malicious prosecution claim in Arizona

2014See A.R.S. § 12- 821.01(A). ¶19 Defendants argued, and the superior court found, that the malicious prosecution claim failed as a matter of law because it did not allege that the defendants “exercised any control over the prosecution after the case was turned over to the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office.” Medrano challenges this finding on appeal. ¶20 Under Arizona law, a malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to allege and prove “(1) that there was a prosecution, (2) that it terminated in favor of plaintiff, (3) that defendants were prosecutors, (4) that they were actuated by malic

2014See A.R.S. § 12- 821.01(A). ¶19 Defendants argued, and the superior court found, that the malicious prosecution claim failed as a matter of law because it did not allege that the defendants “exercised any control over the prosecution after the case was turned over to the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office.” Medrano challenges this finding on appeal. ¶20 Under Arizona law, a malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to allege and prove “(1) that there was a prosecution, (2) that it terminated in favor of plaintiff, (3) that defendants were prosecutors, (4) that they were actuated by malic

2014Decision of the Court cannot be separated as a different proceeding for the purposes of a later malicious prosecution claim. ¶11 Establishing a cause of action for malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant “(1) instituted a civil action which was (2) motivated by malice, (3) begun [or maintained] without probable cause, (4) terminated in plaintiff’s favor and (5) damaged plaintiff.” Chalpin v. Snyder, 220 Ariz. 413 , 418–19, ¶ 20, 207 P.3d 666 , 671–72 (App. 2008) (quoting Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut.

2014Decision of the Court cannot be separated as a different proceeding for the purposes of a later malicious prosecution claim. ¶11 Establishing a cause of action for malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant “(1) instituted a civil action which was (2) motivated by malice, (3) begun [or maintained] without probable cause, (4) terminated in plaintiff’s favor and (5) damaged plaintiff.” Chalpin v. Snyder, 220 Ariz. 413 , 418–19, ¶ 20, 207 P.3d 666 , 671–72 (App. 2008) (quoting Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut.

2014If such an action is filed prior to favorable termination of the proceedings, the action is premature and subject to dismissal.” Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498, 500 , 557 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1976); accord Moran v. Klatzke, 140 Ariz. 489, 490 , 682 P.2d 1156, 1157 (App. 1984) (citing cases).

2014If such an action is filed prior to favorable termination of the proceedings, the action is premature and subject to dismissal.” Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498, 500 , 557 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1976); accord Moran v. Klatzke, 140 Ariz. 489, 490 , 682 P.2d 1156, 1157 (App. 1984) (citing cases).

2014If such an action is filed prior to favorable termination of the proceedings, the action is premature and subject to dismissal.” Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498, 500 , 557 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1976); accord Moran v. Klatzke, 140 Ariz. 489, 490 , 682 P.2d 1156, 1157 (App. 1984) (citing cases).

2014If such an action is filed prior to favorable termination of the proceedings, the action is premature and subject to dismissal.” Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498, 500 , 557 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1976); accord Moran v. Klatzke, 140 Ariz. 489, 490 , 682 P.2d 1156, 1157 (App. 1984) (citing cases).

2026Instead, “‘other corrupt means’ are acts of similar nature to extrinsic fraud and perjury, acts which would tend to vitiate a judgment on collateral attack” and that were “induced by some [act] or acts of the defendant in the malicious prosecution action.” Id.; see also Creamer v. Raffety, 145 Ariz. 34, 40 (App. 1984) (concluding that summary judgment for the defendant on a malicious prosecution claim was appropriate where the plaintiff was convicted by a court, although the conviction was later reversed, because a conviction “conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause” unless it

2026In a malicious prosecution claim, “probable cause exists only if the prosecutor actually believes that the accused was guilty of the crime.” See Bradshaw, 157 Ariz. at 417.

2026See Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 9 . 4 CHOPKO v. FIDELITY NATIONAL, et al.

2014See MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a debtor’s malicious prosecution claim in federal district court against a creditor was preempted by the bankruptcy code).

2014We will not reverse such an award absent an abuse of discretion, and “[w]e will not disturb the trial court’s discretionary award of fees if there is any reasonable basis for it.” Rudinsky v. Harris, 231 Ariz. 95, 101, ¶ 27 , 290 P.3d 1218, 1224 (App. 2012). ¶20 Austin Ranch first argues that the attorney fees award was inappropriate because a malicious prosecution claim does not arise out of contract for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

2014We will not reverse such an award absent an abuse of discretion, and “[w]e will not disturb the trial court’s discretionary award of fees if there is any reasonable basis for it.” Rudinsky v. Harris, 231 Ariz. 95, 101, ¶ 27 , 290 P.3d 1218, 1224 (App. 2012). ¶20 Austin Ranch first argues that the attorney fees award was inappropriate because a malicious prosecution claim does not arise out of contract for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

2012Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir.2003); see also Bearup v. Bearup, 122 Ariz. 509, 510 , 596 P.2d 35, 36 (App.1979) (stating that “a prosecutor or complaining witness acting without probable cause” is an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim).

2012Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir.2003); see also Bearup v. Bearup, 122 Ariz. 509, 510 , 596 P.2d 35, 36 (App.1979) (stating that “a prosecutor or complaining witness acting without probable cause” is an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim).

2012Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir.2003); see also Bearup v. Bearup, 122 Ariz. 509, 510 , 596 P.2d 35, 36 (App.1979) (stating that “a prosecutor or complaining witness acting without probable cause” is an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim).

2002In the context of malicious prosecution, probable cause is defined as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent man in believing the accused is guilty of the offense____The test generally applied is: upon the appearances presented to the defendant, would a reasonably prudent man have instituted or continued the proceeding?” McClinton v. Rice, 76 Ariz. 358, 367 , 265 P.2d 425, 431 (1953) (citations omitted). ¶ 14 Generally, the court decides as a matter of law whether the facts are sufficient to establish probable cause.

2002In the context of malicious prosecution, probable cause is defined as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent man in believing the accused is guilty of the offense____The test generally applied is: upon the appearances presented to the defendant, would a reasonably prudent man have instituted or continued the proceeding?” McClinton v. Rice, 76 Ariz. 358, 367 , 265 P.2d 425, 431 (1953) (citations omitted). ¶ 14 Generally, the court decides as a matter of law whether the facts are sufficient to establish probable cause.