathamgreen2 sentences2026Similarly, in People v Lopez , the Court of Appeals held that, except where a trial court fails in its duty to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, the appropriate way to challenge a plea is under CPL § 220.60 (3) or CPL § 440.10. (71 NY2d 662, 665-666 [1988].) So too do People v Latham (90 NY2d 795, 798 [1997]), King v Albany County Pub. 2026Similarly, in People v Lopez , the Court of Appeals held that, except where a trial court fails in its duty to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, the appropriate way to challenge a plea is under CPL § 220.60 (3) or CPL § 440.10. ( 71 NY2d 662, 665-666 [1988].) So too do People v Latham ( 90 NY2d 795, 798 [1997]), King v Albany County Pub. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2026Defender's Off. (255 [*13]AD2d 770, 770 [3d Dept 1998]), and People v Clark [FN8] (209 AD3d 1063, 1064 [3d Dept 2022]) address instances where a plea was not challenged appropriately with post-allocution motions. 2026Defender's Off. (255 [*13]AD2d 770, 770 [3d Dept 1998]), and People v Clark [FN8] ( 209 AD3d 1063, 1064 [3d Dept 2022]) address instances where a plea was not challenged appropriately with post-allocution motions. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2026Similarly, in People v Lopez , the Court of Appeals held that, except where a trial court fails in its duty to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, the appropriate way to challenge a plea is under CPL § 220.60 (3) or CPL § 440.10. (71 NY2d 662, 665-666 [1988].) So too do People v Latham (90 NY2d 795, 798 [1997]), King v Albany County Pub. 2026Similarly, in People v Lopez , the Court of Appeals held that, except where a trial court fails in its duty to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, the appropriate way to challenge a plea is under CPL § 220.60 (3) or CPL § 440.10. ( 71 NY2d 662, 665-666 [1988].) So too do People v Latham ( 90 NY2d 795, 798 [1997]), King v Albany County Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Alamio v. Town of Rocklandgreen1 sentence2024Contrary to defendants' contention, plaintiff's claim for trespass seeking monetary damages should not be analyzed for statute of limitations purposes in the same way as a claim for the artificial diversion of water onto an adjoining property ( see generally Alamio v Town of Rockland , 302 AD2d 842, 842, 844 [3d Dept 2003]), inasmuch as plaintiff's trespass claim is based upon a permanent physical encroachment, i.e., the underground plumbing that defendants installed on plaintiff's property. "[The] encroaching structure is a continuing trespass [that] gives rise to successive causes of action, | 1 | 1 |
Corporate Property Investors v. Board of Assessorsgreen2 sentences2014Invs. v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 153 AD2d 656, 660 [1989]). 1 I agree that, in some situations, an owner of real property in New York City may obtain relief through Administrative Code § 11-206, even without first having challenged the assessment under the New York City Charter and RPTL article 7, but those situations are far more limited than the majority concludes. 2014Invs. v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 153 AD2d 656, 660 ) [FN1] . | 1 | 1 |
| Tehan v. United States Ex Rel. Shottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Desist v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wiard v. . King
green
2 sentences1882It seems that the proper way to test the validity of the pleading is by demurrer or by motion on trial (Walter v. Fowler, 85 N. Y. 621 ; Fettretch v. McKay, 47 Id. 426 ; Collins v. Suau, 7 Robt. 94; Trinity Church v. Higgins, 48 N. Y. 532 ). 1882It seems that the proper way to test the validity of the pleading is by demurrer or by motion on trial (Walter v. Fowler, 85 N. Y. 621 ; Fettretch v. McKay, 47 Id. 426 ; Collins v. Suau, 7 Robt. 94; Trinity Church v. Higgins, 48 N. Y. 532 ). | 2 | 1882–1915 |
Piper v. Elwood
neutral
2 sentences1901But no such power resides in a justice’s court, and the only way to test the plaintiff’s right to enforce the judgment is to bring a new action upon it, when perhaps it would be competent for him, in answer to the proof of satisfaction by the levy and sale, to show the facts which he contends hie has established on this motion.” See also Piper v. Elwood, 4 Den. 165 . 1848(See Piper v. Elwood, 4 Denio, 165 .) If he would not be permitted, or should not be able, to make such proof, then clearly he ought not to be allowed to set it off here; for, as before remarked, the right to set off on motion depends upon the party having a demand in judgment which he has a clear right to enforce. | 2 | 1848–1901 |
Daetsch v. Taber
green
1 sentence2025Matter ofDashnaw v. Town of Peru, 111 AD3d 1222 (3 rd Dept. 2013); Daetsch v. Taber, 149 AD2d 864 (3 rd Dept. 1989) Within its motion to dismiss the Amended Petition and Complaint, the Town has asserted that an action or proceeding pursuant to Highway Law § 205, and not an Article 78 action, is the proper way to challenge a determination that a road has been abandoned. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dashnaw v. Town of Peru
green
1 sentence2025Matter ofDashnaw v. Town of Peru, 111 AD3d 1222 (3 rd Dept. 2013); Daetsch v. Taber, 149 AD2d 864 (3 rd Dept. 1989) Within its motion to dismiss the Amended Petition and Complaint, the Town has asserted that an action or proceeding pursuant to Highway Law § 205, and not an Article 78 action, is the proper way to challenge a determination that a road has been abandoned. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Matter of Carmel
neutral
1 sentence2022He cannot now use this proceeding as a way to challenge the admitted misconduct ( see Matter of Weissmann , 180 AD3d at 158 ; Matter of Carmel , 154 AD3d at 74 ) . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Matter of Weissmann
green
1 sentence2022He cannot now use this proceeding as a way to challenge the admitted misconduct ( see Matter of Weissmann , 180 AD3d at 158 ; Matter of Carmel , 154 AD3d at 74 ) . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Nash v. Board of Education
neutral
1 sentence2012In March 2011, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed ( 82 AD3d 470 [1st Dept 2011]). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In re Rosen
neutral
1 sentence2001OHI then reveals the real motivating factor behind this action by stating “the only way that a claim could be assembled in light of Gerber’s list of requirements was to commence legal action so that such documents and information could be provided in CPLR-authorized disclosure.” It is well settled that a party claiming ignorance of critical facts must demonstrate that such ignorance was unavoidable and that reasonable attempts were made to discover facts which would give rise to a triable issue (Lumbsy v Gershwin Theater, 282 AD2d 578 ; Lo Breglio v Marks, 105 AD2d 621 , affd 65 NY2d 620 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lo Breglio v. Marks
neutral
1 sentence2001OHI then reveals the real motivating factor behind this action by stating “the only way that a claim could be assembled in light of Gerber’s list of requirements was to commence legal action so that such documents and information could be provided in CPLR-authorized disclosure.” It is well settled that a party claiming ignorance of critical facts must demonstrate that such ignorance was unavoidable and that reasonable attempts were made to discover facts which would give rise to a triable issue (Lumbsy v Gershwin Theater, 282 AD2d 578 ; Lo Breglio v Marks, 105 AD2d 621 , affd 65 NY2d 620 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lumbsy v. Theater
neutral
1 sentence2001OHI then reveals the real motivating factor behind this action by stating “the only way that a claim could be assembled in light of Gerber’s list of requirements was to commence legal action so that such documents and information could be provided in CPLR-authorized disclosure.” It is well settled that a party claiming ignorance of critical facts must demonstrate that such ignorance was unavoidable and that reasonable attempts were made to discover facts which would give rise to a triable issue (Lumbsy v Gershwin Theater, 282 AD2d 578 ; Lo Breglio v Marks, 105 AD2d 621 , affd 65 NY2d 620 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Dreger v. New York State Thruway Authority
green
1 sentence1999We conclude that Court of Claims Act § 11 (c) should not be applied retroactively in such a way as to bar the Court of Claims’ dismissal of the claim in this action (see, Scott v State of New York, 204 AD2d 424 , lv denied 84 NY2d 806 ; Pelnick v State of New York, 171 AD2d 734 ; Charbonneau v State of New York, 148 Misc 2d 891 , affd 178 AD2d 815 , affd 81 NY2d 721 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Charbonneau v. State
green
1 sentence1999We conclude that Court of Claims Act § 11 (c) should not be applied retroactively in such a way as to bar the Court of Claims’ dismissal of the claim in this action (see, Scott v State of New York, 204 AD2d 424 , lv denied 84 NY2d 806 ; Pelnick v State of New York, 171 AD2d 734 ; Charbonneau v State of New York, 148 Misc 2d 891 , affd 178 AD2d 815 , affd 81 NY2d 721 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Pelnick v. State
green
1 sentence1999We conclude that Court of Claims Act § 11 (c) should not be applied retroactively in such a way as to bar the Court of Claims’ dismissal of the claim in this action (see, Scott v State of New York, 204 AD2d 424 , lv denied 84 NY2d 806 ; Pelnick v State of New York, 171 AD2d 734 ; Charbonneau v State of New York, 148 Misc 2d 891 , affd 178 AD2d 815 , affd 81 NY2d 721 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Charbonneau v. State
green
1 sentence1999We conclude that Court of Claims Act § 11 (c) should not be applied retroactively in such a way as to bar the Court of Claims’ dismissal of the claim in this action (see, Scott v State of New York, 204 AD2d 424 , lv denied 84 NY2d 806 ; Pelnick v State of New York, 171 AD2d 734 ; Charbonneau v State of New York, 148 Misc 2d 891 , affd 178 AD2d 815 , affd 81 NY2d 721 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Scott v. State
neutral
1 sentence1999We conclude that Court of Claims Act § 11 (c) should not be applied retroactively in such a way as to bar the Court of Claims’ dismissal of the claim in this action (see, Scott v State of New York, 204 AD2d 424 , lv denied 84 NY2d 806 ; Pelnick v State of New York, 171 AD2d 734 ; Charbonneau v State of New York, 148 Misc 2d 891 , affd 178 AD2d 815 , affd 81 NY2d 721 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Frieland v. Frieland
green
1 sentence1997After the court properly noted that the only way to challenge the stipulation was by way of a plenary action, it went on to make findings of fact and conclusions of law which we deem to be dicta in the absence of an adequately developed record (see, e.g., Caldwell v Caldwell, 209 AD2d 1022 ; Frieland v Frieland, 200 AD2d 484 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Caldwell v. Caldwell
green
1 sentence1997After the court properly noted that the only way to challenge the stipulation was by way of a plenary action, it went on to make findings of fact and conclusions of law which we deem to be dicta in the absence of an adequately developed record (see, e.g., Caldwell v Caldwell, 209 AD2d 1022 ; Frieland v Frieland, 200 AD2d 484 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Stavitz v. City of New York
green
1 sentence1996Thus, where an employee’s conduct is brought on by a matter wholly personal in nature, the source of which is not job related, his actions cannot be said to fall within the scope of his employment” (Stavitz v City of New York, 98 AD2d 529, 531 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hamlin v. Mensch
green
1 sentence1996Short of holding such a hearing, a search warrant can only be controverted for lack of probable cause, i.e., insufficiency of information to support a reasonable belief that evidence of criminal activity would be found in the subject apartment upon execution of the warrant (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 ; People v Munoz, 205 AD2d 452 , lv denied 84 NY2d 870 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Franks v. Delaware
green
1 sentence1996The proper way to challenge that conclusion is for defendants to prove, at a hearing, that the issuance of the warrant was based solely on an intentionally or recklessly false statement made under oath (Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Bigelow
green
1 sentence1996Short of holding such a hearing, a search warrant can only be controverted for lack of probable cause, i.e., insufficiency of information to support a reasonable belief that evidence of criminal activity would be found in the subject apartment upon execution of the warrant (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 ; People v Munoz, 205 AD2d 452 , lv denied 84 NY2d 870 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| California Natural, Inc. v. Nestle Holdings, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Gross v. Kellerman green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Duffy green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Sandoval green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Arsenault v. Massachusetts green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| McConnell v. Rhay green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Morales green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Schwartzman v. Weintraub neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Nelson v. Dykes Lumber Co. neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Di Menna v. . Cooper Evans Co. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Accredited Demolition Construction Corp. v. City of Yonkers green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Claim of Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Keleket X-Ray Corporation v. United States green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Bennett neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Linkletter v. Walker red | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Buffalo Stone & Cement Co. green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Slipyan v. Shapiro neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| In re Remy Sportswear, Inc. green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.