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5 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Albertson v. Raboffgreen2 sentences2025A counterclaim is compulsory “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim,” or the counterclaim is forever waived.44 A counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim when there is a “logical relationship” between them; “the claims share[] the same evidentiary basis,” such as “time, space, origin, or motivation,” “similar testimony . . . the same exhibits, and the same parties”; and “a decision on [the] 40 Freidberg v. Cox, 242 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (Cal. App. 1987) (citing Albertson v. Raboff, 295 2025A counterclaim is compulsory “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim,” or the counterclaim is forever waived.44 A counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim when there is a “logical relationship” between them; “the claims share[] the same evidentiary basis,” such as “time, space, origin, or motivation,” “similar testimony . . . the same exhibits, and the same parties”; and “a decision on [the] 40 Freidberg v. Cox, 242 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (Cal. App. 1987) (citing Albertson v. Raboff, 295 | 1 | 1 |
Freidberg v. Coxgreen1 sentence2025A counterclaim is compulsory “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim,” or the counterclaim is forever waived.44 A counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim when there is a “logical relationship” between them; “the claims share[] the same evidentiary basis,” such as “time, space, origin, or motivation,” “similar testimony . . . the same exhibits, and the same parties”; and “a decision on [the] 40 Freidberg v. Cox, 242 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (Cal. App. 1987) (citing Albertson v. Raboff, 295 | 1 | 1 |
Crowley v. Katlemangreen1 sentence2025A counterclaim is compulsory “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim,” or the counterclaim is forever waived.44 A counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim when there is a “logical relationship” between them; “the claims share[] the same evidentiary basis,” such as “time, space, origin, or motivation,” “similar testimony . . . the same exhibits, and the same parties”; and “a decision on [the] 40 Freidberg v. Cox, 242 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (Cal. App. 1987) (citing Albertson v. Raboff, 295 | 1 | 1 |
Stephens v. State, Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2015We have previously held that a malicious prosecution claim requires “(1) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) ‘malice[,]’ or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.”25 Given that Trask apparently uncovered no evidence that the 25 Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Stephens v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 746 P.2d 908, 911 (Alaska 1987)). -1 12- 1536 Borough Attorney acted wi | 1 | 1 |
Greywolf v. Carrollgreen1 sentence2015We have previously held that a malicious prosecution claim requires “(1) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) ‘malice[,]’ or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.”25 Given that Trask apparently uncovered no evidence that the 25 Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Stephens v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 746 P.2d 908, 911 (Alaska 1987)). -1 12- 1536 Borough Attorney acted wi | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Grimm & Grimm, P.C.green2 sentences1999See Chapman v. Grimm & Grimm, P.C., 638 N.E.2d 462, 466 (Ind.App.1994) (holding that motions to modify custody cannot be considered the "initiation of a proceeding” sufficient to establish a malicious prosecution claim). 9 . 1999See Chapman v. Grimm & Grimm, P.C., 638 N.E.2d 462, 466 (Ind.App.1994) (holding that motions to modify custody cannot be considered the "initiation of a proceeding” sufficient to establish a malicious prosecution claim). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
Begier v. Stromgreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal.App.4th 877 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158, 164-65 (1996) (holding that ex-husband could not sue ex-wife for malicious prosecution for allegations of child sexual molestation in the divorce dissolution because malicious prosecution causes of action cannot be based on family law matters); Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251, 257 (1993) (imposing a bright-line rule that malicious prosecution claims do not lie in family law matters); Green v. Uccelli, 207 Cal.App.3d 1112 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (1989) (holding that the proper relief for wrongful order 1999See, e.g., Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal.App.4th 877 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158, 164-65 (1996) (holding that ex-husband could not sue ex-wife for malicious prosecution for allegations of child sexual molestation in the divorce dissolution because malicious prosecution causes of action cannot be based on family law matters); Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251, 257 (1993) (imposing a bright-line rule that malicious prosecution claims do not lie in family law matters); Green v. Uccelli, 207 Cal.App.3d 1112 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (1989) (holding that the proper relief for wrongful order | 1 | 1 |
Bidna v. Rosengreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal.App.4th 877 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158, 164-65 (1996) (holding that ex-husband could not sue ex-wife for malicious prosecution for allegations of child sexual molestation in the divorce dissolution because malicious prosecution causes of action cannot be based on family law matters); Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251, 257 (1993) (imposing a bright-line rule that malicious prosecution claims do not lie in family law matters); Green v. Uccelli, 207 Cal.App.3d 1112 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (1989) (holding that the proper relief for wrongful order 1999See, e.g., Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal.App.4th 877 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158, 164-65 (1996) (holding that ex-husband could not sue ex-wife for malicious prosecution for allegations of child sexual molestation in the divorce dissolution because malicious prosecution causes of action cannot be based on family law matters); Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251, 257 (1993) (imposing a bright-line rule that malicious prosecution claims do not lie in family law matters); Green v. Uccelli, 207 Cal.App.3d 1112 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (1989) (holding that the proper relief for wrongful order | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Uccelligreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal.App.4th 877 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158, 164-65 (1996) (holding that ex-husband could not sue ex-wife for malicious prosecution for allegations of child sexual molestation in the divorce dissolution because malicious prosecution causes of action cannot be based on family law matters); Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251, 257 (1993) (imposing a bright-line rule that malicious prosecution claims do not lie in family law matters); Green v. Uccelli, 207 Cal.App.3d 1112 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (1989) (holding that the proper relief for wrongful order 1999See, e.g., Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal.App.4th 877 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158, 164-65 (1996) (holding that ex-husband could not sue ex-wife for malicious prosecution for allegations of child sexual molestation in the divorce dissolution because malicious prosecution causes of action cannot be based on family law matters); Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251, 257 (1993) (imposing a bright-line rule that malicious prosecution claims do not lie in family law matters); Green v. Uccelli, 207 Cal.App.3d 1112 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (1989) (holding that the proper relief for wrongful order | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lane v. Bellgreen1 sentence2025A counterclaim is compulsory “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim,” or the counterclaim is forever waived.44 A counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim when there is a “logical relationship” between them; “the claims share[] the same evidentiary basis,” such as “time, space, origin, or motivation,” “similar testimony . . . the same exhibits, and the same parties”; and “a decision on [the] 40 Freidberg v. Cox, 242 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (Cal. App. 1987) (citing Albertson v. Raboff, 295 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
David Griffith v. Roger Hemphill and Donald Davis
green
2 sentences2025In support of the malicious prosecution claim, Griffith alleged that “both proceedings, specific performance and breach of contract, terminated in [his] favor.” He alleged that “there was no probable cause for the proceedings as the defendants could not exercise the option contract” and that the primary purpose of the proceedings was “malice, retaliation and intentional delay, and not the enforcement of the contract.” In support of the abuse of process claim, Griffith alleged that “[t]he defendants had multiple ulterior purposes” such as “intentionally delaying the F.E.D. while looking for oth 2025In support of the malicious prosecution claim, Griffith alleged that “both proceedings, specific performance and breach of contract, terminated in [his] favor.” He alleged that “there was no probable cause for the proceedings as the defendants could not exercise the option contract” and that the primary purpose of the proceedings was “malice, retaliation and intentional delay, and not the enforcement of the contract.” In support of the abuse of process claim, Griffith alleged that “[t]he defendants had multiple ulterior purposes” such as “intentionally delaying the F.E.D. while looking for oth | 1 | 2025–2025 |
City of Nome v. Ailak
green
1 sentence1986Id. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Bollinger v. Jarrett
green
2 sentences1981Kraft v. National Surety Co., 75 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.1935); Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498 , 557 P.2d 1055 (1976); Bollinger v. Jarrett, 146 Mont. 355 , 406 P.2d 834 (1965). 1981Kraft v. National Surety Co., 75 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.1935); Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498 , 557 P.2d 1055 (1976); Bollinger v. Jarrett, 146 Mont. 355 , 406 P.2d 834 (1965). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Nataros v. Superior Court of Maricopa County
green
2 sentences1981Kraft v. National Surety Co., 75 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.1935); Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498 , 557 P.2d 1055 (1976); Bollinger v. Jarrett, 146 Mont. 355 , 406 P.2d 834 (1965). 1981Kraft v. National Surety Co., 75 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.1935); Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498 , 557 P.2d 1055 (1976); Bollinger v. Jarrett, 146 Mont. 355 , 406 P.2d 834 (1965). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Kraft v. National Surety Co.
neutral
2 sentences1981Kraft v. National Surety Co., 75 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1935); Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498 , 557 P.2d 1055 (1976); Bollinger v. Jarrett, 146 Mont. 355 , 406 P.2d 834 (1965). 1981Kraft v. National Surety Co., 75 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.1935); Nataros v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 498 , 557 P.2d 1055 (1976); Bollinger v. Jarrett, 146 Mont. 355 , 406 P.2d 834 (1965). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.