way challenge in Texas

2020However, rather than render judgment against the survivors, the court remanded the case to the trial court, explaining that “we have remanded in the interest of justice when our decisions have altered or clarified the way in which a claim should be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 840 . 12 The Torrington court observed that, years before, in Colonial Savings Association v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. 1976), the supreme court had adopted section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states the law of negligent undertakings in suits brought by a party to an agreement against anothe

2018Appellate courts have remanded in the interest of justice “when a decision has clarified the way in which a claim should be submitted to the jury.” Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Lee, 543 S.W.3d 288, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. filed) (citing Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829 , 840–41 (Tex. 2000)).

2006When a trial court improperly refuses to allow defense counsel to ask a proper voir dire question, it is almost impossible to determine how the error affected “the way in which a defense counsel would [have] conducted] the trial.” Gonzales v. State, 2 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd) (noting that prudent defense counsel — when faced with trial court error preventing him from questioning potential jurors about their attitudes toward a specific defense — would not attempt to present evidence of that defense to jury).

2006When a trial court improperly refuses to allow defense counsel to ask a proper voir dire question, it is almost impossible to determine how the error affected “the way in which a defense counsel would [have] conduct[ed] the trial.” Gonzales v. State , 2 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d) (noting that prudent defense counsel—when faced with trial court error preventing him from questioning potential jurors about their attitudes toward a specific defense—would not attempt to present evidence of that defense to jury).

2008See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638-39 (Tex.1999) (per curiam); City of Waco v. Williams, 209 S.W.3d 216, 219 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).

2008See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638-39 (Tex.1999) (per curiam); City of Waco v. Williams, 209 S.W.3d 216, 219 (Tex.App.Waco 2006, pet. denied).

2008See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638-39 (Tex.1999) (per curiam); City of Waco v. Williams, 209 S.W.3d 216, 219 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).

2008See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638-39 (Tex.1999) (per curiam); City of Waco v. Williams, 209 S.W.3d 216, 219 (Tex.App.Waco 2006, pet. denied).

2020Id. 7 A quo warranto proceeding “is the proper way to challenge procedural faults such as the adequacy of a service plan, lack of notice, lack of a quorum for hearing, and ‘other deficiencies in the procedure of adopting the annexation ordinance.’” Town of Fairview v. Lawler, 252 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (quoting City of San Antonio v. Hardee, 70 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.)).

2010Thus, a quo warranto suit is the proper way to challenge procedural faults such as the adequacy of a service plan, lack of notice, lack of a quorum for hearing, and “other deficiencies in the procedure of adopting the annexation ordinance.” City of San Antonio v. Hardee, 70 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).

2016Only in this way may the claim be presented to a reviewing court in a concrete factual context.’” Luce, 469 U.S. at 43 (quoting New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 462 (1979)).

2011Only in this way may the claim be presented to a reviewing court in a concrete factual context.” Id. at 43 , 105 S.Ct. 460 (citing Portash, 440 U.S. at 462 , 99 S.Ct. 1292 (Powell, J., concurring)).

2026App. 2020) (citing Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. Crim.

2025Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. Crim.

2015The fundamental fairness requirement of the due process clause imposes upon the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all evidence that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. 9 In this 9 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , (1988) (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941)). 4 case, the Court of Appeals glossed over James’ constitutional due process arguments under Youngblood by essentially stating that Detective Bearden testified that he is an expert and that he conducted the HGN test correctly, and

2015The fundamental fairness requirement of the due process clause imposes upon the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all evidence that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. 14 In this case, the Court of Appeals glossed over Campos’ constitutional due process arguments under Youngblood by essentially stating that Detective Meza testified that he is an expert and that he conducted the HGN test correctly, and that there was no evidence introduced 14 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , (1988) (citing Lisenba v. Cali

2011Tijerina, 202 S.W.3d at 305 (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzales v. State, 2 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd) (noting that prudent defense counsel would not attempt to present evidence of a specific defense to jury if prevented from questioning jurors about that defense)).

2011Tijerina , 202 S.W.3d at 305 (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzales v. State , 2 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd) (noting that prudent defense counsel would not attempt to present evidence of a specific defense to jury if prevented from questioning jurors about that defense)).

2001Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.1989).

2000Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.1989).

2010However “[individuals have been allowed to bring private causes of action when challenging annexation of territory that (i) exceeds statutory size limitations, (ii) is within the corporate limits of another municipality, (iii) is not contiguous with current city limits, and (iv) has a boundary description that does not close.” Town of Fairview, 252 S.W.3d at 856 (citing Alexander Oil Co., 825 S.W.2d at 437 ; City of San Antonio, 70 S.W.3d at 210 ; and City of Wichita Falls v. Pearce, 33 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.)).

2009However "[i]ndividuals have been allowed to bring private causes of action when challenging annexation of territory that (i) exceeds statutory size limitations, (ii) is within the corporate limits of another municipality, (iii) is not contiguous with current city limits, and (iv) has a boundary description that does not close." Town of Fairview , 252 S.W.3d at 856 (citing Alexander Oil Co ., 825 S.W.2d at 437 ; City of San Antonio , 70 S.W.3d at 210 ; and City of Wichita Falls v. Pearce , 33 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2000, no pet.)).

2015See Raynor v. Mer- fect an animal is likely to affect humans in the same rell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371 , 1375 way and that the only reason animal studies are (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting that the only way to test done is to predict if the drug at issue will have an whether data from nonhuman studies can be extra- adverse effect on humans. polated to humans would be to conduct human ex- periments or to use epidemiological data); Elkins v. Dr. Gross reviewed a number of animal studies Richardson–Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th that had been conducted on Bendectin.

1997See Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375 (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting that the only way to test whether data from nonhuman studies can be extrapolated to humans would be to conduct human experiments or to use epidemiological data); Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that expert opinion indicating a basis of support in animal studies is admissible but is simply inadequate to permit a jury to conclude that Bendeetin more probably than not causes limb defects); Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1194 (asserting that in vivo and in vitro animal studies singly o

2015See Raynor v. Mer- fect an animal is likely to affect humans in the same rell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371 , 1375 way and that the only reason animal studies are (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting that the only way to test done is to predict if the drug at issue will have an whether data from nonhuman studies can be extra- adverse effect on humans. polated to humans would be to conduct human ex- periments or to use epidemiological data); Elkins v. Dr. Gross reviewed a number of animal studies Richardson–Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th that had been conducted on Bendectin.

1997See Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375 (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting that the only way to test whether data from nonhuman studies can be extrapolated to humans would be to conduct human experiments or to use epidemiological data); Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that expert opinion indicating a basis of support in animal studies is admissible but is simply inadequate to permit a jury to conclude that Bendeetin more probably than not causes limb defects); Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1194 (asserting that in vivo and in vitro animal studies singly o

2015Langs, 183 S.W.3d at 682 (“In this case we reiterate that the face of the trial record must clearly show a double 28 jeopardy violation before a defendant may successfully raise a ‘multiple punishment’ double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal.”) The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear, however, that “when separate theories for an offense are issued to the jury disjunctively, a double jeopardy violation is not clearly apparent on the face of the record if one of the theories charged would not constitute a double jeopardy violation and there is sufficient evidence to support

2015Langs, 183 S.W.3d at 682 (“In this case we reiterate that the face of the trial record must clearly show a double 28 jeopardy violation before a defendant may successfully raise a ‘multiple punishment’ double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal.”) The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear, however, that “when separate theories for an offense are issued to the jury disjunctively, a double jeopardy violation is not clearly apparent on the face of the record if one of the theories charged would not constitute a double jeopardy violation and there is sufficient evidence to support

2010Cf. Cavender v. State, 547 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (explaining that trial court held hearing to determine good-faith basis for prosecutor’s question): Gailey v. State, 671 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd) (explaining that trial court held hearing outside jury's presence after prosecutor asked question allegedly in bad faith).

2010Cf. Cavender v. State, 547 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) (explaining that trial court held hearing to determine good-faith basis for prosecutor's question); Gailey v. State, 671 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd) (explaining that trial court held hearing outside jury's presence after prosecutor asked question allegedly in bad faith).

2008(Dallas) Inc. v. City of Wilmer , 904 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1995); Pearce , 33 S.W.3d at 417 ; Forbes , 304 S.W.2d at 546 .

2008(Dallas) Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1995); Pearce, 33 S.W.3d at 417 ; Forbes, 304 S.W.2d at 546 .

2002See Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero, 948 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Beans v. Entex, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Huddleston v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 93 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1936, writ dism’d). 7 .

2002App. P. 43.3(b) (when reversing a trial court = s judgment, the appeals court must render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered except when the interests of justice require remand for another trial); Torrington , 46 S.W.3d at 841 (stating that cases have been remanded in the interest of justice where the reversing decisions have altered or clarified the way in which a claim should be submitted to the jury). [6] See Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero , 948 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Beans v. Entex, Inc ., 744 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. App. C Ho

2002See Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).

2002See Brown v. State , 477 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Crim.

2002See Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero, 948 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Beans v. Entex, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Huddleston v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 93 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1936, writ dism’d). 7 .

2002App. P. 43.3(b) (when reversing a trial court = s judgment, the appeals court must render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered except when the interests of justice require remand for another trial); Torrington , 46 S.W.3d at 841 (stating that cases have been remanded in the interest of justice where the reversing decisions have altered or clarified the way in which a claim should be submitted to the jury). [6] See Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero , 948 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Beans v. Entex, Inc ., 744 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. App. C Ho

2002See Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero, 948 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Beans v. Entex, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Huddleston v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 93 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1936, writ dism’d). 7 .

2002App. P. 43.3(b) (when reversing a trial court = s judgment, the appeals court must render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered except when the interests of justice require remand for another trial); Torrington , 46 S.W.3d at 841 (stating that cases have been remanded in the interest of justice where the reversing decisions have altered or clarified the way in which a claim should be submitted to the jury). [6] See Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero , 948 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Beans v. Entex, Inc ., 744 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. App. C Ho

2020Id. 7 A quo warranto proceeding “is the proper way to challenge procedural faults such as the adequacy of a service plan, lack of notice, lack of a quorum for hearing, and ‘other deficiencies in the procedure of adopting the annexation ordinance.’” Town of Fairview v. Lawler, 252 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (quoting City of San Antonio v. Hardee, 70 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.)).

2015Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin, 825 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. 1991) (holding that a quo warranto proceeding is not necessary to challenge an annexation when the “annexation is wholly void”).

2020Id. 7 A quo warranto proceeding “is the proper way to challenge procedural faults such as the adequacy of a service plan, lack of notice, lack of a quorum for hearing, and ‘other deficiencies in the procedure of adopting the annexation ordinance.’” Town of Fairview v. Lawler, 252 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (quoting City of San Antonio v. Hardee, 70 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.)).

2010However “[individuals have been allowed to bring private causes of action when challenging annexation of territory that (i) exceeds statutory size limitations, (ii) is within the corporate limits of another municipality, (iii) is not contiguous with current city limits, and (iv) has a boundary description that does not close.” Town of Fairview, 252 S.W.3d at 856 (citing Alexander Oil Co., 825 S.W.2d at 437 ; City of San Antonio, 70 S.W.3d at 210 ; and City of Wichita Falls v. Pearce, 33 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.)).