60 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Internationalgreen2 sentences2025The circuit court found that Towne’s complaint failed to adequately allege the second and third elements: the termination of proceedings in his favor and the absence of probable cause for instigating the proceedings. ¶ 28 The necessity of pleading favorable termination in a malicious prosecution claim is a “long-standing and deeply rooted principle in this court’s jurisprudence.” Cult Awareness 9 Network v. Church of Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 272 (1997). 2016Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 2014 IL App (2d) 131312 , ¶ 15 (citing Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 272 (1997)). 4 ¶ 56 In March v. Cacioppo, 37 Ill. | 6 | 6 |
Swick v. Liautaudgreen2 sentences2020See Swick, 169 Ill. 2d at 512 (finding that a plaintiff must establish all five elements in order to pursue a malicious prosecution claim). ¶ 25 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. ¶ 26 Affirmed. -6- 2019We began our analysis by setting forth the elements of a malicious-prosecution claim in Illinois: “Under Illinois law, a claim of malicious prosecution requires proof of each of the following elements: ‘(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant[s]; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.’ ” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2017 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶ 49 (quoting Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d | 5 | 14 |
Joiner v. Benton Community Bankgreen2 sentences2020Summary judgment is appropriate where the absence of one or more of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim “has been established to the point that it may fairly be said that no genuine issue of fact as to its absence exists.” Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 82 Ill. 2d 40, 45 (1980). ¶ 17 When the underlying lawsuit in a malicious prosecution claim is a civil proceeding, common law requires that the plaintiff plead and prove some special injury “ ‘beyond the anxiety, loss of time, attorney fees, and necessity for defending one’s reputation, which are an unfortunate incident of 2019Summary judgment is appropriate where the absence of one or more of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim “has been established to the point that it may fairly be said that no genuine issue of fact as to its absence exists.” Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 82 Ill. 2d 40, 45 (1980). ¶ 17 When the underlying lawsuit in a malicious prosecution claim is a civil proceeding, common law requires that the plaintiff plead and prove some special injury “ ‘beyond the -6 No. 1-17-1068 anxiety, loss of time, attorney fees, and necessity for defending one’s reputation, which are an unfor | 4 | 5 |
Rodgers v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.green2 sentences2025For the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, probable cause is defined as “a state of facts that would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or to entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person arrested committed the offense charged.” Rodgers v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 315 Ill. 2014Gauger, 2011 IL App (2d) 100316, ¶ 122 ; Rodgers v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 315 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Beaman v. Freesmeyergreen2 sentences2024See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2019 IL App (4th), 160527, ¶ 128, rev’d on other grounds, 2021 IL 125617 . 2023Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2021 IL 125617, ¶ 74 ; Beaman, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 26 ; Swick, 169 Ill. 2d at 512 . ¶ 59 Absence of Probable Cause ¶ 60 “Lack of probable cause for instituting the original proceedings is an indispensable 13 1-22-0525 element of an action for malicious prosecution.” Beaman, 2021 IL 125617, ¶ 116 . | 3 | 3 |
Lyddon v. Shawgreen2 sentences2020App. 3d 323, 325 (1980) (quoting Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. 2019App. 3d 323, 325 (1980) (quoting Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Stopka v. Lessergreen2 sentences2020Summary judgment is appropriate where the absence of one or more of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim “has been established to the point that it may fairly be said that no genuine issue of fact as to its absence exists.” Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 82 Ill. 2d 40, 45 (1980). ¶ 17 When the underlying lawsuit in a malicious prosecution claim is a civil proceeding, common law requires that the plaintiff plead and prove some special injury “ ‘beyond the anxiety, loss of time, attorney fees, and necessity for defending one’s reputation, which are an unfortunate incident of 2019Summary judgment is appropriate where the absence of one or more of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim “has been established to the point that it may fairly be said that no genuine issue of fact as to its absence exists.” Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 82 Ill. 2d 40, 45 (1980). ¶ 17 When the underlying lawsuit in a malicious prosecution claim is a civil proceeding, common law requires that the plaintiff plead and prove some special injury “ ‘beyond the -6 No. 1-17-1068 anxiety, loss of time, attorney fees, and necessity for defending one’s reputation, which are an unfor | 3 | 3 |
March v. Cacioppogreen2 sentences2016Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 2014 IL App (2d) 131312 , ¶ 15 (citing Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 272 (1997)). 4 ¶ 56 In March v. Cacioppo, 37 Ill. 2016Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 2014 IL App (2d) 131312 , ¶ 15 (citing Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 272 (1997)). 4 ¶ 56 In March v. Cacioppo, 37 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Bismarck Hotel Co. v. Sutherlandgreen2 sentences1997App. 3d at 70, quoting Bismarck Hotel Co. v. Sutherland, 175 Ill. 1996"A favorable termination for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim is one which deals with the factual issue or issues of a case.” (Emphasis added.) Bismarck Hotel II, 175 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
American Safety Casualty Insurance v. City of Waukegangreen2 sentences2020Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. City of Zion, 2014 IL App (2d) 131312 , ¶ 22 (observing that “the ‘occurrence’ triggering -6- insurance coverage of a malicious-prosecution claim may precede the accrual of the cause of action”). 3 ¶ 30 Sanders and Chicago Heights also highlight decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, such as American Safety Casualty Insurance Co. v. City of Waukegan, 678 F.3d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 2012), which ruled that exoneration was “the ‘occurrence’ ” for insurance coverage of a malicious prosecution claim. 2019Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. City of Zion, 2014 IL App (2d) 131312 , ¶ 22 (observing that “the ‘occurrence’ triggering insurance -8- coverage of a malicious-prosecution claim may precede the accrual of the cause of action”). 3 ¶ 30 Sanders and Chicago Heights also highlight decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, such as American Safety Casualty Insurance Co. v. City of Waukegan, 678 F.3d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 2012), which ruled that exoneration was “the ‘occurrence’ ” for insurance coverage of a malicious prosecution claim. | 2 | 2 |
Richey v. McBeangreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Richey v. McBean, 17 Ill. 63, 64 (1855) (recognizing that an action for malicious prosecution “must charge that the defendant was actuated by malice in setting on foot the prosecution, and that the same was done without probable cause”); see also Hurd v. Shaw, 20 Ill. 354, 355 (1858) (rejecting a malicious prosecution claim where there was no evidence that the defendant was the prosecutor of the charge against the plaintiff “or that he originated the indictment”). ¶ 36 This court first addressed whether a defendant who did not directly initiate the criminal proceedings against the p 2019See, e.g., Richey v. McBean, 17 Ill. 63, 64 (1855) (recognizing that an action for malicious prosecution “must charge that the defendant was actuated by malice in setting on foot the prosecution, and that the same was done without probable cause”); see also Hurd v. Shaw, 20 Ill. 354, 355 (1858) (rejecting a malicious prosecution claim where there was no evidence that the defendant was the prosecutor of the charge against the plaintiff “or that he originated the indictment”). ¶ 36 This court first addressed whether a defendant who did not directly initiate the criminal proceedings against the p | 2 | 2 |
Hurd v. Shawgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Richey v. McBean, 17 Ill. 63, 64 (1855) (recognizing that an action for malicious prosecution “must charge that the defendant was actuated by malice in setting on foot the prosecution, and that the same was done without probable cause”); see also Hurd v. Shaw, 20 Ill. 354, 355 (1858) (rejecting a malicious prosecution claim where there was no evidence that the defendant was the prosecutor of the charge against the plaintiff “or that he originated the indictment”). ¶ 36 This court first addressed whether a defendant who did not directly initiate the criminal proceedings against the p 2019See, e.g., Richey v. McBean, 17 Ill. 63, 64 (1855) (recognizing that an action for malicious prosecution “must charge that the defendant was actuated by malice in setting on foot the prosecution, and that the same was done without probable cause”); see also Hurd v. Shaw, 20 Ill. 354, 355 (1858) (rejecting a malicious prosecution claim where there was no evidence that the defendant was the prosecutor of the charge against the plaintiff “or that he originated the indictment”). ¶ 36 This court first addressed whether a defendant who did not directly initiate the criminal proceedings against the p | 2 | 2 |
Gilbert v. Emmonsgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Richey v. McBean, 17 Ill. 63, 64 (1855) (recognizing that an action for malicious prosecution “must charge that the defendant was actuated by malice in setting on foot the prosecution, and that the same was done without probable cause”); see also Hurd v. Shaw, 20 Ill. 354, 355 (1858) (rejecting a malicious prosecution claim where there was no evidence that the defendant was the prosecutor of the charge against the plaintiff “or that he originated the indictment”). ¶ 36 This court first addressed whether a defendant who did not directly initiate the criminal proceedings against the p 2019See, e.g., Richey v. McBean, 17 Ill. 63, 64 (1855) (recognizing that an action for malicious prosecution “must charge that the defendant was actuated by malice in setting on foot the prosecution, and that the same was done without probable cause”); see also Hurd v. Shaw, 20 Ill. 354, 355 (1858) (rejecting a malicious prosecution claim where there was no evidence that the defendant was the prosecutor of the charge against the plaintiff “or that he originated the indictment”). ¶ 36 This court first addressed whether a defendant who did not directly initiate the criminal proceedings against the p | 2 | 2 |
Ritchey v. Maksingreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly granted Michael's motion for summary judgment on the tortious interference claim. ¶ 79 Malicious Prosecution ¶ 80 For the malicious prosecution claim, plaintiffs needed to show "(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff." Ritchey v. Maksin, 71 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1978). 2015Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly granted Michael’s motion for summary judgment on the tortious interference claim. ¶ 79 Malicious Prosecution ¶ 80 For the malicious prosecution claim, plaintiffs needed to show “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” Ritchey v. Maksin, 71 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Rosenberggreen2 sentences2014In Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 63 (2001), our supreme court upheld the constitutionality of this statutory provision, noting that there had been a crisis in the area of medical malpractice and the legislature passed certain provisions "as a disincentive for filing frivolous suits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The General Assembly intended the provision to increase the availability of filing a malicious prosecution claim for medical professionals as a means of punishing and discouraging the filing of unfounded medical malpractice cases. 2014In Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 63 (2001), our supreme court upheld the constitutionality of this statutory provision, noting that there had been a crisis in the area of medical malpractice and the legislature passed certain provisions “as a disincentive for filing frivolous suits.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The General Assembly intended the provision to increase the availability of filing a malicious prosecution claim for medical professionals as a means of punishing and discouraging the filing of unfounded medical malpractice cases. | 2 | 2 |
| First Trust Co. of Montana v. McKennagreen | 2 | 2 |
| William C. Ramsey and Johnny Ray King, Cross-Appellees v. James T. Leath, Dan Chandler and George Daly, Cross-Appellantsgreen | 2 | 2 |
Beaman v. Freesmeyergreen2 sentences2025“The absence of any of these elements bars a plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 26 . 2025See, e.g., Beaman, 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 26 (“The - 15 - absence of any [one] element[ ] bars a plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.”); National Tractor Parts Inc., 2020 IL App (2d) 181056 , ¶ 38 (“If a plaintiff fails to establish one element of the cause of action, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.”). ¶ 28 2. | 1 | 9 |
Beaman v. Freesmeyergreen2 sentences2019The court found that defendants “did not exert any unusual influence on the prosecutors which caused a malicious prosecution to take place against [Beaman].” The circuit court dismissed the remaining claims as dependent on the malicious prosecution claim. ¶ 20 The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the “commencement or continuance” element of malicious prosecution and did not address the circuit court’s other grounds for dismissing that claim. 2017 IL App (4th) 160527 . 2019We began our analysis by setting forth the elements of a malicious-prosecution claim in Illinois: “Under Illinois law, a claim of malicious prosecution requires proof of each of the following elements: ‘(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant[s]; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.’ ” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2017 IL App (4th) 160527, ¶ 49 (quoting Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d | 1 | 4 |
| Johnson v. Target Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Adames v. Sheahangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Town of Newfane v. General Star National Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bank of Lyons v. Schultzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Amer.
green
2 sentences2016The New Jersey court - 23 - 1-16-0552 “reasoned that four of the five elements of the tort of malicious prosecution occur when a prosecution is initiated. [Citation.] The court held that the ‘essence’ of the tort of malicious prosecution is the wrongful conduct in making the criminal charge. [Citation.] The court stated that ‘[i]t would be unreasonable to hold’ that the parties intended the policy to provide coverage for a malicious-prosecution claim when ‘four of the five essential ingredients’ of the claim preceded the effective date of the policy.” Id. ¶ 23 (citing Muller Fuel Oil Co., 95 N 2016The New Jersey court - 23 - 1-16-0552 “reasoned that four of the five elements of the tort of malicious prosecution occur when a prosecution is initiated. [Citation.] The court held that the ‘essence’ of the tort of malicious prosecution is the wrongful conduct in making the criminal charge. [Citation.] The court stated that ‘[i]t would be unreasonable to hold’ that the parties intended the policy to provide coverage for a malicious-prosecution claim when ‘four of the five essential ingredients’ of the claim preceded the effective date of the policy.” Id. ¶ 23 (citing Muller Fuel Oil Co., 95 N | 7 | 2014–2016 |
Indian Harbor Insurance Company v. The City of Waukegan
green
2 sentences2017Judge Alonso stated, “It is at best uncertain whether the Illinois Supreme Court would conclude that a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim should be treated like a malicious prosecution claim, in the sense that it should trigger coverage only in the early stages of a criminal case.” Westport II, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 777 . -8- 2017 IL App (2d) 160381 ¶ 22 The insurers argue that the trial court properly followed this court’s opinion in Indian Harbor, which held that Rivera’s lawsuit “presented a single cause and therefore a single occurrence.” Indian Harbor, 2015 IL App (2d) 140293, ¶ 44 . 2017Instead of following our holding that Rivera’s complaint “presented a single cause and therefore a single occurrence” (Indian Harbor, 2015 IL App (2d) 140293, ¶ 44 ), the court denied the motion to reconsider, stating that “[i]t is at best uncertain whether the Illinois Supreme Court would conclude that a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim should be treated like a malicious prosecution claim, in the sense that it should trigger coverage only in the early stages of a criminal case” (Westport II, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 777 ). | 5 | 2015–2017 |
Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harbor Insurance
green
2 sentences2014App. 3d 679, 682 (1983). ¶ 16 The only Illinois case to address the issue of which occurrence triggers insurance coverage of a malicious-prosecution claim is Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 65 Ill. 2014App. 3d 679, 682 (1983). ¶ 16 The only Illinois case to address the issue of which occurrence triggers insurance coverage of a malicious-prosecution claim is Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 65 Ill. | 4 | 2014–2020 |
Szczesniak v. CJC Auto Parts, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021As we held in Szczesniak— a similar bad-check-turned-malicious-prosecution case—not only was Lynn’s statement about Cui’s failure to make payments abundantly true, her statement was also “superseded and rendered immaterial” by the subsequent police investigation ( 2014 IL App (2d) 130636, ¶ 13 ), which adduced sufficient evidence warranting Cui’s arrest and prosecution. 2014The failure to establish any one of the five elements will cause the malicious-prosecution claim -4- 2014 IL App (2d) 130636 to fail. | 3 | 2014–2021 |
Ely v. National Super Markets, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Id. 2019Id. | 3 | 2018–2020 |
Westport Insurance v. City of Waukegan
neutral
2 sentences2017Judge Alonso stated, “It is at best uncertain whether the Illinois Supreme Court would conclude that a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim should be treated like a malicious prosecution claim, in the sense that it should trigger coverage only in the early stages of a criminal case.” Westport II, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 777 . -8- 2017 IL App (2d) 160381 ¶ 22 The insurers argue that the trial court properly followed this court’s opinion in Indian Harbor, which held that Rivera’s lawsuit “presented a single cause and therefore a single occurrence.” Indian Harbor, 2015 IL App (2d) 140293, ¶ 44 . 2017Instead of following our holding that Rivera’s complaint “presented a single cause and therefore a single occurrence” (Indian Harbor, 2015 IL App (2d) 140293, ¶ 44 ), the court denied the motion to reconsider, stating that “[i]t is at best uncertain whether the Illinois Supreme Court would conclude that a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim should be treated like a malicious prosecution claim, in the sense that it should trigger coverage only in the early stages of a criminal case” (Westport II, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 777 ). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Frye v. O'NEILL
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 967 , 520 N.E.2d at 1235 . 2017Id. at 967 , 520 N.E.2d at 1235 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harbor Insurance
green
2 sentences2014App. 3d 198 (1978), rev’d, 77 Ill. 2d 446 (1979). 2014App. 3d 198 (1978), rev’d, 77 Ill. 2d 446 (1979). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Gauger v. Hendle
green
2 sentences2014Gauger, 2011 IL App (2d) 100316, ¶ 122 ; Rodgers v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 315 Ill. 2014Id. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Kies v. City of Aurora
green
2 sentences2011Kies, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 982 . 2011Kies, 156 F.Supp.2d at 982 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche
green
2 sentences2010Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at 742-44 , 74 P.3d at 746-47 , 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 646-48 . 2010Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at 742-44 , 74 P.3d at 746-47 , 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 646-48 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Stanger v. Felix
green
2 sentences2003Stanger v. Felix, 97 Ill. 2003Stanger, 97 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Velez v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Velez , 308 Ill. 2003Velez, 308 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| William J. Templeman Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| Spiegel v. Zurich Insurance green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| Grundhoffer v. Sorin green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Razor Capital v. Antaal green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. City of Waukegan green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Bianchi v. McQueen green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Hurlbert v. Charles green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Porter v. City of Chicago green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology International neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Siegel v. City of Chicago green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Shedd v. Patterson green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Levin v. King green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Ghosh v. Roy green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.