malicious prosecution claim in Indiana

2018The elements required to be *8 shown to obtain a judgment of fraudulent transfer under Ind. Code § 32-18-2-14 or of liability under the de facto merger doctrine are not identical to the elements to be shown to prove a malicious prosecution claim. [14] To the extent that Ingram and Ben's Quarry argue that Diamond had no probable cause to institute an action against them, we note that probable cause exists "when a reasonably intelligent and prudent person would be induced to act as did the person who is charged with the burden of having probable cause." City of New Haven , 748 N.E.2d 374 at 379

2015Section 2.2—Appellees are entitled to summary judgment on Bah’s malicious prosecution claim. [26] In a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must establish that “(1) the defendant ... instituted or caused to be instituted an action against the plaintiff ...; (2) the defendant acted with malice in doing so; (8) the defendant had no probable cause to institute the action; and (4) the original action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 748 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind.2001).

2018Id. (citing Trotter v. Ind. Waste Sys. , 632 N.E.2d 1159 , 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). [13] We note initially that collateral estoppel is applicable "when a particular issue is adjudicated and then is put into issue in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action between the same parties or those in privity with them." Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Ind. Util.

2013Also, in Trotter v. Indiana Waste Systems, Inc., 632 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), this court held that absolute privilege barred a plaintiffs action for slander of title but then went on to separately address whether there was a genuine issue of fact on the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim without giving any indication that that claim was barred by the absolute privilege.

2025Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ind. 2008) (quotations omitted), reh’g denied). 11 The elements of a malicious prosecution claim include: (1) the defendant instituted or caused to be instituted an action against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant acted with malice in doing so; (3) the defendant had no probable cause to institute the action; and (4) the original action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.

2025A malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to prove four elements: “(1) the defendant instituted or caused to be instituted an action against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant acted maliciously in so doing; (3) the defendant had no probable cause to institute the action; and (4) the original action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Estate of Mayer v. Lax, Inc., 998 N.E.2d 238, 249-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

2020See also Conwell v. Beatty, 667 N.E.2d 768, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“First, none of the Big R defendants instituted or caused Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2533 | May 21, 2020 Page 11 of 25 to be instituted a prosecution against Conwell.

2013Lax and Lasco contend that they may proceed on their malicious prosecution claim against Spangler Jennings under either a respondeat superi- or or direct liability theory. 6 We first note that our supreme court has stated, "The inconvenience and hardship of the common-law rule relating to remedies on the death of a party has resulted quite generally ... in the adoption of liberal statutes in regard to the survival and revival of actions." Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 267 , 98 N.E. 177, 180-81 (1912).

2013Lax and Lasco contend that they may proceed on their malicious prosecution claim against Spangler Jennings under either a respondeat superi- or or direct liability theory. 6 We first note that our supreme court has stated, "The inconvenience and hardship of the common-law rule relating to remedies on the death of a party has resulted quite generally ... in the adoption of liberal statutes in regard to the survival and revival of actions." Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 267 , 98 N.E. 177, 180-81 (1912).

2012Generally, a plaintiff must move prove the following four elements of a malicious prosecution claim: “(1) the defendant instituted or caused to be instituted a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) *117 the defendant acted with malice in doing so; (3) the prosecution was instituted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution terminated in the plaintiffs favor.” Butt v. McEvoy, 669 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).

2001City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 729 N.E.2d 600, 606-07 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (Reichhart II).

2001Applying the same principle, the court held that: "where, as here, a qualified petitioner brings a legitimate claim against a governmental entity in the manner prescribed by law, that entity is prohibited from pursuing a malicious prosecution claim against the petitioner regardless of her motivation in bringing the petition." Id.

2000That doctrine requires a trial court to “'apply the law as laid down by the appellate court.’ ” Riggs v. Burell, 619 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind.1993) (quoting Dodge v. Gaylord, 53 Ind. 365, 369 (1876)).

2000That doctrine requires a trial court to “'apply the law as laid down by the appellate court.’ ” Riggs v. Burell, 619 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind.1993) (quoting Dodge v. Gaylord, 53 Ind. 365, 369 (1876)).

1996Malicious Prosecution A plaintiff establishes a malicious prosecution claim by proving that the defendants “instituted or caused to be instituted a prosecution against the plaintiff, that the defendants] acted maliciously in doing so, that the prosecution was instituted without probable cause, and that the prosecution terminal ed in the plaintiffs favor.” Lazarus Dep’t Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), trans. denied (1990).

1991See State Security Insurance Co. v. Globe Auto Recycling Corp. (1986) 141 Ill.App.3d 133 , 95 IIl.Dec. 539, 490 N.E.2d 12 ; 15 Ind.L.Rev. 247 at 250.

1991See State Security Insurance Co. v. Globe Auto Recycling Corp. (1986) 141 Ill.App.3d 133 , 95 IIl.Dec. 539, 490 N.E.2d 12 ; 15 Ind.L.Rev. 247 at 250.

1991Although Indiana courts have never had occasion to consider the applicability of this section to false *1348 arrest actions, see, e.g., Drake v. Lawrence (1988), Ind.App., 524 N.E.2d 337, 340, n. 3 , trans. denied; Livingston v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis (1979), Ind.App., 398 N.E.2d 1302 , the language "initiation of a judicial proceeding" has been interpreted in the context of a malicious prosecution claim to include the bringing of charges before a public official when to do so requires a determination of whether process should or should not be issued.