malicious prosecution claim in California

2025If, however, the plaintiff’s knowledge and belief are disputed, then the jury must determine the facts before the court can decide the legal question of whether those facts constitute probable cause.” (Videotape Plus, Inc. v. Lyons (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 156, 161 ; see Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863 , 880-881 (Sheldon Appel).) To establish the malice element of a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant initiated the prior action for an improper purpose.

2024In Brennan, the Supreme Court held that, “if [an action] ends in contractual arbitration, that termination will not support a malicious prosecution action.” (Brennan, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 314 .) To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s favor [citations]; (2) was brought without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice.’ [Citations.]” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 871 .)

2025(See Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728 , 734-735, 741.) The only issue here is whether Escamilla can establish a probability that he will prevail on the malicious prosecution claim.

2022Analysis Michele’s malicious prosecution claim indisputably falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e) [anti-SLAPP statute applies to claims “aris[ing] from” “any written . . . statement . . . made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body”]; see also Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 734 [holding that a malicious prosecution claim is predicated on the filing of a prior lawsuit].) Consequently, our decision will “depend[] solely on whether [Michele] proved that her malicious prosecution claim h

2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition.

2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition.

2017The underlying action must have been: (i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice. ( Ibid. ; see Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958 , 970, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ( Zamos ); see also Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260 , 297, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 , 139 P.3d 30 ( Soukup ).) 1 The interim adverse judgment rule concerns the probable cause element of a malic

2017The underlying action must have been: (i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice. ( Ibid. ; see Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958 , 970, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ( Zamos ); see also Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260 , 297, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 , 139 P.3d 30 ( Soukup ).) 1 The interim adverse judgment rule concerns the probable cause element of a malic

2026The underlying action must have been: (i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 775 .) “A malicious prosecution claim will also lie if the defendant brought ‘an action charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable cause.’” (Id. at p. 776, fn. 1.) “In contr

2025(Id. at pp. 775-776; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 292 .) A malicious prosecution claim may lie against the attorney who prosecuted the prior action as well as the adverse party.

2025We conclude Parter Medical met its burden of showing the requisite minimal merit to proceed with its malicious prosecution action. 3.1 Probable cause The probable cause element of a malicious prosecution claim requires “ ‘the trial court to make an objective determination of the “reasonableness” of the defendant’s conduct, 12 i.e., to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to the defendant, the institution [or maintenance] of the prior action was legally tenable.’ ” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 776 .) The question is a legal one for the court to resolve to protect litigants and

2025We conclude Parter Medical met its burden of showing the requisite minimal merit to proceed with its malicious prosecution action. 3.1 Probable cause The probable cause element of a malicious prosecution claim requires “ ‘the trial court to make an objective determination of the “reasonableness” of the defendant’s conduct, 12 i.e., to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to the defendant, the institution [or maintenance] of the prior action was legally tenable.’ ” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 776 .) The question is a legal one for the court to resolve to protect litigants and

2021A “procedural [termination] as distinguished from a substantive termination’ is not favorable for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim.” (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 342 .) The termination here “leaves a residue of doubt about [appellants’] innocence or liability” and therefore “is not a favorable termination sufficient to support a cause of action for malicious prosecution.” (Sierra Club Foundation, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149 .) Accordingly, appellants failed to satisfy their second-prong burden under the anti-SLAPP statute of 8 demonstrating a probability that they would

2016(Sheldon Appel Co., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 875.) Thus, the court must determine, in light of the facts known to counsel, “whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable.” (Id. at p. 886.) “A litigant will lack probable cause for his action if he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true, or seeks recovery upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to him.” (Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 547, 568 .) “This is an objective standard, and does not take into account the subjective mental state of the defendant

2023Much like the motion for reconsideration in Merlet, there is no indication that Larsen’s hardship in opposing Sacor’s motion “approach[ed] that suffered by litigants in a will contest or a full-blown lawsuit.” (Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 63 ; cf. Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 692 [a will contest can form the basis of a malicious prosecution claim, even though it is dependent on the 9 filing of the petition to probate the will, because a will contest is a separate and distinct proceeding and “can dramatically transform the probate of a will from a routine ex parte procedure

2022Regular court business would grind to a halt while lawyers exercised their full due process rights to fight the charges.” (Ibid.) The court also noted that the denial of a request for sanctions will not always reflect the merits 6 of a malicious prosecution claim, “for the simple reason that ‘trial courts may be more reluctant to charge litigants or attorneys appearing before them with bad faith than juries to whom such persons are total strangers.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 689, fn. 12 .) Defendants argue that denying their motion, which was “supported by sub

2022Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 478, 493 .) Although malicious prosecution suits are not barred simply because they are disfavored (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 349 ), the elements of this cause of action “ ‘have historically been carefully circumscribed so that litigants with potentially valid claims will not be deterred from bringing their claims to court by the prospect of a subsequent malicious prosecution [action].’ ” ( Daniels, supra, at p. 216 , quoting Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 872 .) “ ‘To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the

2021Rather, ‘“the termination must reflect the merits of the action and the plaintiff’s innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Siebel, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 741 .) “‘If the termination does not relate to the merits—reflecting on neither innocence of nor responsibility for the alleged misconduct—the termination is not favorable in the sense it would support a subsequent action for malicious prosecution.’ [Citation.] Thus, a ‘technical or procedural [termination] as distinguished from a substantive termination’ is not favorable for purposes of a malicious p

2026The underlying action must have been: (i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 775 .) “A malicious prosecution claim will also lie if the defendant brought ‘an action charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable cause.’” (Id. at p. 776, fn. 1.) “In contr

2025A. Elements of a Malicious Prosecution Claim “ ‘ “Malicious prosecution is a disfavored action.” ’ (Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 216 (Daniels).) “ ‘ “This is due to the principles that favor open access to the courts for the redress of grievances.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “[T]he elements of the [malicious prosecution] tort have historically been carefully circumscribed so that litigants with potentially valid claims will not be deterred from bringing their claims to court by the prospect of a subsequent malicious prosecution claim.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Three elements must be pleaded and pro

2020Favorable termination To establish the first, “favorable termination” element of a malicious prosecution claim, the malicious prosecution plaintiff must show both that (1) the prior lawsuit was terminated in her favor (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 342 (Casa Herrera)), and (2) the termination “reflect[s] . . . [the plaintiff’s] innocence of the . . . wrongful conduct” “alleged” in that prior lawsuit (Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1399 (Sycamore Ridge); Lackner v. LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747, 749 (Lackner)).

2020Favorable termination To establish the first, “favorable termination” element of a malicious prosecution claim, the malicious prosecution plaintiff must show both that (1) the prior lawsuit was terminated in her favor (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 342 (Casa Herrera)), and (2) the termination “reflect[s] . . . [the plaintiff’s] innocence of the . . . wrongful conduct” “alleged” in that prior lawsuit (Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1399 (Sycamore Ridge); Lackner v. LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747, 749 (Lackner)).

2025(Id. at pp. 293-294.) Camacho did not address, resolve or attempt to define the legal distinctions of an employee’s voluntary resignation versus termination by an employer. 3.2 Malice The malice element of a malicious prosecution claim concerns “ ‘the subjective intent or purpose with which the defendant acted in initiating the prior action. [Citation.] The motive of the defendant must have been something other than that of bringing a perceived guilty person to justice or the satisfaction in a civil action of some personal or financial purpose. [Citation.] The plaintiff must plead and prove ac

2020Damages Although damages are an element of a malicious prosecution claim where, as here, the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief (Sycamore Ridge, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1411 ), “there is no requirement that, for purposes of surviving an anti-SLAPP motion, a malicious prosecution plaintiff must provide specific evidence of the extent of the damages suffered” 19 (id., at pp. 1411-1412).

2023Santa Monica, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1242 ; Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057 ), they can allege “a malicious prosecution predicate willful misconduct claim.” The FACC does not allege malicious prosecution, which requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate that the prior action (1) was initiated by or at the direction of the defendant and legally terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, (2) was brought without probable cause, and (3) was initiated with malice.” (Siebel v. Mittlesteadt (2007) 41 Cal.4th 735, 740 .)2 While cross-complainants correctly assert we may consider this possible amend

2021Rather, ‘“the termination must reflect the merits of the action and the plaintiff’s innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Siebel, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 741 .) “‘If the termination does not relate to the merits—reflecting on neither innocence of nor responsibility for the alleged misconduct—the termination is not favorable in the sense it would support a subsequent action for malicious prosecution.’ [Citation.] Thus, a ‘technical or procedural [termination] as distinguished from a substantive termination’ is not favorable for purposes of a malicious p

2022Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 478, 493 .) Although malicious prosecution suits are not barred simply because they are disfavored (Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 349 ), the elements of this cause of action “ ‘have historically been carefully circumscribed so that litigants with potentially valid claims will not be deterred from bringing their claims to court by the prospect of a subsequent malicious prosecution [action].’ ” ( Daniels, supra, at p. 216 , quoting Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 872 .) “ ‘To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the

2013Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 478 , 498–499, fn. 29.) For purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, malice "is not limited to actual hostility or ill will toward the plaintiff.

2026The underlying action must have been: (i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 775 .) “A malicious prosecution claim will also lie if the defendant brought ‘an action charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable cause.’” (Id. at p. 776, fn. 1.) “In contr

2026The underlying action must have been: (i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 775 .) “A malicious prosecution claim will also lie if the defendant brought ‘an action charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable cause.’” (Id. at p. 776, fn. 1.) “In contr

2024Appellants have not shown their causes of action have at least minimal merit A. Malicious prosecution “ ‘ “Malicious prosecution is a disfavored action. [Citations.] This is due to the principles that favor open access to the courts for the redress of grievances.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he elements of the [malicious prosecution] tort have historically been carefully circumscribed so that litigants with potentially valid claims will not be deterred from bringing their claims to court by the prospect of a subsequent malicious prosecution claim.’ [Citation.] Three elements must be pleaded and proved t

2021(Staffpro, Inc. v. Elite Show Servs., Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1403 (Staffpro).) Under this rule, it is not sufficient that some of the claims in the prior action terminated in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; rather, for a malicious prosecution claim to lie “there must first be a favorable termination of the entire action.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 686 ; Lane v. Bell (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 61, 72 (Lane).) Johnson concedes his malicious prosecution claim arose out of protected activity, but maintains he has established a probability of prevailing on his c

2025Scuderi points to his initial declaration as evidence he relied on Sullivan’s advice in bringing the 2019 contractual interference action, including Sullivan’s advice to memorialize Scuderi’s loan to Stagecrafts in a security agreement with a UCC-1 financing statement, and Sullivan’s opinion that the UCC-1 financing statement would give Scuderi priority over all other potential creditors of Stagecrafts, including Halo. “‘Good faith reliance on the advice of counsel, after truthful disclosure of all the relevant facts, is a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim.’” (Nunez v. Pennisi

2015“Good faith reliance on the advice of counsel, after truthful disclosure of all the relevant facts, is a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim.” (Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988 (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th *877 1534, 1544 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 492 ]; accord, Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 53-54 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ].) The burden of proving the advice of counsel defense is on Nunez.

2014In Siam , the court applied the reasoning of Bidna, Sheldon Appel, and Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 476, 479 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 662 ] (barring malicious prosecution actions arising out of small claims actions), and concluded malicious prosecution actions cannot be based on an unsuccessful civil harassment petition under section 527.6. ( Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1567, 1571-1574.) Siam held the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the malicious prosecution claim against him.

2014In Siam , the court applied the reasoning of Bidna, Sheldon Appel, and Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 476, 479 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 662 ] (barring malicious prosecution actions arising out of small claims actions), and concluded malicious prosecution actions cannot be based on an unsuccessful civil harassment petition under section 527.6. ( Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1567, 1571-1574.) Siam held the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the malicious prosecution claim against him.

2017(See Jay v. Mahaffey, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1539–1540 [commercial lessors’ dismissal of cross-complaint against lessee’s limited partners was favorable termination for limited partners, as there was no evidence supporting lessors’ claim that 13 dismissal was for economic reasons.]; also see Drummond v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 439 , 456–457.) The second element of a malicious prosecution claim is lack of probable cause.

2017(See Jay v. Mahaffey, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1539-1540, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 700 [commercial lessors' dismissal of cross-complaint against lessee's limited partners was favorable termination for limited partners, as there was no evidence supporting lessors' claim that dismissal was for economic reasons.]; also see Drummond v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 439 , 456-457, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 183 .) The second element of a malicious prosecution claim is lack of probable cause.

2022Termination of a claim on the basis of a discovery sanction may constitute a “ ‘favorable termination’ ” for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim if the alleged discovery violation “ ‘reflect[s] on the merits of the case and the malicious prosecution plaintiff ’s innocence of the misconduct alleged in the underlying lawsuit.’ ” (Daniels, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 217 .) “ ‘[T]he court [thus] examines the record “to see if the disposition reflects the opinion of the [trial] court [in the underlying action] or the prosecuting party that the action would not succeed.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ros

2016(Sheldon Appel Co., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 875.) Thus, the court must determine, in light of the facts known to counsel, “whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable.” (Id. at p. 886.) “A litigant will lack probable cause for his action if he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true, or seeks recovery upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to him.” (Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 547, 568 .) “This is an objective standard, and does not take into account the subjective mental state of the defendant

2022We agree. “ ‘In order for a termination of a lawsuit to be considered favorable with regard to a malicious prosecution claim, the termination must reflect on the merits of the action and the plaintiff ’s innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit.’ ” (Lee, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 719−720, quoting Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1056 .) “[I]n evaluating whether there has been a favorable termination on the merits, the court ‘ “look[s] at the judgment as a whole in the prior action . . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.Ap

2019Lee Did Not Demonstrate a Probability of Prevailing on the Merits “To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to the plaintiff; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292 .) 16 The claims against Lee terminated when Kim, on behalf of his client, voluntarily filed a second amended complaint that dropped Lee as a defendant.8 “In order for a te

2023Much like the motion for reconsideration in Merlet, there is no indication that Larsen’s hardship in opposing Sacor’s motion “approach[ed] that suffered by litigants in a will contest or a full-blown lawsuit.” (Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 63 ; cf. Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 692 [a will contest can form the basis of a malicious prosecution claim, even though it is dependent on the 9 filing of the petition to probate the will, because a will contest is a separate and distinct proceeding and “can dramatically transform the probate of a will from a routine ex parte procedure

2021(Ibid; see also Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 ; Adams, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 528 .) Like the court in Lossing, our Supreme Court has emphasized the role of an action’s independence in determining whether a malicious prosecution claim can arise.

2018It argued that "the favorable termination element of the malicious prosecution tort must be determined with respect to each 'severable' cause of action, and that Elite's second and third causes of action, which terminated in StaffPro's favor, are severable from the first." ( Id. at p. 1402, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 .) The StaffPro opinion, building on this court's earlier Dalany decision, rejected that argument because, under Crowley , "a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution must establish ' "a favorable termination of the entire [underlying] action." ' " ( Id. at p. 1406, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 .) 4 *7

2018It argued that "the favorable termination element of the malicious prosecution tort must be determined with respect to each 'severable' cause of action, and that Elite's second and third causes of action, which terminated in StaffPro's favor, are severable from the first." ( Id. at p. 1402, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 .) The StaffPro opinion, building on this court's earlier Dalany decision, rejected that argument because, under Crowley , "a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution must establish ' "a favorable termination of the entire [underlying] action." ' " ( Id. at p. 1406, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 .) 4 *7

2020Black v. Hepner (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 656, 659 , held that a small claims action could not support a malicious prosecution claim, in part because “the small claims process eliminates, or at least considerably diminishes, the extent of harm to a litigant by its malicious commencement.” Similarly, Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1573 , held that a civil harassment restraining order could not support a malicious prosecution claim in part because the harm from maliciously motivated requests for such restraining orders “should be fairly minimal.” The court noted that hearings on civi

2016(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 732, 741.) A malicious prosecution claim arising from the defendant’s report to police of suspected wrongdoing falls within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute because the communications are “designed to prompt action by law enforcement” and “preparatory to or in anticipation of commencing official proceedings.” (Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1568-1570 [malicious prosecution claim arising from defendant’s reports to a school and to police that plaintiff abused children falls within § 425.16]; Chabak v. Monroy (2007)

2021(Ibid; see also Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 ; Adams, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 528 .) Like the court in Lossing, our Supreme Court has emphasized the role of an action’s independence in determining whether a malicious prosecution claim can arise.

2021(Ibid; see also Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 ; Adams, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 528 .) Like the court in Lossing, our Supreme Court has emphasized the role of an action’s independence in determining whether a malicious prosecution claim can arise.

2014(Roberts, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 .) We conclude the denial of nonsuit does not defeat the malicious prosecution claim as a matter of law. 4.

2007The Court’s view at page 826 that the minor effect of its ruling to force a SLAPP victim to choose between filing an anti-SLAPP at the risk of jeopardizing a subsequent malicious prosecution claim or foregoing that special motion to preserve the claim, does not comport with the clear intent of (b)(3) to not penalize the SLAPP victim for filing and losing an anti-SLAPP motion. [][] This bill would correct that situation by amending (b)(3) to provide that the denial of the motion has no impact at any later stage of the case or in any subsequent action. [1] This approach avoids the problems posed

2003Rather, the plaintiff alleged only that the appeal taken by the defendant was frivolous. ( Coleman, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 793 , 226 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 718 P.2d 77 .) The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not bring a malicious prosecution claim based upon the filing of a frivolous appeal because an appeal "cannot be considered a separate action `seeking affirmative relief....'" ( Id. at p. 794, 226 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 718 P.2d 77 .) In Merlet , Division Two of the First Appellate District held that a malicious prosecution claim cannot be asserted against a party and the party's attorneys for

2003Rather, the plaintiff alleged only that the appeal taken by the defendant was frivolous. ( Coleman, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 793 , 226 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 718 P.2d 77 .) The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not bring a malicious prosecution claim based upon the filing of a frivolous appeal because an appeal "cannot be considered a separate action `seeking affirmative relief....'" ( Id. at p. 794, 226 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 718 P.2d 77 .) In Merlet , Division Two of the First Appellate District held that a malicious prosecution claim cannot be asserted against a party and the party's attorneys for

2018Although the court's malicious prosecution discussion extensively examined the "probable cause" and "malice" elements, its sole evaluation of the "favorable termination" element was its peremptory statement that "[ a ] s indicated above , that part of the judgment in the former action that determined that [Raboff] had no interest in or a right to a lien upon [Albertson's] real property is now final and constitutes a termination of that separable part of the proceeding favorable to [Albertson]." ( Albertson , supra , 46 Cal.2d at p. 382 , 295 P.2d 405 , italics added.) Thus, while Albertson inv

2018Although the court's malicious prosecution discussion extensively examined the "probable cause" and "malice" elements, its sole evaluation of the "favorable termination" element was its peremptory statement that "[ a ] s indicated above , that part of the judgment in the former action that determined that [Raboff] had no interest in or a right to a lien upon [Albertson's] real property is now final and constitutes a termination of that separable part of the proceeding favorable to [Albertson]." ( Albertson , supra , 46 Cal.2d at p. 382 , 295 P.2d 405 , italics added.) Thus, while Albertson inv

2018It argued that "the favorable termination element of the malicious prosecution tort must be determined with respect to each 'severable' cause of action, and that Elite's second and third causes of action, which terminated in StaffPro's favor, are severable from the first." ( Id. at p. 1402, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 .) The StaffPro opinion, building on this court's earlier Dalany decision, rejected that argument because, under Crowley , "a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution must establish ' "a favorable termination of the entire [underlying] action." ' " ( Id. at p. 1406, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 .) 4 *7

2018It argued that "the favorable termination element of the malicious prosecution tort must be determined with respect to each 'severable' cause of action, and that Elite's second and third causes of action, which terminated in StaffPro's favor, are severable from the first." ( Id. at p. 1402, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 .) The StaffPro opinion, building on this court's earlier Dalany decision, rejected that argument because, under Crowley , "a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution must establish ' "a favorable termination of the entire [underlying] action." ' " ( Id. at p. 1406, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 .) 4 *7