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28 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Myrick v. RESORTS INTERN. CASINO & HOTELgreen2 sentences2025Myrick v. Resorts Int'l Casino & Hotel, 319 N.J. 2018And with respect to the malicious prosecution claim, applying our decision in Myrick v. Resorts International Casino & Hotel, 319 N.J. | 2 | 3 |
LoBiondo v. Schwartzgreen2 sentences2026Malicious prosecution, on the other hand, “provides a remedy for harm caused by the institution or continuation of” criminal process “that is baseless.” LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 89 (2009). 2026Malicious prosecution, on the other hand, “provides a remedy for harm caused by the institution or continuation of” criminal process “that is baseless.” LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 89 (2009). | 2 | 2 |
Helmy v. City of Jersey Citygreen2 sentences2020To sustain such a claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) "the criminal action was instituted by the defendant A-3262-18T3 10 against the plaintiff," (2) "it was actuated by malice," (3) "there was an absence of probable cause for the proceeding," and (4) "it was terminated favorably to the plaintiff." Helmy v. City of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183, 190 (2003). 2008Ibid. | 1 | 2 |
Thompson v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2026Ibid.; see also Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44 . 2026Ibid.; see also Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44. | 1 | 1 |
Gilles v. Davisgreen1 sentence2026Super. 80, 83 (App. Div. 1991) (no favorable termination if complaint withdrawn pursuant to an agreement of compromise with accused); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2005) (entry into a court-supervised diversionary program is not a "favorable termination" under Heck for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim). | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2025A favorable termination of a malicious-prosecution claim entails "a determination that plaintiffs were innocent of the criminal behavior charged or entitled to an acquittal." Freeman v. State, 347 N.J. 2025Freeman, 347 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Klesh v. Coddingtongreen2 sentences2020"In New Jersey, there is a distinction between the elements of a malicious prosecution claim depending on whether the underlying action was criminal or civil in nature," and if it is civil, the plaintiff must show "special A-2149-18T4 22 damages." Klesh v. Coddington, 295 N.J. 2020"In New Jersey, there is a distinction between the elements of a malicious prosecution claim depending on whether the underlying action was criminal or civil in nature," and if it is civil, the plaintiff must show "special A-2149-18T4 22 damages." Klesh v. Coddington, 295 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Brien v. Lomazowgreen1 sentence2017See Brien v. Lomazow, 227 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Hearing on Immunity for Ethicsgreen2 sentences2009See In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 672 , 477 A. 2d 339 (1984). [5] On appeal, Thigpen argues that statutory claims and constitutional claims of civil rights violations are not governed by Tort Claims Act procedures, and that the present action should be treated similarly. 2009See In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 672 , 477 A. 2d 339 (1984). [5] On appeal, Thigpen argues that statutory claims and constitutional claims of civil rights violations are not governed by Tort Claims Act procedures, and that the present action should be treated similarly. | 1 | 1 |
McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc.green2 sentences2001See McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 331 N.J.Super. 303, 313 , 751 A. 2d 1066 (App.Div.2000). [4] We recognize that defendant did not assert the absolute privilege in the Law Division as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint; however, the argument has been made and briefed on appeal and, accordingly, we address it. [5] The judge apparently also rejected defendant's request for an instruction based on N.J.S.A. 59:3-2a and b, two of the discretionary immunities available to public employees under the Tort Claims Act. 2001See McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 331 N.J.Super. 303, 313 , 751 A. 2d 1066 (App.Div.2000). [4] We recognize that defendant did not assert the absolute privilege in the Law Division as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint; however, the argument has been made and briefed on appeal and, accordingly, we address it. [5] The judge apparently also rejected defendant's request for an instruction based on N.J.S.A. 59:3-2a and b, two of the discretionary immunities available to public employees under the Tort Claims Act. | 1 | 1 |
Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc.green2 sentences1998We are persuaded that the jury’s consideration of the discrimination claim in the context of this instruction had the capacity to prejudice TropWorld with regard to the malicious prosecution claim. [302 NJ.Super, at 119, 694 A.2d 1045 .] The malicious prosecution charge suffered from defects of its own. 1998There was no explanation of what constituted “lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the structure.” Thus, there was no explanation of the fact that casino management may, under certain circumstances, lawfully require a person to leave the premises though a casino is otherwise “open to members of the public.” Indeed, the entire instruction regarding the malicious prosecution claim was delivered in the abstract and failed to relate those legal principles to the evidence in the case and the factual contentions of the parties. [ 302 N.J.Super. at 119-20 , 694 A.2d 1045 .] The crit | 1 | 1 |
The Penwag Property Co., Inc. v. Landaugreen2 sentences1998See Penwag Property Co., supra, 76 N.J. at 598 , 388 A. 2d 1265 ("[c]ounsel fees and costs in defending the action maliciously brought may be an element of damage in a successful malicious prosecution"). 1998See Penwag Property Co., supra, 76 N.J. at 598 , 388 A. 2d 1265 ("[c]ounsel fees and costs in defending the action maliciously brought may be an element of damage in a successful malicious prosecution"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maiergreen1 sentence1989See State v. Maier, supra, 13 N.J. at 251 -252 The prosecution of traffic offenses is regarded as quasi-criminal even though a traffic offense is neither a crime nor a misdemeanor. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Reldangreen1 sentence1989State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 205-206 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lind v. Schmid
green
2 sentences2020Wildoner, 162 N.J. at 389 ; Lind, 67 N.J. at 262-63 . 2001Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J. 255, 262 , 337 A. 2d 365 (1975). | 4 | 1992–2020 |
Wallace v. Kato
green
2 sentences2026That is so because an arrest warrant is the institution of legal process and “[f]rom that point on, any damages recoverable must be based on a malicious prosecution claim and on the wrongful use of judicial process.” Id. at 390 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 119 at 888). 2026That is so because an arrest warrant is the institution of legal process and “[f]rom that point on, any damages recoverable must be based on a malicious prosecution claim and on the wrongful use of judicial process.” Id. at 390 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 119 at 888). | 2 | 2021–2026 |
Mondrow v. Selwyn
green
2 sentences2025In Piper, we distinguished Mondrow v. Selwyn, 172 N.J. 1996Id. at 387 , 412 A. 2d 447 . | 2 | 1996–2025 |
Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey
green
2 sentences2020Wildoner, 162 N.J. at 389 ; Lind, 67 N.J. at 262-63 . 2019Relying on Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375 (2000), defendants urged the judge to reconsider the denial of summary judgment on this count based on qualified immunity. | 2 | 2019–2020 |
Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Amer.
green
2 sentences1982However, it found this general proposition to be inapplicable to a malicious prosecution claim because "damage begins to flow from the very commencement of the tortious conduct — the making of the criminal complaint. * * * [W]rong and damage are practically contemporaneous." Id. at 579 . 1982However, it found this general proposition to be inapplicable to a malicious prosecution claim because “damage begins to flow from the very commencement of the tortious conduct—the making of the criminal complaint. * * * [W]rong and damage are practically contemporaneous.” Id. at 579 . | 2 | 1982–2002 |
Morris v. T.D. Bank
green
2 sentences2026Bank, 454 N.J. 2026In Morris, the plaintiff entered a bank to make a withdrawal. 454 N.J. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Brunson v. Affinity Federal Credit Union
green
2 sentences2026As to the plaintiff's negligence claims against the defendant and its fraud examiner, the Court rejected the creation of a "'negligence back door' that avoids the intentionally difficult requirements for a malicious prosecution claim and, thereby, renders those requirements irrelevant." Id. at 403 . 2026Here, plaintiff's claim fails because it alleges negligence "as a surrogate for a malicious prosecution claim," id. at 385 , which is not a cognizable cause of action in New Jersey. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
McDonough v. Smith
green
1 sentence2021McDonough v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2149 , 2154-57 (2019). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Davidson v. United States
green
1 sentence2009The law was passed, in 1956, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 286-87 , 113 A. 2d 671 cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887 , 76 S.Ct. 141 , 100 L.Ed. 782 (1955), holding for public policy reasons that a complainant in a legal ethics matter was immune from a malicious prosecution claim by the attorney who was the subject of the ethics charge. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Toft v. Ketchum
green
1 sentence2009The law was passed, in 1956, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 286-87 , 113 A. 2d 671 cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887 , 76 S.Ct. 141 , 100 L.Ed. 782 (1955), holding for public policy reasons that a complainant in a legal ethics matter was immune from a malicious prosecution claim by the attorney who was the subject of the ethics charge. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Goldstein v. United States
green
1 sentence2009The law was passed, in 1956, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 286-87 , 113 A. 2d 671 cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887 , 76 S.Ct. 141 , 100 L.Ed. 782 (1955), holding for public policy reasons that a complainant in a legal ethics matter was immune from a malicious prosecution claim by the attorney who was the subject of the ethics charge. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Toft v. Ketchum
green
2 sentences2009The law was passed, in 1956, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 286-87 , 113 A. 2d 671 cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887 , 76 S.Ct. 141 , 100 L.Ed. 782 (1955), holding for public policy reasons that a complainant in a legal ethics matter was immune from a malicious prosecution claim by the attorney who was the subject of the ethics charge. 2009The law was passed, in 1956, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 286-87 , 113 A. 2d 671 cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887 , 76 S.Ct. 141 , 100 L.Ed. 782 (1955), holding for public policy reasons that a complainant in a legal ethics matter was immune from a malicious prosecution claim by the attorney who was the subject of the ethics charge. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Paterson Tallow Co. v. Royal Globe Insurance Companies
green
2 sentences2002Furthermore, the Court in Paterson Tallow recognized the unique nature of a malicious prosecution claim, stating that although in general an occurrence for purposes of insurance coverage depends on when the complaining party is actually damaged, that analysis is “inapplicable to a malicious prosecution claim because ‘damage begins to flow from the very commencement of the tortious conduct — the making of the criminal complaint.’” Id. at 31 , 444 A.2d 579 (quoting Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. 2002Furthermore, the Court in Paterson Tallow recognized the unique nature of a malicious prosecution claim, stating that although in general an occurrence for purposes of insurance coverage depends on when the complaining party is actually damaged, that analysis is “inapplicable to a malicious prosecution claim because ‘damage begins to flow from the very commencement of the tortious conduct — the making of the criminal complaint.’” Id. at 31 , 444 A.2d 579 (quoting Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences1997Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 , 666 A.2d 146 (1995). 1997Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 , 666 A.2d 146 (1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Vickey v. Nessler
green
2 sentences1996Id. at 150 , 553 A. 2d 34 . 1996Id. at 150 , 553 A. 2d 34 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.